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This thesis is a collection of four separate papers with a core theme: commodity futures 
manipulation. It aims to answer three important questions. How vulnerable are futures 
markets to manipulation? What are the effects of manipulation? How should futures 
markets be regulated? 
We first set up a one-shot game-theoretical model (Chapter 2) with certain classes of 
heterogeneously informed traders to consider how vulnerable a futures market to manipu-
lation is, what influences this vulnerability and how manipulation affects the functioning 
of the market. This model predicts that futures manipulation may occur in equilibrium 
with a positive possibility if the deliverable supply is less than perfectly elastic, and 
the large trader possesses a certain amount of private information (here relating to his 
"type"), and more important, the functioning of futures markets is adversely affected by 
manipulation. 
In Chapter 3, we attempt to extend the above analysis into a dynamic context with 
a slightly modified market structure with the purpose to show how a large trader can 
manipulate a market through dynamically strategic trading when the hedger trades ratio-
nally, observes contract delivery process and may opt out of futures trading. This model 
also predicts a positive probability of manipulation in equilibrium. One interesting result 
from this model is that the adverse effects of manipulation may be lessened due to the 
introduction of exogenous uncertainty in a futures market. This may justify certain types 
of regulation against manipulation initiated by exchanges or regulators, such as trading 
for liquidation only, emergency price or position limits, etc. 
Chapter 4 moves to investigate empirically the economic effects of the alleged Sum-
itomo manipulation on the London Metal Exchange (LME). The results support our 
theoretical analysis. We find the evidence that the manipulation not only reduced the 
accuracy of "price discovery", but also influenced the basis and basis risk in the futures 
market. Thus the functioning of the LME was undermined. Furthermore, by comparing 
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the actual LME cash price with a VAR forecast, we find that the LME cash prices were 
generally above the forecast prices during the period of alleged manipulation, but not 
significantly. Finally, we discuss the regulatory implications of futures manipulation in 
Chapter 5, and argue that manipulation should be one of the major concerns for futures 
regulation. We also undertake a comparative study of futures regulation in the US and 
the UK, and propose specifically how cost-effective futures (derivatives) regulation may 
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Commodity futures markets have been beset by manipulation since the inception of fu-
tures trading over one hundred years ago. The earliest recorded futures manipulation in 
the US dated back to the mid-nineteenth century. It has been claimed that there was 
a corner a month in 1868 in Chicago grain markets (Taylor 1917, p.370). Some famous 
corners became legends in the late nineteenth century, such as the cornering of wheat 
contract of the CBOT by B.P. Hutchinson in 1888, the attempted manipulation of the 
CBOT wheat contract by Joe Leister in 1898, and the cornering of the gold market by 
Fisk and Gould (Kendall 1956 and Taylor 1917, pp.945-69), etc. These manipulative 
activities continued into the twentieth century. Partly because of widespread manipula-
tion, futures trading was often condemned as legalised gambling. Futures manipulation 
clearly motivated US congressional concern over futures trading and resulted in the in-
tervention of the federal government in 1921 with the first federal prohibition against 
manipulations. Since then, the US government has made many efforts to draft and en-
act legislation against manipulation, almost all of which explicitly make manipulation 
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a felony and are focused on prevention and punishment of manipulation. l This legisla-
tion led to the creation of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) in 19:---:1, 
which is a specialised federal organisation to regulate futures markets. But concerns with 
manipulation and trading abuses did not lessen as a result of the creation of the CFTC. 
Manipulative events have remained in futures markets since then, examples being the 
manipulative attempt on December 1977 coffee futures contract on the New York Coffee 
and Sugar Exchange by Salvadorena, the Hunts silver manipulation around 1980 on the 
Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) and the Commodity Exchange at New York (Comex), 
and the manipulative attempt on the July CBOT soybean futures in 1989 by Ferruzzi, 
etc. 
The recent Sumitomo copper manipulation, which involved complex dynamic ma-
nipulative strategies over many years, and global trading co-ordination across different 
markets (worldwide cash copper markets, the LME and Comex futures markets, and pos-
sibly options and OTC markets), prompts even more serious issues. This manipulation 
clearly suggests that manipulation is not necessarily an 'end of month' effect as claimed 
by Edwards and Edwards (1984, p.343), and it may survive for a much longer period of 
time. The implications of the Sumitomo copper manipulation on futures (derivatives) 
regulation are far-reaching, especially on the UK futures (derivatives) regulation in which 
manipulation has not been a major legislative and regulatory concern. 
The extensive futures regulation in the US is predicated mainly on the following 
views. 2 Firstly, futures markets are inherently vulnerable to manipulation. Secondly, 
1 Main US statuary laws regarding manipulation include the Futures Trading Act of 1921 (FTA), 
the Grain Futures Act of 1922 (GFA), the Commodity Exchange Act of 1936 (CEA) which was the 
amendment of the GFA, and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act (CFTCAct) which was 
the amendment of the CEA in 1974. 
2These can be seen from Section 3 of the CEA which states: "Transactions in commodity involving 
the sale thereof for future delivery as commonly conducted on boards of trade and known as " futures" 
arc affected with a national public interest; ... such transactions are utilized by shippers, dealers, millers, 
and others engaged in handling commodity and the products and by products thereof ... as a means 
of hedging themselves against possible loss through fluctuations in price; the transactions and prices 
of commodity on such boards of trade are susceptible to speculation, manipulation, and control, and 
sudden or unreasonable fluctuations in the prices thereof frequently occur as a result of such speculation, 
manipulation, or control, which are detrimental to the producer or the consumer and the persons handling 
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futures manipulation has adverse effects on the functioning of futures markets. the sta-
bilisation of normal economic activities, and may impose appreciable costs on most of 
market users without providing a benefit in return. One might reasonably expect that 
because of the perceived importance of the subject and the vintage of the federal at-
tempts at regulation, questions on manipulation would have been resolved~ the effects of 
manipulation would be well-understood and effective means for manipulation prevention 
would have been achieved. However, the reality is to the contrary. These issues have 
not been adequately addressed theoretically, and empirical studies of the effects of ma-
nipulation are few. It is therefore not surprising that the rationale for futures regulation 
has not been well-understood. These questions motivate this research. This research 
has three purposes. The first is to investigate the vulnerability of a futures market to 
manipulation and to determine the factors influencing this vulnerability. The second is 
to identify and attempt to measure the effects of futures manipulation. The third is to 
explore the implications of futures market manipulation on futures regulation. It is our 
hope that this research may go some way towards filling to literature gap in this field, 
and provide a basis for understanding futures manipulation and addressing public policy 
for futures trading, and in particular, regulation of futures (derivatives) markets. 
1.2 Literature Review 
This section provides a brief analysis of work conducted on the issue of commodity futures 
manipulation. Commodity futures manipulation has been one of the most concern since 
the beginning of futures trading, but it has not been formally addressed by using standard 
economic theory until early 1980s. The relevant theoretical literature on this issue is 
therefore sparse, and this field is still not well-developed. However, from the beginning 
commodity and products and by products thereof ... and such fluctuations in prices are an obstruction 
to and a burden upon interstate commerce in commodity and the products and by-products thereof 
and render regulation imperative for the protection of such commerce and the national public interest 
thereiu. 
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there has been little disagreement that it is necessary for a manipulation to occur that 
there be a large or a group of large traders with market power in the market. 1Iarket 
power and monopoly in futures markets were modeled by Newbery (1984) and Anderson 
and Sundaresan (1984). 
Newbery (1984) investigated futures manipulation by a dominant producer or spec-
ulator under symmetric information and rational expectations framework. He assumes 
that the dominant producer or speculator is less risk averse than the fringe competitors. 
His formal model concerns with one large risk neutral speculator initially and then pro-
ducer, and a fringe of risk averse competitive producers. He demonstrates that when all 
agents have access to the same information sets and can predict the production or trading 
strategy of the large trader, the large trader has incentives to manipulate the market. But 
surprisingly, his result is that if the dominant trader exercises market power, the society 
is generally better off with its presence than with its absence. Anderson and Sundaresan 
(1984) examined the monopolistic behavior of a large producer when there is a futures 
market. Under rational expectations and with a risk averse large agent, they find the na-
ture of equilibrium depends on the expectations and preferences of the large trader, and 
on the expectations, preferences, and cash market positions of the competitive traders. 
Specifically, they argue that only if the monopolist's costs and demand are highly posi-
tively correlated would his hedging induce him to corner a market in equilibrium. Both 
these models assume that there is perfect information in the market, and investigate 
how the large trader's behaviour diverges from competitive behaviour. The large agent 
can manipulate the futures market simply because of his dominance. Actually, the large 
trader's behaviour in these two models is not strictly what futures manipulation usually 
refers (we will discuss the mechanics of futures manipulation in Section 1.5). Given that 
futures manipulation has been one of the most public and congressional concern on fu-
tures trading in the US, an appropriate theory of futures manipulation should address 
the following questions: 
• How can a large trader acquire market power in general in futures markets? 
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• How does he exercise market power given other traders are trading rationally and 
strategically? 
• How does futures manipulation differ from manipulation in the other markets? 
• What determines the vulnerability of a futures market to manipulation? 
• What are the costs of manipulation? and how can manipulation be deterred? 
From the long history of futures manipulation, two key elements appear to have 
contributed to the success of a manipulation: the futures delivery mechanism, and asym-
metric information in futures trading. Kyle (1984) presented the first formal model 
of commodity futures manipulation (a squeeze) which incorporates these elements. He 
derives the sufficient conditions for a manipulation to occur in equilibrium. In Kyle's 
model, the information is asymmetric since the manipulator is assumed to be capable of 
observing hedgers' order flows, and he exploits this advantage by amassing a large long 
position when hedgers are trading actively, or by obtaining short positions when hedgers 
are trading inactively. Other traders (here speculators) who can observe the combined 
order flows, are unable to detect the manipulator's presence in the market. They there-
fore sell at a price that on average is below the cash price prevailing at expiration when 
there is a squeeze. Thus the informed trader earns a profit, and a squeeze occurs in 
equilibrium. Since the hedgers are treated to be exogenous in his model and are the 
least informed, Kyle concludes that the hedgers lose money consistently, and therefore 
squeezes discourage hedging. But the assumptions that there exists two delivery grades 
of a commodity in the market and a trader must have inside information about hedgers' 
order flows in the model are so restrictive that it is almost not applicable in practice, and 
therefore, it fails to explain how manipulation occurred in any actual market. Following 
a slightly modified model structure of Kyle (1985), Kumar and Seppi (1992) investigated 
the susceptibility of futures markets to price manipulation, and demonstrated that ma-
nipulation can even OCCllr in equilibrium in a cash settlement market. But the mechanism 
14 
involved there is different from that of a "corner" or "squeeze" in deliyery-settled futures 
markets which is the focus of our attention in this research. 
Jarrow (1992) investigated market manipulation trading strategies by large traders in 
a securities market more generally. He argues that whether large traders can manipulate 
prices to their advantages and generates profits at no risk depends on the properties 
of the price process as a function of the speculator's trade, and the existence of market 
manipulation strategies is related to the dependence of price process on the past sequence 
of the large trader's holdings. J arrow derives the sufficient conditions of the existence as 
well as nonexistence of equilibrium manipulation strategies. Specifically, under certain 
conditions, a large trader can profitably squeeze shorts by forcing them to liquidate their 
positions at an arbitrarily high price if he acquires a long position in a derivative security 
and the security deliverable against the derivatives which is larger than the aggregate 
supply. But Jarrow's focus is manipulation in a securities market, and he is not aware 
of the importance of the underlying delivery market conditions on futures manipulation 
strategies. His theory is therefore unable to explain why futures manipulation does not 
occur more often in any actual markets. 
Recognisng the importance of the delivery process on futures manipulation and ex-
tending the Kyle's two grades of a commodity to a more general situation where the 
supply of deliverable stocks on a futures contract is imperfectly elastic, Pirrong (1995b) 
presented a model to explain how manipulation occurs in equilibrium and what deter-
mines the severity and frequency of manipulation. In his model, there are three types of 
traders in the market: a large trader, market makers and noise traders. Pirrong shows 
manipulation may occur with a positive probability in a market provided that: (i) noise 
traders cause unpredictable variations in order flow; and (ii) the supply curve in the 
delivery market is less than perfectly elastic. Pirrong's theorem provides a helpful ex-
planation why corners sometimes occur in futures markets, and identifies factors that 
affect the susceptibility of a futures market to manipulation, but it is insufficient to show 
why some markets with sufficiently high level of noise trading and imperfect elasticity of 
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supply in the delivery markets, are not cornered all the time. 
More recently, Chatterjea and Jarrow (1998) modeled the US Treasury securities 
auction market and demonstrated that market manipulation can occur in a rational 
equilibrium. The mechanics of manipulation in the US Treasury securities market are 
similar with those of corners or squeezes in commodity futures markets. In the when-
issued-market traders are allowed to sell short, but they must cover their short positions 
by buying back the auctioned securities (substitutes are not acceptable). A Government 
bond dealer (or a group of dealers) can partially observe the order flow in the when-
issued-market. When he observes large short-selling, he may bid aggressively during the 
auction and control majority of the securities, and consequently, some shorts are unable 
to cover their positions with the auctioned securities and have to purchase the on-the-
run Treasury in the secondary market. The shorts therefore get squeezed. In order for 
a 'squeeze' to occur, the dealer must be able to observe the order flow, and this type 
of manipulation, with the similar informational assumption as Kyle's, is therefore only 
applicable to some specific auction mechanisms. Chatterjea and J arrow therefore suggest 
that the dealer's ability to corner or squeeze the market differs across auction types, and 
argue that the UPA (unit price auction) is revenue superior to the DA (discriminatory 
auction). 
Since part of our motivation of this research is to address futures regulation, thus 
major existing literature on futures regulation is also briefly discussed here. Our general 
perception is that, futures (derivatives) regulation has not been well explored compared 
with regulation of other financial sectors. Stone (1981) analysed the principles of futures 
regulation. Although brief, his "tripod" theory that generalises rationale for regulating 
futures markets may be still valid today. The "tripod" theory proposes that reasons of 
futures regulation lie in: (i) protecting customers; (ii) regulating against the potential 
of abuses of concentration by large position holders; and (iii) regulating against natural 
nlonopoly in futures exchanges or clearing houses. Edwards (1981) gave the first com-
prehensive analysis of the rationale for futures regulation, which provides justifications of 
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government regulation over futures markets in the United States. Edwards and Edwards 
(1984) and Easterbrook (1986) investigated specifically the regulation of futures mar-
kets against manipulation. However, their conclusions differ on whether self-regulation 
is sufficient to prevent manipulation. Edwards and Edwards (1986) were inconclusiye 
on this issue, but Easterbrook (1986) concluded that exchanges can offer satisfactory 
precautions against manipulation. Fischel and Ross argued that, since manipulation in 
financial markets (including futures manipulation) is likely to be self-deterring and en-
forcement of prohibitions is likely to be costly, and therefore, "actual trades should not be 
prohibited as manipulative regardless of the trader's intent" (Fischel and Ross 1992, p. 
553). Pirrong (1995a), however, argued that self-regulation is not sufficient in regulating 
futures markets. Anderson (1986) surveyed futures regulation as practised in the US and 
the UK, but he did not explore the rationale for futures regulation, and therefore, he was 
unable to explain why there exist differences in these two futures regulatory systems. 
It is not surprising that, views on how to regulate against futures manipulation may 
differ since it seems that there has not been a comprehensive framework to analyse the 
mechanism and the effects of futures manipulation. 
Given this background of research on this issue, let's briefly mention the contribu-
tions of this thesis. We basically focus on the reformulated Millsian critique by Anderson 
(1992, pp.961-962) to investigate whether actual manipulation occurs in a futures market 
even if hedgers anticipate this possibility. The general answer is yes. We then proceed to 
explore what affects the vulnerability of a futures market to manipulation. Our theoret-
ical analysis of commodity futures manipulation in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 contributes 
to the existing literature on this issue in three important aspects. First, we take into con-
sideration of asymmetric information and its associated adverse selection problem. We 
assume the large trader in a futures market has two "types" (a manipulator or a specula-
tor) which are not certain to other traders. This asymmetric informational assumption is 
more realistic than Kyle's, but it is totally ignored by Pirrong (1995b). Second, we explic-
itly model hedgers' behaviour, which is treated as exogenous in Kyle (1984) and absent 
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in Pirrong (1995b). Traders' behaviour can be characterised in optimisation framework. 
Finally, we extend conventional static equilibrium analysis of futures manipulation into 
a dynamic context, which essentially allows us to see whether manipulation remains an 
equilibrium strategy in a dynamically strategic trading environment. Following our the-
oretical analysis of manipulation, we examine the empirical evidence of the effects of 
the Sumitomo copper manipulation in Chapter 4. We then explore the precise ratio-
nale for futures regulation and conclude futures regulation should raise special concerns. 
We propose a maybe more cost-efficient manipulation deterrence framework and discuss 
UK futures regulation specifically. We argue that futures regulation in the UK, which 
is currently silent on futures manipulation, should be modified to make manipulation 
illegal. 
1.3 Structure of the Thesis 
The thesis comprises six chapters with a focus on the following three closely related topics 
with regard to commodity futures manipulation. 
• How can manipulation occur in equilibrium? including an investigation of the 
vulnerability of a futures market to manipulation and equilibrium manipulative 
strategies in a commodity futures market by using game theory and market mi-
crostructure theory. 
• How serious is manipulation? including a theoretical identification of manipulation 
effects and an empirical examination of the economic effects of the alleged Sumitomo 
copper manipulation by using LME metals data. 
• How should futures (derivatives) markets be regulated? including an exploration 
of the precise rationale for futures regulation and a comparative study of futures 
regulation in the US and the UK. 
18 
In the next two sections of this chapter, we provide a general oven'ie\\' of futures 
trading, the functions of futures markets, the definition and mechanics of futures manip-
ulation. 
The main parts of the thesis consist of Chapter 2, Chapter 3, Chapter 4 and Chapter 
5, which arise from four separate papers written over the past three years. Chapter 
2 and 3 provide two theoretical models of commodity futures manipulation, Chapter-1 
investigates empirically the economic effects of the Sumitomo copper manipulation on the 
LME, and Chapter 5 discusses regulatory implications on futures (derivatives) markets. 
Chapter 2 mainly deals with a one-shot game-theoretical model with four classes 
of heterogeneously informed traders: a large trader, one representative hedger, market 
makers and noise traders. The game is played by the large trader, the hedger strate-
gically. The aim of this model is to demonstrate that how vulnerable a futures market 
to manipulation is, what determines this vulnerability and how a manipulation affects 
the functioning of the futures market, This model predicts that futures manipulation 
may occur in equilibrium with a positive possibility if the delivery market is less than 
perfectly elastic, and the manipulator possesses a certain amount of private information 
(here relating to his "type"). Most important, the price discovery function of futures 
markets is adversely affected and hedging is discouraged in the presence of manipulation. 
In Chapter 3, we attempt to extend the above model into a dynamic context within a 
slightly modified market structure. We construct a two-period model with three classes 
of traders: one large trader, one representative hedger and noise traders. The purpose 
of this model is to show how a large trader can manipulate a market through dynamic 
strategic trading when the hedger trades rationally, observes contract delivery process 
and may opt to stay out of futures trading. This model also predicts a positive probability 
of manipulation in equilibrium, but this probability may be lower than that in the static 
model even the delivery market structures are the same. The idea is that hedgers' 
learning processes can themselves, though to a certain extent, constrain the large trader's 
behaviour to be competitive. This result may help to explain partially \vhy manipulation 
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occurs less frequently in an actual market even with high liquidity and inelastic supply 
curve in the delivery market. One interesting feature of this model is that, due to the 
introduction of a new variable (market uncertainty) into the system, the adverse effects 
of a manipulation may become less serious than what our one-period model predicted, 
since a manipulator has to take this uncertainty into account when he makes his trading 
decisions. This result may justify certain types of regulation against manipulation by 
exchanges or regulators, such as trading for liquidation only, emergency price or position 
limits, discretionary margin adjustments, trading halts, etc. 
In Chapter 4, we use LME metals (copper and aluminium) data to test the effects of 
the alleged Sumitomo copper manipulation empirically. The empirical results support our 
theoretical analysis. We find the evidence that the manipulation not only influences the 
relationships between the futures price and the expected future cash price, but also affects 
the contemporaneous relationships between the futures price and the cash price, i.e., the 
basis. We also investigate the effects of the alleged manipulation on the LME prices 
by using a simple VAR approach. We found that the actual LME prices were generally 
above the VAR forecast prices over the period of alleged manipulation, although not 
significantly. 
Chapter 5 discusses the regulatory implications of futures manipulation. If futures 
manipulation is an equilibrium phenomenon in commodity futures markets, and ma-
nipulation reduces the accuracy of price discovery and discourages hedging activities, 
anti-manipulation should be the primary rationale for futures regulation. This Chap-
ter also reviews and compares how futures markets have been regulated in the US and 
the UK. In addition, in Chapter 5 we propose a maybe more cost-efficient manipulation 
deterrence framework, which consists of a large trader reporting system, a more rigor-
011S ex post manipulation prosecution methodology and a certain amount of emergency 
anti-manipulation firepower. Specifically, we discuss UK futures (derivatives) regulation 
and argue how UK futures (derivati\res) regulation should be reformed to reinforce the 
anti-manipulation impact. 
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The final chapter concludes this research and points to the direction of future research. 
1.4 The Economic Functions of Futures Markets 
To help understand the subject of commodity futures manipulation, in this and the 
following section, we provide a simplified review of futures trading, explain the economic 
functions of futures markets, define futures manipulation and describe the mechanics of 
commodity futures manipulation. 
As their name suggests, commodity futures exchanges are centralised marketplaces 
where traders buy and sell commodities for delivery in the future. A commodity futures 
contract is a standardised contract - pursuant to the rules of a particular commodity 
exchange. The party undertaking the obligation to purchase is referred as the "long", 
and the party undertaking to sell and possibly to deliver the commodity is referred as the 
"short". By the time a contract expires, all traders must have settled, either by making 
an equal and opposite offsetting transaction or by an EFP (exchange futures for physical) 
or by delivery. Some longs may hold their positions and take delivery at the contract 
expiration, but most traders close out their contracts prior to the contract's expiration 
by purchasing an offsetting contract, thereby cancelling their obligations. 
A futures contract involves a commitment to deliver, or to take delivery of a specified 
quantity of some assets or commodities at a particular future date at a price determined 
at the time of contracting. This definition also characterises a forward contract. The 
key elements which distinguish a futures contract from a forward contract are: firstly, 
futures contracts are marked to market at the end of each trading day, so that futures 
contracts have zero equity value, while forward contracts have positive or negative equity 
value prior to the maturities of the contracts; secondly, futures contracts are traded on 
organised exchanges and hence acquire all the features of a liquid financial asset. It is this 
ability to retrade the asset which allows groups of individuals who have no intention of 
either making or taking delivery of the underlying commodity to establish an important 
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trading presence in the market; and thirdly, futures contracts are highly standardised 
and guaranteed by an intermediating clearing association, which implies futures trading 
may involve basis risk but substantially eliminate default risk. 
Viewing a futures contract as a security, it has two significant characteristics which 
contribute to the special role it performs in an economy. Firstly, as a derivati,"e security. 
its payoffs depends directly on the prices of other well-defined assets or commodities, in 
contrast to bonds or equities, where the links to prices are generally much more diffuse. 
Secondly, because of this link to prices, there will be a high correlation between the 
profits and losses on a given contact and the value of the endowments of those with an 
appreciable degree of exposure to the risk of fluctuation in the price of the underlying 
assets. The second characteristic is an obvious consequence of the first, and creates a 
use for the security as a hedging instrument, or in other words as a means of acquiring 
insurance against certain specific forms of risk. It is one of the two widely recognised 
functions of futures markets, which is usually termed "price insurance" or "risk-shifting". 
Another important economic benefit of futures markets is termed "price discovery", 
which arises from the fact that futures contracts are competitively traded on organised 
exchanges. Price discovery is the revealing of information about the future cash market 
prices through futures markets. Futures prices thereby aid market observers in making 
their own predictions of the future cash prices. Futures trading takes place on organised 
futures exchanges, where all trading on a commodity is centralised on the floor of the 
exchange or through an exchange supported screen-based computer trading system. All 
the prices, which are the outcome of open and competitive trading on the floors of the 
exchange, reflect current market expectations about what cash price will be, or what 
underlying supply and demand for a commodity will be in the future. A futures price 
that is substantially higher than current price indicates a market expectation that there 
will be a relative shortage in the future; on the other hand, a futures price that is 
considerably lower than current price reflects a market expectation that there will be 
('xc('ss supply or slack demand of a commodity in the future. By reflecting information 
and expectations about future supply and demand of a commodity, the futures price 
coordinates producers' and consumers' decisions about storage, production, consumption. 
etc. Therefore, a futures market serves an important social purpose by helping people 
make better estimates of the future cash prices so that they can make their consnmption 
and investment decisions more wisely (Kolb 1994, pp.22-23). 
1.5 Economics of Futures Market Manipulation 
Whereas a futures market is concerned with obligations coming due at some future time, 
a cash market may be equated with immediate or forward physical requirements. Conse-
quently, cash prices fluctuate with the influences of supply and demand and, at any given 
moment, will reflect those conditions. Prices in futures markets, however, are based on 
anticipated as well as current supply and demand and, will shift along with actual trends 
in production and consumption or predications of those trends as reflected on the trading 
floor. Therefore, there are inherent differences between futures trading and cash trading 
for the same commodity. The reasons for this discrepancy are complex. In general, as 
discussed in the previous section, futures markets are to provide a mechanism to forecast 
futures prices and to shift risks, but are not typically a source of supply of commodity 
itself (Bianco 1977, p.29). 
Despite the distinctions between contracts negotiated in cash and futures markets, 
prices for the same commodity in the two markets follow parallel paths, i.e., the price 
relationship - the basis, defined as the difference between cash price and the futures 
price for a given commodity, remains fairly constant, but is not without variation under 
normal conditions. When a futures contract is at expiration, the futures price and the 
cash price for a commodity must be the same, i.e., the basis must be zero (assume there 
are no transaction costs). The nature of relative constancy and convergence of basis is 
guaranteed by the delivery requirements of a futures contract and arbitrage conditions. 
In a normal market, a futures price' will exceed cash price, evidencing an available snpply 
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of the deliverable commodity. If the basis widens by a futures price rising significantly 
over cash price due to a substantial supply increase, traders will "spread" by buying 
cash commodities at a lower cash price, while simultaneously contracting to sell the 
commodity at some future time at a higher price. These shorts may subsequently cover 
their positions by delivering their cheaply bought commodities in the futures market 
for profits. Conversely, if the commodity is in tight supply, the cash price will rise 
significantly over the forward price and the basis may become positive, which is termed a 
"backwardation".3 Under these circumstances, arbitrage does not work well, because of 
limitations on selling physical commodities short and other market frictions, and traders 
will therefore sell at a premium cash price. This expected premium, which is determined 
by anticipated demand and supply condition, may be sustained and affected by several 
factors, one of which is market manipulation. 
Market manipulation is an activity or a set of transactions which is calculated to create 
fictitious demand and supply conditions. It takes several forms. Allan and Gale (1992) 
classified manipulation into three categories: action-based manipulation, information-
based manipulation and trade-based manipulation. The first two categories of manipula-
tion are not specific to futures markets, such as manipulating a market through rumours 
or false information conveyed into the market place, through "capping", "pegging", or 
"wash trading" , etc., which are well defined legislatively, juridically, and admistratively in 
various laws, and in the rules of various exchanges and regulatory organisations.4 For an 
example, section 5(c) of the Commodity Exchange Act makes it a condition of contract 
market designation that the exchanges' governing board "provides for the prevention of 
dissemination by the board or any member thereof, of false or misleading or knowingly 
inaccurate reports concerning crop or market information or conditions that affect or 
3When a market is below full carry, there might be an opportunity for a reverse Cash and Carry 
arbitrage. This strategy requires selling cash short, but it is generally not possible in commodity markets. 
For a detailed analysis, see Kolb (1994, pp.81-105) . 
..\ Although there are still difficulties in identifying these types of manipulation accurately, they are 
clearly unlawful. For a discussion, see text and notes in Hirrington (1981, pp.248-49). 
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tend to affect the price of any commodity in interstate commerce" . .s We do not intend 
to discuss these types of manipulation in this research. 
Trade based manipulations are most prevalent in futures (derivatives) markets. The 
most significant form of manipulation, and the one of the greatest concern, is market 
power manipulation. Market power is regarded as an ability to create and sllstain a 
premium (manipulated or artificial price) by a trader, or a group of traders, either by 
buying many futures contracts, or a large quantity of the underlying commodities, or 
both, and demanding or threatening to demand a quantity of delivery which exceeds 
the normal available supply of deliverable stocks at expiration, in order to create an 
artificially "tight" supply condition (the monopoly power); or by selling many futures, 
or a large quantity of the underlying assets, or both, and intending to make so much 
delivery that no other traders are able to take or through excessive sales to drive the 
market price to an artificial level (the monopsony power). Market power manipulation 
essentially eliminates effective price competition in a market for cash commodities and/or 
futures contracts by a large trader or a group of large traders through the domination 
of either supply or demand, and the exercise of that domination to produce artificially 
high or low prices. This type of manipulation requires large resources and may cause 
devastating effects on a futures market, financial integration, and the stability of whole 
economy. 
However, futures manipulation has not even been defined by statue in the US, and 
legal definition of manipulation has instead been derived through specific manipulation 
cases6 which involve different markets and circumstances. It is not surprising that the 
emphasis of definition may shift from one term to others. Edwards and Edwards (1984) 
generalised three essential elements of a manipulation from manipulation case laws. These 
are: (i) price artificiality, i.e., the creation of an abnormal or artificial price; (ii) causation, 
57 U.S.C. 7(c) (1976 & supp. III 1979). 
(iKe), manipulatioll court cases in the United States include: General Foods Corporation v. Brannan 
(170 F.2d 220, 231, 7th Cir. 1948); Great Western Food Distributors, Inc. v. Brannan (201 F.2d -176, 
479, 7th Cir. 1953); lrolkart Bros. v. Freeman (311 F.2d 52, 58, 5th Cir. 1962); Cargill, Inc. v. Hardin 
(452 F. 2d 115-1, 8th Cir. 19(1). 
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i.e., the accused trader caused the abnormal or artificial price; (iii) intentionality, i.e.: the 
accused trader has acted with manipulative intent. Unfortunately, there has not been 
established standards for either an artificial price or causation of such price, and inferring 
intent from accused trader's actions is even more burdensome. 
Except for the possible existence of market power in futures trading, the possibility 
for futures manipulation is additionally facilitated by the anonymity and imperfectly 
matched hedging (or "cross hedging", see Anderson and Danthine 1981) which are com-
monly regarded as the merits of futures trading in contrast with other trading forms. A 
trader holding long futures contracts may either offset by selling equal opposite contracts 
or by standing for delivery. He may find it is more profitable to stand for delivery when he 
acknowledges that there is a "tight" supply in underlying commodities if he has acquired 
a large quantity of futures contracts at lower prices, and the shorts, who find the cost 
of marginal delivery is substantially high or with no intention to make delivery, have to 
pay a premium to be released from contracted obligations. The first issue confronting a 
manipulator is how to acquire a large position from other intelligent traders. The possi-
bility of accumulation of a large quantity of futures contracts is partially provided by the 
anonymity characteristic of futures trading, which is to facilitate trade among strangers 
and effectively a form of asymmetric information in futures trading. As Kyle put it, "the 
organised structure of futures trading makes it unnecessary for traders to know individ-
ually the principals on their other side of the transaction, because the brokers on the 
trading floor bring traders off the floor together behind a wall of anonymity and because 
the clearing house of the exchange guarantees the integrity of positions on both sides of 
the market" (Kyle 1984, p.143). It is one of the major virtues of futures trading indeed, 
which promotes liquidity and reduces transaction costs of futures trading, and makes 
futures nlarkets an attractive form of market organisation. The contribution of imper-
fectly lllatched hedging allows the potential of manipulation. Hedgers are traditionally 
major players in commodity markets: they enter into futures contracts to protect their 
profit nlargins on physical commodities they are producing or must use or are committed 
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to buy or sell in the future. Often hedges are against physicals that do not correspond 
exactly to the commodity specified in the futures contract but that typically follO\\'s it 
closely in price. It is usually this imperfectly matched hedging that is used by a manip-
ulator to force the hedgers, who have been persuaded by the liquidity of the market to 
short futures contracts against cash positions that are not themselves deliverable, to pay 
a high premium. 
If a trader or a group of traders manipulate a futures market involving buying futures 
contracts, or both futures contracts and underlying commodities, we usually term this 
type of manipulation "long manipulation"; while manipulation involving selling futures 
contracts, or selling both futures contracts and underlying commodities, is termed "short 
manipulation". Evidenced by the long futures manipulation history in the United States, 
as noticed by many commentators, short manipulations are rare. 7 The reason for scarcity 
of short manipulations may be regarded as short manipulation being more costly (Ed-
wards and Edwards 1984, p.343; Johnson 1981, p.731). Long manipulation is our major 
concern in this research. 
The long manipulation related to the "tight" supply conditions are usually distin-
guished by the terms a "corner" or a "squeeze". Following Kyle (1984, pp.144-45), we 
refer a "corner" in this research to the case that a trader manipulates a futures mar-
ket through controlling over large enough deliverable stocks or both deliverable stocks 
and large futures positions to set up a temporary monopoly in the commodity. Un-
der this circumstance, the deliverable supply becomes "tight" for the hedgers and other 
traders mostly because the deliverable supply is captured by the manipulator. While in a 
squeeze, a manipulator exploits the delivery mechanism of the futures contracts by taking 
advantage of the fact that the deliverable supply is not easily available for delivery on 
favorable terms, and he makes profits either by threatening to take delivery and thereby 
7 Only few cases were suspected as downward manipulations. One of those cases was Kosuga manip-
ulation of the CBOT onions market by holding virtual monopoly on cold storage onions deliyerable in 
Chicago, simultaneously, during the final two weeks in February 1956, maintained their short positions 
in March 1956 onion futures. Short manipulations may require even large resources, and are possibl:" 
confined to some perishable commodity futures contracts. 
forcing shorts to bailout at high prices to avoid the high costs of making delivery, or by 
taking delivery of so much of the commodities that the shorts would not acquire at the 
cheapest to deliver. In futures markets, the term "cornering" has been therefore used to 
characterise the situation where a trader acquires a large long position in both the futures 
and in the supply of deliverable stocks against the futures to force the shorts to offset 
at a price which may be characterised as arbitrarily high; while the term "squeezing" 
is used to characterise a less extreme situation where a trader may not involve in cash 
transactions, but for one reason or another deliverable supplies of the commodity in t.he 
delivery month are low, while the manipulator's long position in the futures market is 
considerably in excess of the deliverable supplies. 
Although it may be beneficial to make a distinction between a "corner" and a "squeeze" 
when we consider the causes of manipulation, as noticed by many researchers, the dis-
tinction between a 'corner' and a 'squeeze' is not sharp and precise for a number of 
reasons. Nevertheless, traders in futures market face similar consequences in the pres-
ence of either types of manipulation: the marginal cost of delivery is increased, so is the 
equilibrium futures price. Typically, when a long manipulation develops, a short may 
face the following possibilities to offset her futures position: 
• Default. The short refuses to perform the contractual obligations specified in the 
futures contract, specifically the delivery obligations. The cost of default is usually 
very high and default has been prohibited in the contract specifications, although 
in some seldom cases, in order to prohibit any possibility of a squeeze or a corner, 
some exchanges allow a short to default on contracts. 8 
• Orderly liquidation and cash settlement forced by an exchange or government reg-
ulatory authority. For example, on July 11, 1989, the Board of Directors of the 
8For example, Chicago Board of Trade adopted rules in 1869, 1870 and 1921 to allow a short to 
default. See Lurie (1975), Commodities Exchanges as Self-regulating Organizations in the Late 19th 
Cl'lltur)': Some Perimeters in the History of American Administrative Law, Rutgers Law Review, :28. 
p.110i; see also, 5 FED. TRADE CO~nd'N, REPORT ON THE GRAIN TRADE 2i. 52, 1921, p.2.33. 
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CBOT with the approval of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission issued 
an emergency order: "... any person or entity ... who owns or controls a gross 
long or gross short position for any purpose whatsoever in excess of three million 
bushels in the July 1989 soybean futures contract traded on the Exchange must 
reduce said position ... by at least 20% per trading day ... ".9 
• Deliver commodities that would not be cheapest to deliver, which involves to deliver 
higher grade of deliverable commodities but with no or little premium in the prices 
for those physical commodities, or to deliver non-cash settled financial products 
whose price is higher than "cheapest to deliver" products (the most potential is 
bond futures). 
• Liquidate their positions at or slightly below the marginal cost of delivery. Shorts 
agree to bail themselves out at a premium, and usually result in huge losses. This 
is a normal solution for most manipulation cases. 
The first two possibilities take place only when exchanges or regulatory authority 
realised a manipulation was developing and took emergency actions, which are only 
possible in limited large and obvious cases. In most cases, shorts have to agree to close 
out their positions at a substantial premium. 
Whether it is a "corner" or a "squeeze", manipulation discourages hedgers' use of 
futures markets by imposing the cost of hedging, and has pronounced price effects and 
basis effects. Both are harmful to the functioning of futures markets. 
9See Division of Trading and Markets, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, Memorandum 
to the Commission, Sept.1989; see also Barnhart, Kahl and Barnhart (1996, pp.781-82). There were 
some other cases involving liquidation and cash settlement measures ordered by exchanges or regulatory 
authority. For an example, the May 1976 ~Iaine potato futures contract traded on the New York 
~Ier('alltile Exchange to be ordered to trade for liquidation only, the New York Mercantile Exchange did 
later amend it's Maine potato futures contract on 21 January, 1983 to include mandatory cash settlement 
in lieu of physical delivery. 
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Chapter 2 
A Simple Model of Futures 
Manipulation w-ith Heterogeneously 
Informed Traders 
2.1 Introduction 
Futures trading has been extensively regulated in the United States since the passage 
of the first federal futures trading legislation in 1921. The extensive regulation over 
futures trading is predicated mainly on the following views. First, futures markets are 
inherently vulnerable to manipulation. Second, futures manipulation has adverse effects 
on the functioning of futures markets, and may impose appreciable costs on market users 
without providing a benefit in return. However, th~?e issues have not been adequately 
addressed theoretically. 
Several models have attempted to investigate these issues. Kyle (1984) presented the 
first formal model of futures manipulation, and derived sufficient conditions for manipu-
lation to occur in equilibriunl. In Kyle's model, a large trader with superior information 
about the order flow from hedgers, exploits this advantage by amassing a large long po-
sit.ion when hedgers are trading actively, or by obtaining short positions \vhen hedgers 
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are trading inactively. Other traders (speculators) who can observe the combined order 
flows, are unable to detect the manipulator's presence in the market. They therefore 
sell at a price that, on average, is below the cash price prevailing at expiration when 
there is a manipulation. Thus the informed trader earns a profit, and a manipulation 
occurs in equilibrium. But the assumption that a trader must have inside information 
about hedgers' order flows in the model is so restrictive that it is almost inapplicable 
in practice. The model therefore fails to explain manipulation in any actual market. 
Jarrow (1992) investigated market manipulation trading strategies by large traders in 
a securities market. He argues that the ability of large traders to manipulate prices to 
their advantage and to generate riskless profits depends on the properties of the price 
process seen as a function of the speculator's trade. The existence of market manipula-
tion strategies is thereby related to the dependence of price process on the past sequence 
of the large trader's holdings. He derives sufficient conditions of the existence, as well as 
nonexistence, of equilibrium manipulation strategies. Under certain conditions, a large 
trader can profitably squeeze shorts by forcing them to liquidate their positions at an 
arbitrarily high price if he both acquires a long position in a derivative security and the 
security deliverable against the derivatives larger than the aggregate supply. But Jarrow 
ignores the importance of the underlying market conditions on manipulation strategies, 
and therefore, his theory is unable to explain why manipulation does not occur more of-
ten in any actual market. Particularly in any commodity futures market, it is clear that 
a manipulator cannot force shorts to settle at an arbitrarily high price, since additional 
demand of delivery by the manipulator can always be met at finite costs. 
Pirrong (1995b) also pr'esented a model to explain how manipulation can occur in 
equilibrium and what determines the severity and frequency of manipulation. Pirrong 
shows rnanipulation may OCCllr with a positive probability in a market with a certain 
anlOunt of random noise trading and in the presence of an imperfectly elastic supply 
curve in the delivery market. Pirrong's theorem provides a helpful explanation why 
corners sonletimes OCCllr in futures markets, but is insufficient to show why some markets, 
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with apparently a sufficiently high level of noise trading and imperfect elasticity of supply 
in the delivery markets, are not cornered more frequently. 
Although Pirrong's model provides insight in the equilibrium analysis of futures mar-
ket manipulation, he does not model hedgers' behaviour explicitly. The fact that hedgers 
- traditionally the most important traders are missing in the analysis qualifies the value 
of his model. More important, Pirrong (1995b) did not take asymmetric information 
problem into account. 
In fact, in addition to delivery market characteristics and noise trading, asymmetric 
information and its associated adverse selection problem may also play an important 
role in determining the vulnerability of a futures market to manipulation. When a 
manipulation is considered by other traders to be very likely, the equilibrium futures price 
may rise to reflect this probability, therefore limiting the ability of the large trader to 
profitably manipulate. This is similar to the reformulated 1\Iillsian argument by Anderson 
(1992). For a manipulation to occur, there must be some traders who are not well aware 
of the manipulator's presence in the market and who voluntarily stand on the other 
side of market. This requires asymmetric information, and asymmetric information is a 
central feature of futures trading. Anonymity of futures trading allows the possibility 
of asymmetric information, which makes the futures market one of the most attractive 
forms of market organisation. A manipulator may therefore possibly take advantage of 
the anonymity characteristic of futures trading, and build a huge long futures position 
and then stand for delivery. Other traders, of course, should take this manipulation 
probability into consideration when they make futures trading decisions. An appropriate 
approach to modelling futures manipulation therefore naturally leads to game-theory. 
Premised on these views, we develop a simple game-theoretical model of futures ma-
nipulation which contains four kinds of traders: a large trader, one lepresentative hedger, 
a number of market makers and noise traders. Market makers quote futures prices by ob-
serving the trading process and reflecting their beliefs on the probability of manipulation 
in the price they quote. However, they cannot tell how nluch the large trader is buying 
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or how much the hedgers are selling. In this model, they are treated to be exogenous. 
In this model, noise traders are also seen as participating futures trading for exogenous 
reasons. The risk averse hedger, who is persuaded to hedge her risk exposure by using the 
futures market, cannot predict accurately the probability of manipulation, but she must 
hold some beliefs about this probability before she makes her trading decisions. This 
prior probability is formed from her previous trading experience (effectively the previous 
contract delivery processes - we will discuss the information updating in Chapter 3). If 
this belief is high, the hedger would choose not to trade futures or choose to hedge in the 
other direction. The result is that market makers quote a higher futures price, thereby 
inhibiting the manipulator in his attempt to manipulate. The manipulator can also learn 
it from the trading environment. If the prior market belief is high, he may choose to 
go short in stead of undertaking long manipulation. When this belief is not very high, 
manipulation can occur with a positive probability. Of course, there are other factors 
which may also affect the vulnerability of futures markets to manipulation. One of the 
most important factors is the delivery market characteristics, especially the availability of 
additional deliverable stocks. If additional deliverable stocks are available without much 
additional costs, manipulation may occur with a lower probability. Thus this model 
predicts that if the marginal cost of delivery at delivery point is sufficiently high, and 
there is less than perfect information for other traders on the presence of a manipulator, 
futures manipulation can occur in equilibrium. Manipulation discourages the hedger's 
use of futures markets, increases the equilibrium futures prices, and makes futures prices 
biased estimates of the future cash prices from the point view of all market participants 
except the market makers. In this way, the economic functions of futures markets are 
impaired. 
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In section 2.2, we begin with a de-
scription of the structure of the market, the model setup and the equilibrium concept. 
Section 2.3 characterises the equilibria. Section 2.4 discusses some important issues re-
lated to this nlodel and possible extensions. In section 2.5, we analyse traders' behm"iollf 
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in this model and some policy implications on futures regulation. A brief conclusion is 
provided in the final section. 
2.2 Structure of the Model 
2.2.1 The market structure 
We consider a one-period model with two dates: date 1 and date 2. On date 1, traders 
negotiate a futures contract which expires on date 2. The commodity futures contract 
is settled by delivery. Traders may therefore exit their positions on date 2 either via 
offsetting their positions or by delivery. 
Let there be four classes of traders: one large trader, one representative hedger, 
a number of market makers, and noise traders. The large trader has market power. 
This game is played between the large trader and the hedger. They trade futures on 
date 1 strategically. The large trader acquires a futures position on date 1, while the 
hedger hedges her total exposure Z in the futures market. Following standard market 
microstructure literature, for example, Kyle (1984, 1985), Glosten and :NIilgrom (1985), 
Foster and Viswanathan (1996), etc., market makers are treated to be exogenous, and are 
modeled to trade in such a way that the expected profits of acquiring a futures position 
at market-clearing prices, then liquidating it later through trade or through delivery, are 
zero. They are assumed to be competitive, but we do not specify why they should be 
competitive. It may be that they must compete for the right to conduct transactions each 
other as well as with floor traders in t.he same contract on the exchange. Noise traders 
trade randomly an amount of <; which is normally distributed with mean 0 and variance 
a;. The market we are modelling involves no transaction costs, and Bll orders are raarket 
orders. Trading is modelled and structured to give the flavor of continuous auctions in 
Kyle (1985), although we concentrate on a one-shot auction. Trade occurs according 
to the following events. On date 1, the large trader and the hedger simultaneously 
snlllInit lnarket orders according to information available to them, and market makers, 
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after observing the aggregate order flows, immediately quote a futures price and trade 
necessary positions to clear the market. On date 2, all positions are settled through 
offsetting or by delivery. 
Deliverable stocks on date 2 is determined by the supply and demand conditions of 
the commodity at the delivery point, denoted by x(c), where c denotes the supply and 
demand disturbance which is assumed to be normally distributed with mean 0 and vari-
ance a;. On date 1, traders do not necessarily observe c, but they know the distribution 
of c. The large trader does not necessarily hold any fraction of deliverable stocks. The 
cash price p(x(c)) on date 2 is determined jointly by the commodity demand and supply 
conditions and the amount of deliverable stocks, where a~~(~))) < O. The marginal cost of 
increasing deliverable stocks to X(c) > x(c) equals MC(X(c)), where MC(X(c)) > 0, 
and a~~~?;)) > O. The cash market structure can be best understood by assuming that 
there are two cash markets: the cash market for normal deliverable stocks at delivery 
point and the cash market for transforming non-deliverable goods into deliverable goods. 
The first cash market establishes the cash price for the quantity of delivery up to x(c), 
while the second cash market establishes the marginal costs of bring additional deliver-
able stocks for the amount of delivery exceeding x(c). We define P(X(c)) the marginal 
cost of delivery for the shorts, where P(X(c)) = p(x(c)) + MC(X(c)), and aPl1E~E)) > O. 
The marginal cost of delivery for the shorts includes the price and transaction costs the 
shorts must pay to acquire the commodity, costs of transport it to the delivery point and 
costs involved in grading to ensure that its quality meets the contract specifications. It 
increasingly rises with the amount of excess demand for delivery, but the marginal cost 
of delivery is assumed to finite since it is always feasible to bring additional stocks to 
delivery point at finite costs in actual futures markets, such that 0 < P(X (c)) < +00. 
The anonymity and noise trading in futures markets facilitate the possiLility that the 
large trader can acquire a long futures position which exceeds the deliverable stocks on 
date 2, which is, however, not disclosed with certainty to other traders at date 1. The 
large trader may demand or threaten to demand a delivery of X(c) > x(c), and therefore 
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he can close out that part of his futures position which exceeds x( c) at the marginal 
cost of delivery. Under these circumstances, the hedger who normally shorts in futures 
market, must pay the marginal cost of delivery to meet her contractual obligations on 
the positions she has not been able to close out. As an atomistic short, she is indeed 
willing to pay the marginal cost of delivery to liquidate her futures positions due to the 
characteristic of imperfectly matched hedging at most except for the part of x(c). This 
implies that the large trader could profitably squeeze the shorts. 
We take the "burying the corpse" effects into consideration. The large trader expects 
to take delivery of X (c) on date 2 and sells it on the cash market at the post-delivery price 
which is usually lower than the expected competitive price p(x(c)). But the post-delivery 
price depends on the market demand and supply conditions prevailing at that time, the 
size of the delivery, and the demand and supply elasticities of the commodity. It is 
possible for the large trader to exploit the supply elasticity to keep the post-delivery price 
as high as possible for a longer period of time. We try to avoid this complication here, and 
assume the post-delivery price immediately after delivery is the competitive price p(x(c)). 
The "burying the corpse" effect implies that manipulation is not invariably profitable, 
although almost all large trader's long futures positions exceeding x(c) can trigger the 
occurrence of manipulation. When a trader takes delivery of X (E) > x( E), stocks in the 
delivery rise and post-delivery cash price in the market falls due to the inflation in stocks. 
In order to make manipulation profitable, two necessary conditions must hold: firstly, 
the large trader must acquire some minimum futures position Qmin > x(c), so he can 
liquidate sufficient futures positions at the marginal cost of delivery P(X(E)), and make 
profits even after deducting the losses from burying the corpse; and secondly, he must 
be able to acquire some futures positions at sufficiently low price, which requires that 
the manipulative initiative is not disclosed at the beginning. Otherwise, he could ollly 
it( 'Cumulate futures positions at or close to the marginal cost of delivery. Therefore, the 
large trader's strategies are twofold: 
Firstly, given his futures position, the large trader must decide the optimal delivery 
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X(c) he is going to take, not only in order to bid up the marginal cost of delivery 
sufficiently high to achieve a high revenue from selling parts of his futures position, but 
also to ensure that the revenue by selling futures contracts exceeds the losses by sales 
of the delivery stocks at the post-delivery price which is lower than the marginal cost 
of delivery. Thus, when the trader buys Q futures contracts at date 1, he chooses the 
optimal amount of delivery to maximise his expected revenue. 
We assume that the expected cash price on date 2 has a two-point distribution, which 
equals either to the marginal cost of delivery P(X(c)) when there is a manipulation, or 
to the competitive price p(x(c)) when there is no manipulation. For simplicity, we write 
the expected values of the cash prices on date 2 as P(.) and p(.) respectively, and the 
expected values for the normal deliverable stocks and excess deliverable stocks at date 
2 as X and x respectively hereinafter. Let Y(X) denote the trader's revenue, the large 
trader's expected revenue can be written as: 
E[Y(X)] = (Q - X)P(.) + p(.)X (2.1 ) 
The first term on the RHS is the trader's expected revenue from settling his futures 
contracts by offsetting, while the second term is the expected revenues from sales of the 
stocks delivered to him at the competitive market price. Maximisation of (2.1) defines an 
implicit function X(Q), which is the optimal value of delivery, given the trader's futures 
position choice, his expected delivery price and post delivery price prevailing at date 2, 
d 8X(Q) < 0 an 8Q . 
Secondly, the large trader chooses his futu~~s positions strategically to maximise his 
expected profits. We will defer consideration of this problem to the next section. 
2.2.2 Information sets and payoff functions 
All traders have access equally to the same information about the cash market and supply 
disturbance E as of dat.e 1, and they are aware that the expected marginal cost of making 
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delivery is P(.) > p(.) and o:l) > 0, if X > x. Each player knows his/her o\\"n payoff 
function, the market makers' pricing function, and expected delivery stocks x at date 2 
(without manipulation). Each trader is aware of the distribution of noise trading as well. 
We assume the hedger has incomplete information about the large trader's type which 
determines the large trader's payoff function, but the large trader knows the hedger's type~ 
and therefore her payoff function. The large trader's types are related to the ultimate 
cash market demand conditions. The large trader's types corresponding to the ultimate 
cash prices are two: type I (Td and type II (T2)' Formally: the large trader's type space 
is Ti = {TI' T2}. We can interpret this as stating that the type I (TI ) manipulates the 
market by taking delivery of a quantity which exceeds the competitive level of deliverable 
stocks on date 2 (we call the type I trader the manipulator hereinafter), while the type 
II (T2 ) speculates (we call the type II trader the speculator). The hedger's type space 
is T = {T}. The hedger and market makers do not know whether the large trader 
belongs to TI or T2, but they hold a prior probability q that the large trader is the type 
I, where q = Pr(Ti = Td = 1- Pr(Ti = T2)' The prior probability of manipulation 
arises from previous delivery processes, trading records and experience, and effectively it 
is conditional on previous delivery prices. The large trader knows that the hedger and 
market makers hold this prior. 
We assume that the different cost functions associated with manipulation justify the 
two types of large trader. The type I large trader has a low cost of manipulation, while 
the type II large trader has a high cost of manipulation. The costs of manipulation 
could be expected civil penalties, 'psychic' costs associated with lawbreaking, the costs 
of ex post prosecution, forbidden access to futures markets, and bankruptcy costs due to 
failed manipulation, etc. The low cost of manipulation for the type I trader may be due 
to his sounder financial resources, easier accessibility to external finance, less regulatory 
constraints, scopes of business involved, for example, a commercial trader's large futures 
position is easier to be justified than that of the trading arm of a bank, etc. 
Following well established tradition, the hedger is assumed to be risk an'rsc, and 
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she is seen as buying insurance in futures markets to hedge against price risk. The 
large trader is normally assumed to be risk neutral (see, for example, Kyle (1984) and 
the major case in Newbery (1984), and large literature on informed trading). His risk 
neutrality may be approximately justified by assuming that the large trader's wealth is 
sufficiently large and his portfolios are well diversified. In addition, the market makers' 
pricing function is nonstochastic and increases monotonically with the net long order 
flows. Given the pricing function and the optimal delivery the large trader has to take 
(for type I, the optimal delivery is X*; for type II, 0, as determined by equation (2.1)), he 
chooses futures positions Qi, where i = 1,2, representing type I and type II respectively, 
in order to maximise his expected profits. Simultaneously, given the market makers' 
pricing function and the prior probability of the large trader's type, the hedger chooses 
futures position H to maximise her expected utilities. Qi and H are real numbers. A 
positive quantity of Qi represents purchases, and a negative quantity denotes sales; while 
a positive quantity of H denotes sales, and a negative quantity denotes purchases. 
Let E[II(Qi, H)] represent the large trader's expected profit function as a function of 
all the players' strategy choices and of his types, 
E[II(Qi, H)] = Qi[P(·) - j] + (Qi - X)[P(.) - p(.)] - Vi 
where j is the futures price on date 1, Vi is the costs associated with manipulation for 
the large trader, i = 1, 2, representing the two types of the large trader. Without loss of 
generali ty~ we assume that VI = ° and V2 > 0. 
Assunle that aE[rr~~:,H·)l > ° and aaE[~~~:,H·)l < 0, which will be demonstrated to be 
true given the monotonicity assumption of the market makers' pricing function. 
1\10re explicitly, for the type I large trader j the expected profit function is: 
(2.2) 
Tll(' first term on the RHS of (2.2) is the expected profits from settling futures ('011-
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tracts through offsetting; the second term is the expected values for sales of delivery ex 
post; and the last term is the costs of acquiring futures positions. 
For the type II trader, we assume that the physical costs (V2 ) he expects is so large 
if he attempts to manipulate that his maximum expected profits from manipulation is 
strictly less than the maximum expected profits from speculation ·which forces him to 
pursue an objective function that differs from that of the type 1's. Therefore, his expected 
profit function is: 
(2.3) 
If V2 > [[Q; - X*(Q;)]P(.) + X*(Q;)p(.) - Q;/] - Q~[P(.) - /)), i.e., the expected 
physical costs of manipulation for the type II trader exceed the potential benefits, the 
type II trader's objective function is justified. 
Assume that the hedger has a mean-variance utility function. Let U(IT(H, Qi)) denote 
the utility function for the hedger, H the total futures position by the hedger, Z the 
aggregate risk exposure and A the absolute risk aversion. As the hedger's beliefs that 
the large trader is the type I are q, therefore the hedger's expected delivery price must 
be qP(.) + (1 - q)p(.), and her expected payoff function can be written as: 
E[U(IT(H, Qi))] Z[qP(.) + (1 - q)p(.)] + H(/ - [qP(.) + (1- q)p(.))) 
1 
- 2 AVar(II(H, Qi)) (2.4) 
Similarly, given the optimal position taken by the large trader and the market makers' 
f .. f . 8E[U(II(H Q*))] 0 d 88E[U(II(H,Q*))] 0 utures pncing unctIOn, 8H' t > ,an 88H t < . 
Given their prior beliefs, market makers quote a futures price which is the conditional 
expected cash price on date 2, and the expectations are conditional on the aggregate 
positions traded by the large trader, the hedger and noise traders and on the information 
about c on date 1. Let ~ be the net long position traded by the large trader, the hedger 
and noise traders, i.e., ~ = Qi - H + c:;, where c:; is the net long position by noise traders. 
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Therefore the futures price f at date 1 satisfies: 
f = f (~, q) = E (p I q, ~) (2.5) 
where p is the cash price prevailing at date 2. 
Given their prior, after they observe the aggregate quantities traded by the large 
trader, the hedger and noise traders, the market makers' posterior probability of manip-
ulation is: 
The posterior probability of manipulation is the probability that the large trader's 
futures position exceeds the normal deliverable stocks, given the market makers' prior 
and additional information from the net order flow. Mathematically, <I>(Qi - H + <;) = 
Pr(Ql > x Iq, ~ = Qi - H + <;) = Pr(B* < Qi - H + <;), where B* is market makers' 
optimal value which is not known to all other players, but assume that it's distribution 
is known to all market players. ¢(Qi - H + <;) is the density function. Its probability 
distribution has following properties: <I>'(Qi - H + <;) > 0 and <I>"(Qi - H + <;) > o. The 
probability of manipulation increases monotonically with the net long positions traded. 
Assume that the market makers' futures pricing function takes linear form and de-
pends on the posterior probability of manipulation, the expected competitive price and 
manipulated price at date 2. Thus the futures price becomes: 
{ 
p(.) if <I> ( Q i - H + <;) = 0 
f(~, q) = 
p(.) + <I>(Qi - H + <;)[P(.) - p(.)] 
(2.6) 
if 0 < <I> ( Q i - H + <;) < 1 
2.2.3 Extensive form representation 
In ternlS of the extensive form representation of the manipulation game, there are 3 
active players: 1 large trader, 1 representative hedger plus nature. Nature moves first 
and determines the realisation of the large trader's type. The large trader observes 
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Ti = {TI' T2}. The hedger and market makers have a prior belief (q) on the large trader's 
type, and q = Pr(Ti = TI ) = 1 - Pr(Ti = T2). This is a common knowledge among all 
traders. 
In any extensive form game, a player's strategy is a specification of the action he/she 
will take in any information set, i.e., the player's actions at any point can depend only 
on what he/she knows at that point. Here, the information set for the large trader 
is defined by the realised values of the types, ~ = {TI' T2} (given by Nature's move) 
and those for the hedger's by a prior belief q = Pr(~ = TI). Given market makers' 
pricing function, the large trader's actions and the hedger's actions are their futures 
position choices Qi, H respectively. The action space for the large trader is defined as 
am E Am = {Qi E S : -00 < Qi < +oo}, and the action space for the hedger is defined 
as ah E Ah = {H E t : -00 < H < +oo}, where Qi and H are real numbers. Thus a 
(pure) strategy for the large trader is a map s from its possible expected cash market 
demand conditions into possible choices of Qi and a (pure) strategy for the hedger is a 
map t from R giving her choices of H for her prior beliefs. 
The equilibrium concept used here is the static Bayesian Nash equilibrium. If the 
large trader contemplates changing his strategy, he assumes that the hedger does not 
change hers in response, and vice versa. A pair of strategies constitute an equilibrium 
if each player maximises his/her expected payoffs, given that the other is using his/her 
specific strategy. Thus given market makers' futures pricing function, a pair of (Q;, H*) 
is a static Bayesian Nash equilibrium if and only if: 
• The large trader's strategy Q; is optimal given the hedger's strategies for any 
i E {I 1 2}, and any Si E S : 
E[II(Q;, H*)] :> E[II(Qil H*)] 
• The hedger's strategy H* is optimal given her prior assessment Pr(~ = TI ) = q, 
q E [0, 1], and the large trader's strategies, for any ti E t: 
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E[U(TI(H*, Qn] > E[U(II(H, Qn] 
According to this equilibrium concept, the large trader maximises his expected profits 
taking into account the effect that a change in his trading has on futures price. One 
important point worth mentioning is that the large trader must never be induced to trade 
in such a way that his type is revealed to market makers on date 1 with certainty. The 
reason is obvious. If he trades futures in the way that market makers can infer his type 
with probability 1, he could neither profitably manipulate nor speculate. Suppose that 
the market makers can infer from order flow that he is the type II, then the equilibrium 
futures price is p(.), and the large trader's strategy must be no trading; accordingly, if 
market makers can infer that he is the type I, they will quote futures price as P(.), then 
the large trader will lose money with probability 1. These arguments will be developed 
into more details in the next section. 
2.3 Equilibria Characterisation 
Given the framework described above, we can compute a pair (Q:, H*) which will consti-
tute an equilibrium. Naturally, the large trader may want to choose a different (presum-
ably lower or even negative (short)) quantity of futures position if his expected price at 
delivery is low (without manipulation) than if it is high (with manipulation). The hedger, 
for her part. should anticipate that the large trader may tailor his position choices to his 
private information on his type, and therefore cash market demand conditions prevailing 
at delivery period in this way. 
Given the market makers' futures pricing function (equation (2.6)), if the large trader 
is the type L he will jointly choose Qi and X* (Qd to solve his optimisation problems 
(following equation (2.1) and (2.2)) to maximise his expected profits, i.e., 
maxE[Y(X)] = max {(Ql - X(Ql))[P(.)] + X(Ql)[P(.)]} (2.7) 
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Equation (2.7) states that the large trader maximises his revenue by choosing the 
optimal delivery given his futures position; while equation (2.8) says that he maximises 
his expected plofits by choosing his optimal futures position given his optimal delivery 
decision. Assume that there is a linear relationship between the marginal cost of delivery 
and the quantity of delivery that the large trader demands. The (expected) marginal 
cost of delivery on the delivery market can be written as: 
P(.)=w+,X (2.9) 
where, is the inverse of the appropriately scaled supply elasticity into exchange ware-
houses. The higher " the less elastic is the delivery supply into the exchange warehouses, 
and vice versa. 
Given the manipulator's choice of Q1 and the expected cash market price (without 
manipulation) p(.), the first order condition of (2.7) with respect to X yields: 
X = p(.) -w +,Q1 
2, 
(2.10) 
Given the manipulator's optimal futures position, he has to take more delivery when 
the delivery supply is more elastic at the delivery market (i.e., , is lower); on the other 
hand, he can take less delivery as the supply elasticity declines. Substitute equation 
(2.10) to (2.9), the marginal cost of delivery is: 
P(.) = w + p(.) + ,Q1 
2 
(2.11) 
Equation (2.11) states that, given the manipulator's optimal futures position, the 
nlore inelastic the delivery supply (i.e., the higher ,), the higher is the marginal cost of 
delivery, which (Teates more advantage for the manipulator. Substitute equation (2.10) 
4-l 
-
and (2.11) back to equation (2.8), then equation (2.8) becomes: 
where 
f(b., q) = p(.) + <I>(Qi - H + <;-)(w - p(.) + ,Q1) 
2 
(2.12) 
As a first step to characterize the equilibrium, we claim that there is some critical 
value of market beliefs, if the market beliefs on the probability of manipulation exceed 
this critical level, manipulation will not occur in equilibrium with probability l. 
Proposition 1 There exists a unique q*, for any q > q*, H* < 0 and E[V(II(H*, Qn] > 
Vo with probability 1 (where Vo is the hedger's reservation utility and Vo > 0); Q; < 0 
and E[II(Q;, H*)] > 0 with probability 1. 
Proof. Proposition 1 states that there is a critical value for market beliefs regarding the 
large trader's type, such that for any other prior belief which is up to or which exceeds 
this value, the hedger's optimal strategy is to either stay out of futures trading (when 
q = q*), or to go short (when q > q*). Under these circumstances, manipulation would 
never be an optimal strategy for the large trader. 
To prove this, let's look at the hedger's problem first. We wish to demonstrate this 
critical value exists. 
Returning to equation (2.4), the hedger's expected price given her prior is: 
Her conditional expected revenue is: 
Z(2p(.) - qp(.) 2+ qw + 'YqQ~) + 
-
The variance of the first term is: z2e;Q)2o-;, the variance of the second term is: 
7 2 0'2 +Q2O'2 (2 ) 
EO P 4 E H2, and the covariance of the first and the second term is: - Q ;Q [<1>( Qi - H + 
c;) - q]a;ZH. Therefore, the variance of the hedger's revenue becomes: 
Var(IT(H, Qn 
where o-~ is the variance of the probability distribution of market makers' pricing function. 
We assume that this probability distribution is independent of cash price movement. 
Substitute these values back into equation (2.4), equation (2.4) becomes: 
E[U(IT(H, Q;)] Z(2
p(.) - qp(.) + qw + ,qQl) 
2 
+Ht - p(.~ + I'Q! )[<I>(Qi - H + ,) - q] 
_ ~A[(2; q)2cr;Z2 _ (2 ~ q) [<I>(Qi - H + ,) - q]O";ZH 
a 2a 2 + q2o-2 + c ¢ c H2] (2.13) 
4 
Maximisation of equation (2.13) given their prior beliefs regarding the large trader's 
type becomes the hedger's optimisation problem. The first order condition of equation 
(2.13) with respect to H yields: 
o t - p(.~ + I'Q! ) [<I>(Qi - H + ,) - q]- t - p(.~ + I'Q! )¢(Qi - H + ,)H 
A 2 q(2 - q) (2 - q) 
+"2Z o-c [ 4 (<1>(Qi- H +C;)-q)- 4 ¢(Qi- H +<:)] 
(2.14) 
Fronl equat.ion (2.14), we can solve out H* as a function of Q:. q, 0-;, (J~, (J~. '). Z and 
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p(.). Note that Q; = qQi + (1 - q)Q;. Assume that the function form takes 7/J2(')' 
Mathematically, H* can be expressed as: 
(2.15) 
Since the hedger must have some reservation utility (Uo > 0). For the hedger to 
participate futures trading, she must make sure that her expected utility is not less than 
her reservation level. Substitute equation (2.15) to equation (2.13), and let equation 
(2.13) equal Uo. It is not hard to solve out the critical value q*. For any q > q*, any 
short position the hedger takes, the hedger's expected utility must not be greater than 
her reservation level, i.e., E[U(II(H*, Qn] < Uo. For the hedger's expected utility not 
to be less than her nlinimum level, she must choose to stay out of futures trading when 
q = q*, or to go long when q > q*. 
For the type II large trader, his expected cash price is p(.), while the equilibrium 
futures price is p(.) + <I> (Q; - H* + <;) (W-P(.~+I'QI ), which is greater than p(.). He therefore 
will definitely go short and make positive expected profits. 
For the manipulator not to lose money, the optimal strategy is either to stay out of 
futures trading or to go short. To see why, (to be contradicted) consider if he chooses 
Ql > x to enter the nlarket, market makers would infer from the order flow that 1i = 
T1. Since the hedger trades no futures or goes long in this case, then market order 
flow exhibits uniquely long, and large long order flow can be identified with certainty. 
l\Iarket nlakers would set f(q.1).) = P(.), making the manipulation unprofitable, hence 
this cannot be an' equilibriunl. Clearly, for the manipulator not to lose money when 
q > q*, it must be the case that either Q1 = 0 and E[II(Ql, H*)] = 0, or Ql < 0 and 
Eln( Ql. H*)] > O. II 
The intuition behind proposition 1 is simple. The hedger is risk averse, and is prepar-
ing to forgo some revenues in exchange for transferring some risks to other traders. But 
her risk <l\'{'rsion is linlited, whenever she expects to reach the balance between the losses 
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on the expected revenue and gains on the expected utility, she will decide not to par-
ticipate futures trading or to hedge in the other direction. Under this circumstance, 
the manipulator's large long order would be identified with certainty by market makers, 
hence he cannot profitably manipulate. Proposition 1 implies that there are occasions on 
which the market shuts down, which is similar as the lemons problem of Akerlof (1970). 
When the prior probability of manipulation is sufficiently high that the hedger has no 
incentives in participating futures hedging, then there are no profitable opportunities for 
the large traders as well. The market will recover when the hedger and market makers 
are sure that the type I trader has left the market to some extent. However, in the real 
world, it is rare that markets shut down entirely even if a manipulator has entered the 
market, since it is not possible for the hedger and market makers to infer accurately from 
available information the presence of manipulator due to noise trading. 
Proposition 1 demonstrates that manipulation does not occur in equilibrium when 
q > q*. The next proposition shows, under certain circumstances, manipulation occurs in 
equilibrium with a positive probability. Given the market makers' non-stochastic pricing 
function, an equilibrium always exists and the equilibrium is unique. In equilibrium, both 
the large trader and the hedger trade a unique optimal position, there exists a unique 
probability that manipulation occurs and a unique equilibriwn futures pricing process. 
Proposition 2 If 0 < q < q*, there exists an equilibrium. The equilibrium, classified 
according to the values of the market makers' conditional probability, is necessary to fall 
into one of the following three types: 
1. <P(Q: - H* + c;) = O. Manipulation occurs with probability zero, the equilibrium 
futures price is p(.). Q: = 0, H* = - (22- Q )Z + 4(P~)-f(')) . 
q qaE 
2. <P ( Q: - H* + c;) = q . Manipulation occurs with probability q, the equilibrium futures 
price is (1 - q)p(.) + qP(.). Qi = (l(i)~~~l~-w), Q; = 0, H* = Z. 
3. 0 < <P(Q: - H* +c;) < 1. Manipulation occurs with probability <P(Q; - H* +c;), the 
equilibrium futures price is p(.)+<P(Q;-H*+c;)[P(.)-p(.)]. There exists a unique Q; and 
H* .''-/lel! that E[fI(Q;,H*)] > E[fI(Qi,H*)L and E[U(fI(H*,Q;)] > E[U(fI(H.Q:))]. 
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Proof. Case 1: <1>(Q: - H* + c;) = O. This is the case where no suspected manipulation 
is identified from the order flow by market makers, and the market makers' futures quote 
is p(.). Let's look at the hedger's problem first. 
IS 
For the hedger, her conditional expected cash price at date 2 giYen her prior beliefs 
Her conditional revenue is 
E[Il(H, Q;] 
2p(.) - qp(.) + qw + ,qQl 
2 
Z(2p(.) - qp(.) + qw + ,qQl) 
2 
+H[p(.) - (2p(.) - qp(.) 2+ qw + -yqQ')1 
The ,·ariance of the first term of the above equation is Z2 ( 2;q ) 20";, the variance of 
the second term is H2 (~ ) 20";, and the covariance between the first and the second term 
is zHe;Q)2qO";. Following equation (2.4), the hedger's optimisation problem becomes: 
maxE[U(Il(H,Q;))] = max{Z(2
p(.) - qp(.) + qw + ryqQl) 
2 
+H[p(.) _ (2p(.) - qp(.) + qw + ,qQl)] 
2 
_ ~A[Z2(2; q)20"; + ZH(2; q)2qO"; + H2(%)20";]X 2.16 ) 
The first order condition of equation (2.16) with respect to H yields the optimal 
futures position for the hedger: 
(2.17) 
Note that w-p(.)+,Ql in equation (2.17) is 2[P(.)-p(.)] (following equation (2.11)), 
equation (2.17) then becon1es: 




Equation (2.18) states that the hedger will go long, but her long position will be 
reduced with the increase of the level of risk aversion and the variance of supply shocks, 
but increase with the differences between the manipulated price and the competitive 
pnce. 
For the type II large trader, his expected future cash price is the same as the market 
makers' quoted price, from equation (2.3), and his optimal position should be zero, i.e., 
(2.19) 
We claim that the optimal strategy for the type I trader (the manipulator) is to stay 
out of futures trading. To prove this claim, we assume that the type I trader enters 




The first order condition of equation (2.20) with respect to Q1 yields: 
(2.21 ) 
Because the trader's cost of acquiring futures positions is fixed in this case, if he can 
acquire any positions exceed i.l1g Qrin which can be solved out from equation (2.21), he 
will make positive expected profits. This is, 
Q~in = p(.) - W or Q~in = X , (2.22) 
Frorn equation (2.22), as an expected profit maximiser, he will choose an arbitrarily 
large long order into the nlarket with probability 1, and therefore, his strategy would be 
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found out by the market makers with certainty. Since the hedger will go long in this case, 
market makers cannot be fooled in front of unique large long order flow, they therefore 
will quote futures price as P(.), thus making manipulation unprofitable. Hence, it is 
contradicted by the supposition that trader's manipulative incentive is not disclosed to 
market makers, and cannot constitute an equilibrium. On the other hand, he cannot 
make profits by shorting futures either, since he can only sell short at the equilibrium 
futures price p(.), which is expected to be the price prevailing at delivery. Under this 
circumstance, the type I trader had better stay out of futures trading altogether. 
Case 2: cI>(Q:-H*+c;) = q. This is a special case that the conditional probability is the 
same as their prior, i.e., there is no further evidence on the presence of the manipulator 
by market makers from net order flow. In this case, the market makers' futures pricing 
function is: 
f(/:;, q) = 2p(.) - qp(.) 2+ qw + ,,(qQ, 
For the type I trader, from equations (2.8), (2.9), and (2.11), his optimisation problem 
becomes: 
maxE[II( Q1, H*] 
The first order condition of equation (2.23) with respect to Q1 yields: 
1Q w - p(.) (p(.) - w) _ Q - 0 
2 1 + 2 + q 2 q1 1-
Rearranging the above equation gives: 
Q* _ (1 - q)(p(.) - w) 
1 - (1 - 2q)1 
(2.24) 
But \\'(' argue t.hat there is no equilibrium strategy for the type II trader in this 
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case. To see why, (to be contradicted) suppose that he chooses futures position Q2, his 
optimisation problem is 
(2.25 ) 
Obviously, his expected cash price is less than the equilibrium futures price. As a 
profit maximiser, he will go short as much as he could, since arbitrarily large short order 
contradicted the supposition that market makers' conditional probability of manipulation 
is q. Hence this cannot be an equilibrium strategy. 
We now turn to look at the hedger's optimisation problem. 
The hedger's expected price is (2P(.)-qp(.);QW+Q-yQl ), because her expected futures price 
is exactly the equilibrium futures price, she will hedge exactly the amount of her risk 
exposure Z. 
In this case, the equilibrium clearly hinges on the value of , and the size of the 
hedger's risk exposure Z. If, and Z are sufficiently large, the manipulator could still 
possibly choose Qi > x to manipulate the market without revealing his type to market 
makers with certainty. Otherwise, market makers would quote the futures as P(.) in 
stead of p(.) + <p(Q: - H* + <;)[P(.) - p(.)). For a manipulation to occur in equilibrium, 
we require that either hedging is quite active Qi - Z < x, or the supply in the delivery 
market is inelastic to a certain degree. From equation (2.24), the later condition can be 
t d (l-q)(p(.)-w) represen ,e as:, < (1-2q)(x+Z)' 
Case 3: 0 < <P ( Q: - H* + <;) < 1. In this case, we claim that there is a unique strategy 
for each player to constitute an equilibrium. 
Let's look at the type I trader's problem first. Given market makers' pricing function 
and the hedger'S choice of H, it is not difficult to solve out Qi as a function of H", " q, 
(T; and p(.). Assume that the function form takes 'l/Jl (. ), then the first order condition of 
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equation (2.12) with respect to Q1 gives: 
o 
(2.26) 
Solving equation (2.26), we get the optimal quantity of the type I trader's futures 
position Qi as a function of H*, " q, (J; and p(.). Mathematically, it can be expressed 
as: 
(2.27) 
Although Qi is implicitly expressed in equation (2.27), it is intuitively true that 
~9l > 0 holding the probability function fixed, and a:;_/ < 0 given that the large trader's 
expected profits are fixed. The implication is that the more active the hedger trades, the 
more position can the type I trader acquire without affecting the risk that his type would 
be revealed, given the market makers' pricing function. While the second inequality 
implies that the more inelastic the supply of delivery commodities, the less position 
required for the type I trader to profitably manipulate the market. 
For the type II trader, substituting the futures price back to equation (2.3), his 
optimisation problem becomes: 
W-p(.)+,Q1 
maxE[fI(Q2, H] = max[-Q21>(Q2 - H* + c;)( 2 )] (2.28) 
The first order condition of equation (2.28) with respect to Q2 yields: 
Solution to equation (2.29) yields: 
Q* __ 1>(Q; - H* + c;) 
2 - ¢(Q; _ H* + c;) 
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(2.30) 
Since <1>(Q; - H* + <;) > 0, and ¢(Q; - H* + <;) > 0, the type II trader's optimal 
strategy is therefore to go short with futures. 
Finally, let's look at the hedger's problem. From proposition 1, we know that given 
the large trader's optimal strategy and market makers' pricing function, the hedger's 
optimal choice is given by equation (2.15). We only describe some properties of their 
optimal decisions here. 
Since ° < q < q*, from proposition 1 we are sure that H* > 0. Although it is tedious to 
prove, intuitively all the following properties must hold: ~~ < 0, ~~ < 0, g~ < 0, ~1 > 0. 
These conditions imply that the inelastic supply of delivery commodities at deliyery 
market, the hedger's risk aversion, and the cash price volatility contribute negatively 
to the hedger's short positions; while the larger the risk exposure, the larger the short 
position will she take. 
From equations (2.15), (2.27), and (2.30), there are three unknowns~ and we can solve 
them out explicitly. Thus, we get Qi, Q;, H*, the optimal position strategies for the type 
I trader, the type II trader and the hedger respectively. The type I trader will choose Qi 
long position to profitably manipulate the market; the type II trader will choose Q; short 
posi tion to speculate; and the hedger will choose H* to hedge her long risk exposure in 
cash markets .• 
It is clear from the equilibrium analysis that the probability of manipulation is neces-
sarily not higher than the prior beliefs that the large trader belongs to type I~ or strictly, 
it is not higher than the critical level of the prior beliefs q*. HoweveL one needs to be 
careful in characterizing the large trader's equilibrium strategy, since type I trader can 
choose type II trader's strategy, if he expects it is more profitable to go short. This is 
v('ry important when we consider a game with sequential equilibrium~ although we are 
not going to pursue it here. In order to assume Qi is the type I t[ader's optimal strategy, 
we need inlpose one more restriction. This is that manipulation strategy dominates spec-
ulation strategy whenever a market is manipulatable, i.e., E[II(Qi, H*] > E[II(Q;, H*)]. 
Intuiti\'ely. it is true when the level of q is not high. 
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2.4 Discussions 
2.4.1 How much delivery is optimal in practice 
The foregoing presented a simple theoretical model of commodity futures manipulation. 
It has been shown that when a manipulation is considered by other traders to be very 
likely, manipulation will not occur in equilibrium. But if a manipulation is not highly 
expected, and under certain other conditions, manipulation can occur in equilibrium. In 
equilibrium, the manipulator will take an amount of delivery which exceeds the normal 
delivery supply. 
In practice, usual solution to futures manipulation cases, however, does not involve 
much delivery. As introduced in Chapter 1, what the manipulator prefers is the higher 
liquidation price, and taking delivery itself is not the objective of manipulation, but the 
means to ensure the elevation of futures price at contract maturity in stead. In our 
model, the manipulator already takes into account the "burying the corpse" effect of a 
manipulation, and the optimal level of delivery and optimal position are well determined 
endogenously. The tactics of threatening and bluffing do not appear to be important in 
contrast to most manipulation cases in the real world. Put it in another way, the large 
trader is indifferent in taking delivery up to the optimal amount (X*) in our model. But. 
both the long and short have incentives to take or make less delivery indeed, if delivery 
is costly for both sides. and the manipulator would offer a liquidation price which is less 
than the marginal cost of delivery to the short. If we consider the large trader's legal 
risk for taking huge delivery that he does not want, it is not difficult to understand why 
he will try to avoid delivery if he can persuade the short to liquidate her position at a 
premium. One obvious means to achieve this objective for the manipulator is to offer a 
price to the short slightly below the marginal cost of delivery. 
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2.4.2 What happen if hedgers are not fragmented 
In our model, the hedger is assumed to be an atomistic price taker, and she will be 
happy to accept any liquidation price which is less than the marginal cost of deli\'ery. 
Under this circumstance, manipulation will succeed without involving much delivery. 
But what happens if there are a lot of shorts and they act to collude in the presence 
of manipulation. It is easy to imagine how this situation can arise in practice. The 
shorts at the last stage may collude each other to fight against the manipulator, or one 
relatively large short may buyout of other shorts' positions. In this case, the short will 
gain bargaining power with the manipulator to achieve a better price, instead of the price 
assigned by the manipulator. Manipulation is still possible as long as other conditions 
remain, but the profitability and the nature of equilibrium will change. It is predictable 
that the actual probability of manipulation will be less than what our model implies. 
However, the actual outcomes are indeterminate, which involves a game with bilateral 
bargaining. We do not intend to pursue this problem into details here. 
2.4.3 How the large trader behaves in multi-period models 
Another interesting consideration is to see what happens if we extend our model from 
the single period to two- or multi-period. We briefly consider a two-period model here. 
Assume futures trading takes place on two dates, date 1 and date 2 respectively. On 
date 1 and 2, the large trader and the hedger trade futures contracts that expire on date 
3. The cash price on date 3 is determined by the deliverable stocks, and demand and 
supply disturbance c. Futures prices on date 1 L< ... ld date 2 which are quoted by market 
makers after observing date 1 and date 2's order flow, are 11 and 12. The hedger expects 
to have exogenous risk exposure ZI + Z2 on date 3, and hedge in futures market to cover 
tIl(' exposure of Zl outstanding on date 1 and Z2 on date 2 respectively. 
Assun1e the classes of game players and the types of large trader are exactly the same 
as what we described in the previous game. The hedger has a prior assessment (q) of 
the large trader's type before she n1akes decisions to hedge her risk exposure ZIon date 
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1. Assume 0 < q < q*, trade precedes as discussed in previous game. Although both the 
hedger and market makers do not observe the large trader's type, after date l' trading, 
the hedger can infer from the previous delivery prices, futures prices and her own first 
period's position about the large trader's type, and update her beliefs before she enters 
into the second period's trading. Assume J-l is the posterior probability of manipulation, 
then J-l = Pr[Ti = Tl If 1, H] . The hedger will trade on date 2 only if the large trader is 
not the type I with certainty. 
It is interesting to note that, the large trader's optimal strategy will change enor-
mously. Put in other words, the optimal strategy for the large trader may not be an 
equilibrium strategy in this two-period game. It is clear that the manipulator has incen-
tives to convey the information that he is not the type I on date 1. Since if he chooses to 
manipulate at date 1, there may be less profitable opportunities at date 2. The indirect 
way of doing it may be to signal by choosing futures position being low even if he is the 
type 1. The less profits from the date l' trading may be offset by the second period's 
gains, so the total expected profits may be maximized. There are clearly many equilibria 
in this game. We are not going to delve into equilibrium analysis here (Chapter 3 mainly 
deals with a dynamic model, but the market structure is slightly different from what 
we are considering here). IvIanipulation can still occur in equilibrium. The conditions 
for the occurrence of manipulation are the similar as those in the previous game, but 
the large trader manipulates the other traders' beliefs so that he maximises his total 
expected profits. On the other hand, the losses to the hedger may be even larger. The 
effects of manipulation are clearer: the equilibrium futures price is kept higher than the 
competitive level for longer periods, and hedging activities are discouraged by the higher 
costs imposed by the manipulator. 
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2.5 'fraders' Behaviour and Policy Implications 
2.5.1 'fraders' behaviour 
Our futures manipulation model shows if a manipulation is not considered to be very 
likely by other traders, and the marginal cost of delivery is sufficiently high, manipulation 
can occur in equilibrium. The large trader makes positive expected profits by either 
manipulating or speculating. In the presence of manipulation, the large trader's profits 
come at the expense of the hedger and market makers; while there is no manipulation, 
his profits may come either from the hedger or from the market makers alone. At the 
same time, market makers can possibly benefit from making the market) which is also 
at the expense of the hedger, and the hedger can also possibly benefit from her short 
positions when there is no manipulation) which is at the expense of the market makers. 
The behaviour of market makers 
The market makers holding their prior beliefs regarding the large trader's type and ob-
serving the trading process quote futures price. They expect the cash price at contract 
expiration is either P(.), if the large trader is the type I; or p(.), if the large trader is the 
type II. Althollgh they try to infer the large trader's type from order flow, they cannot 
identify whether a specific order is from the hedger or from the large trader or from noise 
traders, since the large trader is not so foolish that he trades in such a way that his type 
is revealed on date 1. The only way in which the market makers can do is to keep some 
optimal value 8* of net order flows in mind and price futures to a probability-weighted 
average level using their prior beliefs on the large trader' types and additional information 
from the net order flow. When there is no manipulation, the market makers either offer to 
the hedger (as in the case of proposition 1) at the price p(.) + <1>( Q: - H* + c;) [P(.) - p( .)]. 
As time approaches date 2, they realise that there is no manipulation. hence the cash 
price will be at the competitive level, and they liquidate their net short positions to re-
alise <l profit; or the)' bid to the hedger and the large trader (as in the case of proposil ion 
58 
2) at that price. After they realise that there is no manipulation, they liquidate their net 
long positions to suffer a loss. When there is a manipulation, the market makers offer to 
the manipulator at the price p(.) + <I>(Qi - H* + <;)[P(.) - p(.)], but the ultimate price 
will be the manipulated price (the marginal cost of delivery), then they liquidate their 
positions and suffer a loss. It is hard to gauge whether the market makers can break 
even, which depends on the frequency of manipulation and the size of net positions they 
take in each case. But as in the case of informed trading, it may be safe to conclude 
that manipulation discourages market making activities. The consequences would be 
that they adjust the bid-ask spreads to protect themselves (but we did not model bid-ask 
spread in our model, for details, see Glosten and Milgrom 1985). 
The behaviour of the hedger 
The market makers lose to the large trader in the presence of manipulation, and they can 
either benefit from the hedger or lose to the hedger when there is no manipulation. But 
their losses can be protected by their advantageous position of the second-movers, since 
the presence of either large long net order flow or net short order flow will force them to 
change their price quotations. Obviously, the hedger is in general the loser. When she 
takes a short position at p(.) + <I> ( Qi - H* + <;) [P(.) - p(.)], if the large trader manipulates, 
the final price on date 2 rises to the marginal cost of delivery, then she suffers a loss. The 
size of the loss is approximately measured as -(1 - <I>(Qi - H* + <;))[P(.) - p(.)]H*. If 
the large trader speculates, the final price is the competitive price, she makes a profit in 
futures trading, and the profit is measured as <I>(Qi - H* + <;)[P(.) - p(.)]H*. When she 
takes a long position at p(.)+<I>(Qi-H*+<;)[P(.) -p(.)], and if the large trader speculates, 
the final price falls to the competitive level, therefore she suffers a loss again. The loss is 
approxinlately measured as -q<I>(Qi - H* + <;)[P(.) - p(.)]H*. Although the hedger can 
benefit from futures trading sometimes, she must share the limited profits from market 
nmkcrs with the large trader. Therefore, in general the profits cannot make up for the 
losses. The hedger cannot do better than that, because she is the least informed. The 
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only way in which she can protect herself is to hedge less the risk that would be fully 
hedged in a futures market without manipulation or stay out of futures market altogether. 
Hence manipulation discourages hedging activities. 
From the equilibrium analysis above, it is clear that the equilibrium probability of 
manipulation is necessarily not greater than the prior beliefs in the market on the prob-
ability that the large trader belongs to the type I, q. More strictly, it is less than q*, the 
critical value of the market beliefs on the probability of manipulation for a manipulation 
to occur in equilibrium. This may offer a partial explanation of the fact that actual 
manipulation is not so often in commodity futures markets, although conditions for the 
occurrence of manipulation are rather weak in our model. 
2.5.2 Policy implications 
Our model predicts that long manipulation typically increases the equilibrium futures 
price and discourages hedging, and more important, manipulation causes futures price 
to be a biased estimate of the future cash price from the point view of all market par-
ticipants and observers except the market makers. The unbiasedness is not held for the 
large trader and the hedger because they are not able to observe the net order flow, 
although the large trader knows his own type and the hedger's objective function. This 
implies the proper functioning of futures markets is impaired. Therefore~ traders and 
market observers who make their production, storage or investment decisions based on 
the futures price may be nlisled. There are other welfare costs of manipulation. Firstly, 
manipulation may create unnecessary costs of delivery. As showed in the model, for 
a manipulation to occur in equilibrium, it is necessary for the large trader to demand 
or threaten to demand an amount of delivery exceeding the normal level of deliverable 
stocks, which will result in unnecessary costs of delivery. These costs include transporta-
tion costs of shipping commodity from non-delivery markets to delivery point, grading 
costs of transforming non-deliverable commodity into contract specified warehouses. etc. 
S('('ondly, 111aniplliation nlay distort spatial consumption patterns of the comnlOdity. I\Ia-
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nipulation increases the price of the commodity in the delivery market; which benefits 
the owners of the commodity and increases the costs of consumption of the commodit:y. 
It may also attract more than normal level of delivery to the delivery point and the 
price of the commodity will fall at the delivery market after delivery is made due to 
the burying the corpse effect. This will result in too much consumption in the delivery 
market and too little at non-delivery points, and the distortions of price relationships 
between the delivery market and non-delivery points. Thirdly, manipulation discourages 
hedging not only through the hedger's loss of money consistently, but also by the loss 
of utility through less hedging than in the competitive case, since the hedger anticipates 
the possibility of a higher cash price at delivery due to manipulation. These are the im-
portant social costs of manipulation, which provides the rationale for futures regulation. 
It is therefore beneficial for a response of public policies to lowering the actual proba-
bility of manipulation <I>(.), and thereby lowering the market beliefs on the probability 
of manipulation, the q. Explicit considerations of futures regulation are left to Chapter 
5, we briefly analyse to what extent futures manipulation as modeled in this Chapter 
can be deterred or eliminated by using some commonly proposed anti-manipulation rules 
which are either imposed by futures exchanges, regulatory authorities or self-regulatory 
organisations. 
Delivery options 
Delivery options aims at increasing deliverable supply at the delivery market, which \vill 
redw'c the profitability of manipulation by increasing the elasticity of the nlarginal cost of 
delivery. Adding delivery options dearly has beneficial effects on reducing the probability 
of manipulation. 
One way to increase delivery supply is to add delivery points and to allow a futures 
contract to hmoe multiple delivery grades. One main argument against this is that it 
nlay reduce hedging effectiveness of futures contracts (see, for example; Edwards and 
Edwards 1DS·L Fischel and Ross 1991, etc.). The reason is that adding delivery options 
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may decrease the relation between the futures price and the cash price in the specific 
deliverable commodity in the original futures contract. Another argument against this is 
that it may be a less effect means of transferring ownership of the physical commodity, 
since longs may receive delivery of the commodity at unsatisfactory location. Both 
arguments are not necessarily true after careful examinations. Firstly, although multiple 
delivery points and grades will certainly reduce the correlation between the futures price 
and the price of the specific deliverable commodity, and therefore the hedging effectiveness 
for hedging that commodity, in any actual futures market, it is seldom that a hedger's 
hedge is exactly matched with the specification of the contract, and most hedges are cross 
hedges where there is mismatch in the location or grade of the hedge and the location or 
grade deliverable against any futures contract. Secondly, a futures market is to provide a 
mechanism for price discovery and risk shifting, but not a merchandising tool for physical 
commodities (Bianco 1977, p.29). 
However, in practice there is still a trade-off between adding delivery options to reduce 
the probability of manipulation and hedging effectiveness of some specific commodities. 
Too broader delivery options will danger a futures contract for hedging some specific risk 
and therefore the liquidity and the success of a contract. The optimal amount of delivery 
options may differ cross different commodities and extensive discussions are beyond the 
scope of this chapter. 
In general, it may be beneficial to allow delivery of a futures contract at a variety 
of points or of variety of grades in order to reduce the frequency of manipulation. But 
this does not imply that delivery options can eliminate manipulation altogether, since it 
is too costly and indeed not feasible to construct a perfect elasticity of the commodity 
by simply adding delivery options, and too many delivery options may make a futures 
conb'(u t less useful in providing a mechanism for discovering the price and shifting the 
risk for some specific commodities. 
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Cash settlement 
Cash settlement has been proposed as a device to reduce or eliminate futures manip-
ulation by using the physical delivery mechanism. A cash settlement futures contract 
establishes an obligation for the shorts to deliver cash to longs in an amount equal to a 
settlement index t hat reflects the cash market value of a particular commodity. It is true, 
if the settlement index is free of rnanipulative influences, futures manipulation would be 
eliminated entirely~ and the long has no incentive to bid the futures price to reflect the 
marginal cost of delivery by establishing an extremely large position. But in practice, it 
is very difficult to construct the settlement index for commodities which is free of ma-
nipulation. The usual way to construct settlement index is to base it on cash market 
prices or on the transaction prices. If so, cash settlement does not affect manipulation 
very much. As we showed in our model, manipulation only occurs when the deliverable 
supply is "tight" 1 the cash prices or transaction prices which are the basis of the price 
index for cash settlement are very likely to be manipulatable. In this case. manipulation 
of futures market and manipulation of cash market would occur jointly. For example, 
suppose we use cash price as the cash settlement price in our model, and if the hedger 
is sure that the large trader is the type I after date 1 's trading, she is myare that both 
the cash and futures prices prevailing on date 2 would be pushed up to P ( .), which will 
be the settlement price on date 2, and she will be willing to pay up to P(.) to cancel 
her contractual obligations. Therefore, the cash settlement does not affect manipulation 
except that the large trader may bid the cash price to the level of the nlarginal cost of 
delivery by buying the deliverable stocks and sell them at the post-delivery price. 
However, if we can construct a cash settlement index which is based on the average 
price of a group of related commodities in local markets, a group of the sanle commodities 
in different locations, manipulation would be better deterred or eliminated. But this 
construction may be subject to ignorance of current market conditions. 1Iore important, 
it creates difficulties for hedgers to hedge specific risks, which is critical to the success of 
it conllllodity futures contract. 
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Position limits and position reporting 
Position limits, if well devised, have beneficial effects on the manipulation prevention. 
Position limits are usually imposed on the long positions, which is premised on the 
historical experience that short manipulation is rare. 
In our model, we show long manipulation would occur if a manipulation is not con-
sidered to be very likely by other traders, the additional deliverable stocks are not inex-
pensively available and the large trader's futures position exceeds the deliverable stocks 
at the delivery point at contract maturity. Clearly, if we set a position limit which is less 
than the deliverable stocks at the contract maturity, pure squeezes will be eliminated, 
but which is not necessarily true for corners. A corner's action on cash markets can 
reduce the stocks available for shorts to make delivery to a certain amount by controlling 
cash stocks at hand, so that his limited futures position can still possibly exceed the 
deliverable stocks available for the shorts to make delivery. More important, it is bene-
ficial to be aware that position limits do not affect the occurrence of corners if we only 
impose position limits on the futures positions, except that they do discourage corners 
by reducing their expected profits. The potential beneficial way to impose position limits 
is to extend the limits from futures positions only to cash positions, positions on OTC 
markets, and options positions. Once this is done, manipulation would be well prevented 
in our model. 
However, position limits are less effective in practice. Three main reasons lie in: 
first, it is possible for several large traders to act co-operatively to manipulate a market; 
second, position limits should be set according to the deliverable stocks of a specific 
market, but deliverable stocks are changeable from time to time~ and it is therefore 
naturally difficult to work out criteria for these limits; and finally, in order to achieve 
the preventive effects of position limits on manipulation, it is essential to extend the 
lirnits from futures to other markets. This provokes potential conflicts among regulatory 
authorities on different markets and also ultimately imposes huge costs on Inarket users. 
The Large Trader R.eporting SysteIn by the CFTC has been argued to be an effcct i\·(' 
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way to prevent manipulation in the United States. The US large trader reporting system 
requires that reports be filed with the CFTC for futures contracts and options on futures 
by four primary sources: positions holding bona fide hedge positions; contracts market: 
foreign and domestic traders and futures commission merchants (FCrvls) and foreign 
brokers. Any trader, either foreign or domestic, who holds controls, or has a financial 
interest in an open futures position which equals or exceeds the fixed reporting level for 
that particular commodity (reporting position) must file until his position declines below 
the reporting level. A reportable trader must be required to file two types of reports. 
The first, the CFTC form 40 (statement of reporting trader) which must be filed no later 
than 10 business days after the trader assumes a reportable futures position, identifies 
the trader and discloses the identity of persons who have a significant financial interest in~ 
or control the trading of, the reportable account. The second type, the CFTC series '03 
reports', must be filed for the time period specified in a special call, provides the CFTC 
with the raw position data of the reportable trader. The information is subsequently 
released by the CFTC in aggregated form in the weekly Commitments of Traders in 
Futures (CTF) reports. 
A large trader reporting system aims at reducing manipulation probability through 
increasing market transparency .. It is very effective tool in manipulation deterrence and 
manipulation prevention. Firstly, a large trader reporting system has effects on manip-
ulation deterrence. With the large trader reporting system, it is true that the large 
trader must act less aggressively to make a manipulation less likely to occur. Since his 
position must be filed with the CFTC, if he does optimally, he is likely to be prosecuted 
successfully ex post by the CFTC. Secondly~ the large trader reporting system has pre-
ventative effects on manipulation. The CFTC publishes CTF reports weekly, and from 
this information other traders become more aware of an incre8Se in the concentration 
in long positions which might result in a manipulation, they can manage their positions 
accordingly, thus prohibiting manipulation to a certain degree. 
\V(, must admit the linlitations of t.he effects of the large trader reporting systelll 
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on manipulation. First, we lack an obvious criteria for the reportable position, if the 
reportable position is defined too large, the system does not work, or does not work well; 
but if too small, it may impair the trading incentives for some large commercial traders. 
Second, it does not rule out the possibility for several large traders to manipulate a 
market cooperatively. Third, the current reporting is confined to on-exchange positions. 
Finally, as analysed above; the system's effects on the prevention of manipulation work 
partially through its deterrent effects by ex post prosecutions, which is conditional on the 
supposition that manipulation is made a felony legally, but futures regulation has not 
been so in most countries except the USA. 
2.6 Conclusions 
~~e examined a simple model based on some informational and game-theoretic assump-
tions. We have shown that manipulation, either as a "squeeze" or as a "corner", may 
occur in equilibrium under certain conditions. Manipulation has adverse effects on the 
functioning of futures markets. Manipulation distorts the relationship between futures 
price and the expected cash price, and futures price is not an unbiased estimate of the 
future cash price anymore from the point view of all market participants or observers 
except the market makers. Long manipulation typically increases the equilibrium futures 
price, discourages hedging activities, and results in other welfare costs to society .. 
The risk averse hedger who is the least informed, but is persuaded to use the advanced 
form of market organisation - futures markets to hedge her risk exposure is in general 
the loser; the market makers who are committed to make the market, although they can 
observe the trading process, are still uncertain about the large trader's type. They can 
lose to the informed trader. tdthough sometimes they may gain from the hedger; the only 
winner is the large trader because of his privileged information. 
One attractive feature of our model is that the informational assumptions are less 
rc:-;tricti\'(' and doser to t.he real world compared with the previous models. Another 
66 
feature is that we demonstrate the uniqueness of equilibrium, and all traders act and 
response optimally in equilibrium according to the information available to them at the 
time of contracting. Finally, we modelled the hedger's behaviour explicitly, and more 
important, in contrast to the Kyle's model, the hedger's losing position in the presence 
of manipulation is endogenous in our analysis. 
Some commonly proposed measures to fight against manipulation are briefly analysed. 
Although some have beneficial effects on the prevention of manipulation, we have to be 
aware that factors to trigger the occurrence of manipulation are mainly from the features 
of futures markets and futures trading themselves. Therefore, we expect to face a trade-off 
between the elimination of manipulation and the elimination of futures trading altogether. 
Possible extensions of this single-period model to a two- or multi-period model, or 
from a single large trader model to a simultaneous-move model with two or more large 
traders, or from a model with one atomistic hedger to a model with one or several 
powerful hedgers with bargaining power, under our informational structure, may reveal 
the traders' behaviour more explicitly, which is the direction of future research. 
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Chapter 3 
A Dynamic Futures Manipulation 
Game "With Incomplete Information 
3.1 Introduction 
As discussed in the previous chapter, in addition to delivery market characteristics and 
noise trading, asymmetric information problem exists in futures markets. These may also 
help to explain the vulnerability of a futures market to manipulation. When other traders 
are less aware of the presence of a manipulator, a nlanipulation may occur in equilibrium. 
Since under this circumstance, there is a significant probability that the manipulator 
acquires a huge futures position from other traders which exceeds the deliverable supply 
and thereby squeezes the shorts successfully. However, when this is considered to be likely 
by other traders, a manipulation is not profitable, as rational traders do not voluntarily 
stand on the other side of the market to get squeezed. In extreme cases, other traders 
will choose to stay out of futures trading altogether, and the market may break down. 
Therefore, a manipulator must attempt to hide behind other traders. 
In a one-shot game with asymmetric information (Chapter 2) in which other traders 
cannot tell the large trader's type accurately, we show that the sufficient conditions for a 
Illaniplllation to occur include: (i) the probability that the large trader is a manipulator 
68 
is below a certain critical level; (ii) delivery supply is inelastic to a certain degree. 1Ianip-
ulation can benefit the large trader in two ways. When a manipulation is considered to be 
very likely, he goes short and makes profits which are larger than those by assuming risk 
transferred by hedgers. When a manipulation is not highly expected by other traders, he 
may establish a large position and undertake a manipulation. The consequences are that 
futures price becomes a biased estimate of the future cash price from the point view of all 
traders except the market makers, and futures price is kept higher than the competitive 
level (in the presence of long manipulation). Therefore, futures manipulation reduces the 
accuracy of price discovery, discourages hedging activities, and results in other welfare 
costs. 
In this chapter, we attempt to extend the above model of futures manipulation into 
a dynamic context using a slightly modified market structure. In the real world, we do 
not observe a high frequency of manipulation even in markets which meet the sufficient 
conditions above. Several reasons may be offered to explain this fact, apart from the 
differences in market characteristics. First, almost all futures markets are extensively 
regulated markets. Second, large traders, who use heavily futures markets, clearly do 
not wish to destroy the markets. Finally, other traders may detect a manipulator's pres-
ence from previous delivery prices and then shift their trading strategies accordingly, thus 
making manipulative strategies unsuccessful. Apart from futures regulation, we there-
fore expect that asymmetric information and the associated adverse selection problem 
may force a manipulator to behave like an ordinary speculator, such that his presence 
in the market is only detectable to a certain degree in a dynamic setting, and market 
manipulation only occurs occasionally. In a finitely repeated game, we conjecture that 
manipulation would not occur at all until the end of the game approaches if other traders 
cg,n detect the large trader's type accurately ex post from available information. Oth-
erwise, the market will break down until the manipulator leaves the market. However, 
full information revelation may be not realistic in any actual futures market, since it is 
llsnally iInpossible for traders to obtain son1e essential information even after delivery has 
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taken place or price is announced - for example, there may be very limited information 
on each trader's position, supply shocks, etc. 
In sequential trading games, noise trading is commonly introduced to avoid fully re-
vealing equilibria outcomes (see, for example, Kyle 1985; Back 1992; Foster and Viswan-
than 1996; etc.), and this is assumed to be symmetric and uncorrelated with other vari-
ables. In these models, noise trading is effectively used as a disguise by the informed 
trader to minimise the price effects of his trading. The informed trader's profits are thus 
positively related to the variance of noise trading. This assumption of noise trading may 
be inappropriate in our manipulation game, since noise trading may bring additional di-
mension of risk to the large trader's decisions. We therefore, in addition to conventional 
noise trading, introduce a new variable, termed market uncertainty, which generalises 
some restrictions as implied by noise trading within informed trading models into this 
game, so that it affects traders' decision maki:c.g in an important way. 
As in informed trading models, we still assign noise trading the role of camouflage 
by the large trader such that it is impossible for the hedger to infer from her own fu-
tures position to the large trader's position, and hence discover the large trader's type 
accurately ex post, but it does not affect the large trader's decision-making very much 
(at least it is insufficient to destroy the large trader's strategy). This may be justified 
by assuming that the variance of noise trading is not large. The new variable - market 
uncertainty, is however important for the large trader's decision-making. It can be sim-
ply represented by assuming that there is a probability that the large trader may fail to 
achieve what he is intending, which may capture correlation effects among noise trading 
and other variables in the model, and may also incorporate other sources of exogenous 
uncertainty. This new variable may be justified by assuming that there is a probability 
that noise trading and supply shocks may simultaneously come into force, or his nlanip-
ulative potential may be circumvented by the exchange or other regulatory authorities, 
which is not directly controlled by traders, but the probability of such occurrence can be 
estimated from history in a specific market. In a dynamic trading game, this uncertainty 
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is important, since it may change the large trader's behaviour enormously, and it may be 
more difficult for some traders to detect other traders' presence accurately. For example. 
here the hedger cannot tell whether a manipulator is in place perfectly even she observes 
a higher previous delivery price, and the manipulator himself is also uncertain whether 
a manipulation will be successful in the presence of this market uncertainty. 
Although it is difficult to predict whether manipulation may occur less frequently 
with this exogenous uncertainty than that without it, the manipulator may behave less 
aggressively, the accuracy of 'price discovery' may be less disturbed and the hedger may 
be less seriously hurt in the case of manipulation in this model, since a manipulator 
must take this uncertainty into account when determining his trading strategy. The 
implication is that, increasing this uncertainty may help to reduce the adverse effects of 
manipulation, which justifies certain anti-manipulation rules currently imposed by some 
regulators or exchanges, such as trading for liquidation only, allowing shorts to default 
on contracts, trading halts, etc. 
Based on these observations, we construct a two-period model with three classes of 
traders: one large trader with two types: type I and type II, where the type I is a 
speculator and the type II is a manipulator; one representative hedger and noise traders. 
The hedger who hedges her exogenous risk exposure in cash markets by llsing a futures 
market, is uncertain about the large trader's type, and therefore his payoff function. But 
she holds some beliefs on the large trader's type when making her hedging decisions. 
The large trader, who possesses market power, can manipulate other traders' beliefs on 
his type, and move the market to his advantage. He can do so by mimicing the type I 
trader to some extent so that the manipulation probability is kept sufficiently low at the 
initial period and then to manipulate the market in the last period. The hedger observing 
the previous contract delivery process updates her beliefs and makes the second period 
trading decision, but she cannot identify the large trader' type accurately because of 
noise trading and some degree of exogenous uncertainty. The consequence is that, there 
always exists some positive probability of manipulation in the market. and the futures 
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price is kept above the competitive level. 
Our purpose here is to investigate how a large trader manipulates a futures market 
successfully even when the hedger trades strategically, and how other parameters affect 
the nature of equilibrium. This makes our model setting differ in many aspects from 
standard market microstructure literature where the focus is to analyse how a market 
maker learns from the order flow and how this, in turn, affects the movement of prices 
over time: 
First, information-based trades arise from different sources. Market microstructure 
models (for example, Copeland and Galai 1983; Glosten and Milgrom 1985; Kyle 1985; 
etc.) assume that order flows may include information-based trades, and therefore market 
makers who observe the net order flow, can infer from the order flow about the traders' 
types and then quote bid-ask prices. While our model suggests that the delivery process 
(delivery price, the quantity of delivery taken, etc.) may contain information about the 
presence of a manipulator, and the hedger who observes the delivery process, can infer 
from it the possible existence of a manipulator. 
Second, we implicitly allow traders to have price-elastic demand functions. In our 
model, both the hedger and the large trader's equilibrium strategies essentially depend on 
futures prices, although we do not explicitly assume that traders submit price-contingent 
orders, such as demand schedules as, for example, Kyle (1989). In standard market 
microstructure models, the informed is not allowed to condition his trades on prices. 1 
Finally, in our model, both the large trader and the hedger trade competitively to 
maximise their respective utilities and choose their trade sizes which allow the traders' 
behaviour to be analysed more explicitly. In standard market microstructure models, 
however, the uninformed (the market maker) is normally assumed to be not a utility 
maximiser and the informed trader's trading size is restricted in order to avoid instanta-
lSee, for example, Copeland and Galai (1983), Glosten and Milgrom (1985), etc. In these models, 
informed traders will prefer to trade as much and as often as possible as long as prices are not at full 
information levels. To avoid this instantaneous revelation outcome, they assume that traders are chosen 
to trade probabilistically, and a trader allows to trade at most one unit of asset when it is his turn to 
trade. 
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neous information revelation outcome (see, for example, Glosten and Milgrom 1985). 
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. In section 3.2, we describe the basic 
structure of the market we are modelling. Section 3.3 provides traders' information 
sets, strategies and the equilibrium concept. In section 3.4, we analyse the properties of 
equilibria and derive the sufficient conditions for the existence as well as non-existence 
of manipulative strategies. Finally, brief concluding remarks complete this chapter. 
3.2 Structure of the Model 
3.2.1 The market and traders 
We concentrate our attention on a commodity futures market with manipulation history. 
The market we are modelling involves no transaction costs. All orders are market orders. 
The market is cleared by setting total long orders equal total short orders. Futures 
positions are settled by delivery at the end of each period. At the beginning of each 
period, traders simultaneously submit orders according to information available to them. 
There are three classes of traders. One large trader with two types: the type I trader 
always speculates to maximise utilities by taking risk transferred from the hedger; the 
type II trader manipulates the market to maximise his utilities. Both are risk averse, but 
the type II is less risk averse. His less risk aversion and low costs of manipulation may 
justify his type as a manipulator, which may arise from his well-diversified portfolios~ 
easier accessibility to external finance, scope of business involved, etc. In addition, the 
market contains one representative risk averse hedger; and continuum of noise traders 
who trade for exogenous reasons. This game is played by the large trader and the hedger 
strategically. 
The large trader is an imperfect competitor, and he maximises his expected utility 
given his type, but takes into account the impacts of his trading strategy (futures position) 
on the equilibrium futures price. The hedger maximises her utility given the information 
(wailable to her. Gi\'en the specific utility function form (for details~ see Section 3.4.1), 
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each trader (except noise traders) is effectively seen to submit a linear demand schedule 
which is conditional on the futures price. The market is cleared by aggregating the 
amount of noise trading and the schedules submitted by the large trader and the hedger. 
In this aspect, the market clearing mechanism looks like a ''Walrasian'' auctioneer, who 
aggregates the total demands, calculates a market clearing price and allocates quantities 
to satisfy traders' demands. Theoretically, there is a probability that a market clearing 
price does not exist when there is positive excess demand or negative excess demand at 
all prices. We therefore assume that the auctioneer can announce a positively infinite 
futures price when there is positive excess demand so that buyers will receive negatively 
infinite utility, or a negatively infinite futures price when there is negative excess demand 
so that sellers receive negatiyely infinite utility. Under these circumstances, infinite price 
will not occur in equilibrium. 
3.2.2 Timing of the model 
We consider a two-period model in which the size of the population of traders is constant. 
It also captures the features of an overlapping-generations model. The large trader lives 
in both periods. The two hedgers live in only one period: t = 0, t = 1 respectively, but 
they have memory. Once the hedger settles her futures position at the end of period 
0, another representative hedger with the same preference as the previous one comes 
into the market. All strategic traders maximise their utilities by choosing their optimal 
futures positions. 
t=o 
The timing and events proceed as follows: 
At t = ° 
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The large trader is born with one of the two types: the type I with probability of qo 
and the type II with probability of 1 - qo. Given these prior beliefs, the hedger forms 
her expectations on the delivery price at the end of t = 0 and decides her optimal hedge. 
The large trader chooses his strategy (the first period futures positions) to maximise his 
two-period utilities by taking into account the fact that his first period strategy affects 
the hedger's beliefs regarding his type. All positions are settled either by delivery or 
through offsetting by the end of the period. 
At t = 1 
Given the delivery of the first period futures contract has been taken, the hedger by 
observing the delivery process updates her beliefs according to Bayes' rule. The hedger 
chooses her optimal strategy to maximise her utilities, while the large trader decides his 
futures positions which mature at the end of period 1 accordingly. Essentially, the large 
trader's second period strategy is determined by his first period actions. After the end 
of period 1, the large trader leaves the market. 
3.3 Information and Strategies 
3.3.1 Information sets 
Common knowledge 
All traders have equal access to information about previous equilibrium futures prices, 
delivery prices and other relevant information during the delivery processes. When there 
is no market uncertainty, delivery prices for the two periods are determined by the de-
mand and supply conditions of the underlying assets prevailing at that time. Without 
loss of generality, we assume that the delivery (cash) price is expected to be two-point 
distributed, which equals either P(.) or p(.), and is the same for the two periods. (.) 
denotes the content of supply shocks which are assumed to be normally distributed with 
mean 0 and variance 0";. 
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There is a prior probability qo that the large trader belongs to the type I, which can 
be calculated from the previous delivery price. We assume that qo is a sufficient statistic 
for the history up to the date t = O. Mathematically qo = prob(Ti = Tl). Ti denotes the 
large trader's type space Ti E [Tl' T2], where Tl stands for the type I (the speculator) and 
T2 stands for the type II (the manipulator). This information is up datable according to 
Bayes'rule. 
Noise traders trade aggregately a total position 'T} in each period, which is normally 
distributed with mean 0 and variance (J~. The representative hedger in each period hedges 
risk exposure Zj outstanding at the end of each period respectively, where j = [0,1]. For 
simplicity, we assume that Zj=Z. 
There is an exogenous uncertainty 1- L, where L > ~, which is the probability that 
the large trader fails to achieve what he is intending, perhaps because of the correlation 
effects of noise trading with other variables in the model, or due to some other exogenous 
reasons. 
Asymmetric information 
Nature draws the type of the large trader and discloses the information to the large 
trader only. Effectively, the large trader knows his own type, his payoff function and the 
hedger's payoff function; while the hedger is uncertain about the large trader type and 
therefore, his payoff function. 
3.3.2 Information updating 
The previous contract delivery process is observable by each trader. We assume that 
the delivery price contains sufficient information about the large trader's type. Without 
loss of generality, the delivery price observable by traders at the end of the first trading 
period is assumed to be either pH or pL, where pL < pH. pH is the realised higher 
delivery price and pL is the realised lower delivery price. 
The higher price nlay contain two events: first, the large trader intends manipulation 
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and succeeds; second, the large trader intends speculation, but asymmetric noise trading 
or supply shocks or some other exogenous forces push the price to a high level. The 
hedger cannot tell the difference. Similarly, the lower price may also result from two 
events: first, the large trader intends speculation; and second, the large trader intends 
manipulation but fails. However, there is a positive relationship between the level of 
delivery price and the large trader's type. 
Given the prior qo that the large trader is the type I and the level of uncertainty (1- 1-), 
after she observes the first period delivery process, the hedger's beliefs are updated using 
Bayes' rule. Thus if the type II trader is known to play the strategy of speculation with 
probability 0, and intending manipulation with probability (1 - 0) at t = 0, i.e., playing 
~ 
a mixed strategy intending speculation with probability 0, then the hedger updates her 
beliefs: 
(3.1) 
if P = pL is observed and 
(3.2) 
if P = pH is observed, where 0 = 1-0 + (1 - 0)(1 - 1-). 
If 0 < 1, then 0 < I- as long as (21- - 1) > 0, i.e., 1/2 < I- < l. 
From equation (3.1) and (3.2), it is clear that conditional on P = pL, if 0 < 1-, then 
ql > qo, inlplying that market beliefs that the large trader is the type I improve if a lower 
first period delivery price is observed. Conditional on P = pH, then ql < qo, implying 
that market beliefs weaken if a higher first period delivery price is observed. The first 
~ 
period delivery price is also affected by the large trader's first period strategy. Given 0, 
t.he hedger's expected probability of observing a lower delivery price at the end of t = ° 
is I-qo + (1 - qo)O and the expected probability of observing a higher delivery price is 
(1 - I-)qo + (1- qo)(l - 0). Consequently the hedger's expected future cash price at the 
,...,... 
{ { 
end of t = 0 is: 
h - -Eo (P) = P(.) - [8 + Lqo - qo8][P(.) - p(.)] 
where 8Eio(iJ) = -(1 - qo)[P(.) - p(.)] < 0 and 8~~?> = (8 - L)(P(.) - p(.)) < o. 
As L -----* 1, Eg(P) -----* P(.) - [qo + (1 - qo)8][P(.) - p(.)]. The hedger's expected price 
depends on the prior probability and the large trader's first period strategy only. As 
L -----* ~,Eg(P) -----* ~[P(.) + p(.)], implying that, as the market tends to become extremely 
uncertain, the hedger's expectations do not depend on the large trader's actions. 
3.3.3 Extensive form representation 
The large trader types are distinguished by manipulation or speculation, which is given by 
nature and revealed to the large trader. This is a game of incomplete information about 
the large trader's cost functions and risk tolerance. We adopt the approach proposed by 
Harsanyi (1967), which involves replacing this incomplete information game by a game 
of complete but imperfect information. This allows us to treat the Nash equilibria of 
this second game as the equilibria of the original game. The imperfect information game 
involves another player, "Nature", which is indifferent over all possible outcomes. Nature 
moves first to select Ti according to the probability distribution: qo = Pr(Ti = Td 
1 - Pr(7i = T2). The large trader is then informed about Ti , but the hedger is not. 
The large trader's strategy in each period is either manipulation or speculation. Ma-
nipulation implies the large trader expects a high delivery price and chooses a large futures 
position which exceeds normal level of deliverable stocks. Speculation means that he has 
no intention to move prices and chooses a futures position according to the risk he is able 
to assume. Let sand m denote speculation and manipulation respectively. The large 
trader's strategy space is defined as Sj E [8j,mj], where Sj E (-00,+00), j = [0,1], j 
stands for the two periods specifically. A positive value of Sj represents going long in 
futures and a negative value represents going short in futures. The hedger's strategy is 
to hedge her risk exposure in cash markets using futures contracts. The strategy space 
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is defined as Hj = hj ,where Hj E (-00, +(0). A positive value of Hj represents going 
short in futures and a negative value stands for going long in futures. 
The real action in this game comes in the first period when the large trader chooses 
futures positions S taking the hedger's expected delivery price at the first period Eg(ii) 
as given, but taking into accolmt the way in which the hedger forms her expectations in 
the second period E? (P) as a function of the type inferred from the events at the end of 
the first period. 
The positions that the large trader obtained are unobservable. But the final delivery 
price is observable by all traders. After observing the delivery process in the first period, 
the hedger updates her information regarding the large trader's type using Bayes' rule. 
The information updating process is additionally blurred by the introduction of exogenous 
uncertainty. It can arise from the correlation effects between noise trading and supply 
shocks or other exogenous reasons. 
We follow the notation of sequential equilibrium developed by Kreps and Wilson 
(1982a, 1982b). A sequential equilibrium comprises a strategy for each trader and for 
each period j, where j = [0, 1], qj taking histories of moves up to period j into numbers 
in [0,1] such that: 
• In each period, the hedger's strategy is optimal, given her beliefs in that period 
and given the large trader's equilibrium strategy; 
• In the two periods, the large trader's strategy is optimal, given his types and given 
the equilibriunl strategy by the hedger in each period; 
• Given the equilibrium strategies followed by the two types of the large trader, the 
hedger's posterior beliefs are derived from the prior beliefs and the observations of 
delivery process at the end of period O. 
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3.4 The Existence of Manipulation Strategies 
3.4.1 Payoff functions 
All traders have mean-variance utility functions. Let E denote expectations; U denote 
utility; II denote profits, and p, 1'\" A denote constant absolute risk aversions for the spec-
ulator (type I), the manipulator (type II) and the hedger respectively, where I'\, < p < A. 
Traders' expected payoffs can be written as follows: 
1. Payoff functions for the large trader 
If he is a speculator, his expected payoffs are: 
where j = 0,1, S denotes a speculator, and ES(Uj ) 
ES(TIj ) = Sj * [EJ(p) - fj]· 
If he is the manipulator, his expected payoffs are: 
where m denotes the manipulator, and Em (Uj ) = Em (TIj ) - 0.51'\, V ar(TI j ), Em (TI j ) = 
mj * [Ej(p) - fj]. 
2. Payoff function for the hedger 
The hedger's expected payoffs are: 
where IIj = Zp + (fj - p)hj and Z is the hedger's risk exposure outstanding at the 
end of each period. 
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3.4.2 Assumptions 
In order to simplify the solution to this game, we additionally require the following 
assumptions. 
• Assumption 1 The futures market is highly liquid and delivery market is imperfectly 
elastic. 
By assumption 1, we can ignore the large trader's decisions related to the cash (de-
livery) market. Cash market conditions, such as supply elasticity of deliverable stocks, 
burying the corpse effects, etc., are actually critical to the success of a manipulation. For 
relevant analysis, see Pirrong (1995b) and Wang (1997). After this simplification, the 
large trader can always manipulate by taking sufficient positions which exceed deliverable 
stocks if a manipulation is not considered by the hedger to be very likely, i.e., the hedger 
will hedge actively. 
• Assumption 2 Expected utility functions E(U) are strictly increasing, twice con-
tinuously differentiable and concave. 
3.4.3 Sufficient conditions for the existence of manipulation 
strategies 
In this section, we turn to examine equilibrium properties of this game. As the first 
step in characterizing the equilibrium, we claim that the prior beliefs are essential to 
the existence of manipulation strategies. If the prior probability that the large trader 
belongs to the type I is lower than a critical level, speculation strategy strictly dominates 
manipnlation strategy in equilibrium. 
Proposition 1 Given other exogenous parameters, there exists a prior probability qo 
such that for any other values of qo < qo, speculation strategy dominates manipulation 
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strategy at t = O. Where qo is given by the following equation: 
(3.3) 
and x is the normal level of deliverable stocks at the end of period O. 
Proof. see Appendix. 
From equation (3.3), given other parameters, it is easy to see that the critical value of 
the initial beliefs increases with the normal level of deliverable stocks and the variance of 
supply shocks, but decreases with the hedger's total risk exposure and the price difference 
between the manipulated price and the competitive price. 
The intuition behind proposition 1 is very simple. When the prior is low, the hedger 
expects a high price at delivery, and will hedge less. If the prior is lower than a level 
such that the hedger's total hedge is less than the normal level of deliverable stocks at 
delivery, the large trader will by no means acquire a position which is sufficiently large 
to manipulate profitably. Since the large trader also knows that, he will definitely not 
submit a large market order to the market. 
Equations (A.3.1) and (A.3.2) also present two important results we wish to claim in 
this model, i.e., long manipulation typically increases the equilibrium price and manipu-
lation discourages hedging activities (recall that qo is the probability that the large trader 
is the speculator here). From equation (A.3.1), it is easy to find that the higher the prob-
ability of manipulation, the higher is the futures price, i.e., ~~~ = - K(L-jJ)~~-p(.)) < 0; 
while from equation (A.3.2), we have the higher the probability of manipulation, the less 
should the hedger hedge optimally, i.e., ~~~ = )..(L-jJ)~~)-p(.)) > O. 
The next propositions are related to the nature of equilibria when the initial market 
beliefs exceed this critical level. 
Proposition 2 For some values of q > q*, mixed strategies of manipulation exist if 
and only if the relationships among the prior beliefs, the certainty level of the market 
and the randomisation level of the large trader's first period strategy satisfy the following 
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condition: 
1 N (2L-1) 
B = L - 1 _ qo ( - M + a _ b (b - vi ab - b2 )) 
where a = (>,+p) 2 , b = (>':K)2' M = P(.) - p(.), and N = (Zo - TJ)'cr;. 
Proof. see Appendix. 
From Proposition 2, given other exogenous values, the level of randomisation is in-
versely related to the initial prior, or equivalently, the probability of manipulation in-
creases with the values of the prior beliefs that the large trader is the type I. But the 
relationship between the probability of manipulation and the prior beliefs is less straight-
forward, we shall analyse this graphically using an example. 
Example 1 Assume that a = 0.32, b = 0.20, N = 8, M = 25 and L = 0.95. Given 
these exogenous values of the model, the relationships between the prior probability 
and the level of randomisation (B) is shown in Figure 3-1. From Figure 3-1, the level of 
randomisation is inversely related to the prior beliefs. Put in other words, the probability 
of manipulation increases with the initial beliefs. Moreover, this inverse relationship is 
not linear. The probability of manipulation increases more than proportionately with 
the prior beliefs when the initial beliefs reach a certain level, which is the critical value 
of q as derived in proposition 1. 
Corollary 1 There exists a minimum value of qo ,qb,where qb > q*, such that (pure) 
manipulation strategy dominates (pure) speculation strategy, where qb may be expressed 
Proof. We wish to demonstrate that Em(uo, Eg(P)) ~ ES(Uo, Eg(P)) for given values of 
other parameters. 
If the large trader is known to play pure strategy of speculation, the hedger's expected 
delivery price is (1 - L)P(.) + Lp(.). The large trader's expected payoffs and the hedger's 
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expected payoffs are given as follows: 
E~(Uo, Eg(P)) = [l-p(.) + (l-l-)P(.) - fo]so - O.5pVar{[l-p(.) + (l-l-)P(.) - fo]so} (3.4) 
Eg(Uo) = ZEg(P) + (fo - Eg(P))ho - O.5,\Var[ZEg(p) + (fo - E~(P))ho] (3.5) 
Maximisation of equation (3.4) and (3.5) subject to the market clearing condition 
yields: 
the optimal position for the large trader: 
l-p(.) + (1 - l-)P(.) - fo 
So = ----~---
P(J; 
the optimal position for the hedger: 
h - Z fo - [(1 - l-)P(.) + l-p(.)] 
0- + ,\ 2 (J£ 
and the equilibrium futures price for the period 0 is: 
fo = ,p(.) + (1 - ,)P(.) _ (Z ~ 1)))..P!I; 
+p 
The large trader's expected payoffs if he plays speculation are therefore, 
(3.6) 
If the large trader plays (pure) manipulation strategy, the hedger's expected price 
will be P(.) - ((2l- - l)qo + 1 - l-)(P(.) - p(.)). Following the same procedure as above, 
we get the large trader's expected payoffs if he plays Illdaipulation as: 
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, , 
qo ~ qo, where qo is given by 
(3.8) 
• 
Equation (3.8) states th&.t, the minimurn requirement of the initial prior is positively 
related to the hedger's risk aversion and the variance of supply shocks, and is inverse 
to the market certainty level and the differences between manipulated price and the 
competitive price. The last component in equation (3.8) implies that the more inelastic 
the deliverable supply, the higher is the level of the initial prior required in order for the 
large trader to manipulate. This may be due to the implementation of a more cautious 
hedging strategy by the hedger if she expects that it is costly to bring additional supply 
to the delivery market. 
Proposition 2 and Corollary 1 show that when the initial market beliefs are sufficiently 
high, the large trader, if he is the type II, will choose to manipulate. This result is not 
surprising. The large trader has private information on his own type when he chooses his 
strategy, while the hedger only expects a probability-weighted delivery price. When the 
prior probability that the large trader is the type I is high, the hedger will have sufficient 
incentives to hedge. This makes the market manipulatable, and the large trader will 
manipulate with probability 1. This result is consistent with the finding in Wang (1997) 
where the assumptions and market structures were slightly different. 
In the next part of this section we "'ish to show how, in a dynamic context, the 
type II trader will behave. In order for the manipulator to behave rationally, we assunle 
that manipulation strategy dominates speculation whenever a market is manipulatable. 
Essentially, we require that qo sa.tisfies the condition specified in equation (3.8) given 
other model parameters. In a two-period game, he is expected to choose to randomIse 
the strategy of speculation to some extent and manipulate the market at the last stage 
SHch that his total payoffs are maxinlised. The idea is simple. If the large trader chooses 
85 
pure strategy of manipulation at the beginning, his type may be identified with higher 
probability, and he may have to forsake future profitable opportunities. In an extreme 
case, the market maybe break down until he leaves the market. 
The fundamental problem is to find the large trader's optimal strategies such that his 
total utility is maximised and leaves the hedger with sufficient incentives to hedge. 
We start from the second period. At t = 1, the type II trader (manipulator) always 
intends to manipulate, since the manipulation strategy always dominates the speculation 
strategy; while the type I trader always intends to speculate. 
The probability of observing an actual higher price is ql (1 - l,) + (1 - ql)l" and the 
probability of observing an actual lower price is qll,+(l-ql)(l-l,). The hedger's expected 
delivery price at the end of t = 1 is therefore: 
E~Cj5) [ql(1- l,) + (1 - Ql)l,]P(.) + [Qll, + (1 - Qd(l - l,)]p(.) 
(Ql + l, - 2Qll,)[P(.) - p(.)] + p(.) 
where a~r(ji) = (1 - 2l,)[P(.) - p(.)] < 0 for ~ < l, < l. 
ql 
(3.9) 
The type II trader's problem is to maximise his expected utility by choosing a large 
futures position taking the hedger's expectations fixed, i.e., 
max Em (Ul ) = max{[l,P(.) + (1 - l,)p(.) - fl]ml 
-0.5K:Var[[l,P(.) + (1 - l,)p(.) - fI]ml]} (3.10) 
subject to: 
the hedger's participation constrain 
ZE~(ii) + (II - Eio(fi) )hl - 0.5AVar[ZE~(p) + (fI - E~(fi) )hl ] 
~ ZE~(fi) + (h - E~(fi))h~ - 0.5AVar[ZE~(fi) + (h - E~(fi))h'l] (3.11) 
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and the market clearing condition at t=l 
(3.12) 
Maximisation of equations (3.10) and (3.11) subject to the market clearing condition 
at t = 1 yields: 
the large trader's optimal position: 
the hedger's optimal position: 
h = Z + 11 - [(ql + ,,- 2qIL)[P(.) - p(.)] + p(.)] 
I \ 2 
/\Uc 
where ~ = -(1 - 2")[P(.) - p(.)] > 0, for 1/2 < L < 1. 
The equilibrium futures price at t = 1 is therefore: 
II = A[LP(.) + (1 - ,,)p(.)] + K:[(ql(l - 2L) + L)(P(.) - p(.)) + p(.)] _ (Z - 7])K:AU; 
A+K: A+K: 
(3.13) 
where ~ = ~(;~~L) [P(.) - p(.)] < 0 
Substituting the futures price and the large trader's optimal position back to equation 
(3.10), we get the large trader's expected utility at t = 1: 
From equation (3.14), the expected utility from manipulation when a lower price 
is observed at t = 1 is clearly larger than that when a higher price is observed, i.e., 
Em (UI I P = p L ) > Em (UI I P = pH). The large trader will face a trade-off. If he chooses 
to lnanipulate at t = 0, there will be a higher posterior probability that the large trader 
is the type II, and his expected utility from manipulation at t = 1 will be lower even if 
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the market is still manipulatable. We expect that the large trader will playa random 
strategy so that his total utilities are maximised. 
Assume that the type II trader intends to speculate with probability () at t = O. his 
total payoffs can be written as: 
E(U) (){E~(Uo,E~(ji)) + E~(Ullp = pL)} (3.15) 
+(1 - ()){E~(Uo, E~(P)) + E~(UI Ip = pH) 
where Eo(Uo, Eg(P)) = [Lp(.) + (1- L)P(.) - fo]so - O.5pVar{[Lp(.) + (1- L)P(.) - folso}, 
and 
Eo(Uo, Eg(P)) = [LP(.) + (1- L)p(.) - f~]mo - O.5~Var{[LP(.) + (1- L)p(.) - f~lmo} 
If the prior beliefs at both periods are sufficiently high, i.e., qj > q*, the solution to 
this game amounts for the type II trader to choose an optimal level (()*) of randomisation 
to maximise equation (3.15) subject to the hedger's participation constraints and market 
clearing conditions in both periods, these are: 
the hedger's participation constraints: 
(3.16) 
(3.17) 
the market clearing conditions: 
So - ho + 7] = 0 (3.18) 
(3.19) 
The type II trader chooses () in the first period to maximise two-period payoffs, taking 
as fixed the hedgers' expectation of future delivery price, such the large trader's strategies 
(e, E~(P)) form a Nash equilibrium pair. The equilibrium values of e satisfy: 
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-
i) e = " or e = 1 if and only if 
EJ(Uo, E~(P)) + Er;(U1 Ip = pL) > Eo(Uo, E~(P)) + Er;(U1 Ip = pH) 
ii) for some values of e, e E (1 - ", ,,) if and only if 
iii) e = (1 - ,,) or e = ° if and only if 
We turn to examine the large trader's strategy. As the first step, we claim that perfect 
pooling strategy for the large trader is not an equilibrium strategy. This rules out the 
possibility of pooling equilibrium in this model. 
Proposition 3 There is never an equilibrium with e = "-
Proof. This proof is by contradiction. Suppose that the large trader mimics the spec-
ulator perfectly at t = 0. In this case, the posterior probability equals to the prior 
regardless of the realization of the delivery price at the end of t = 0, and therefore, the 
type II trader's expected utilities are as the same when a high delivery price is observed 
as when a low price is observed, i.e., Er,:(U1 Ip = pL) = Er,:(U1 Ip = pH). For the 
pooling equilibrium condition to be satisfied (from the condition (i) above), we require 
that EO(Uo, E~(P) > Eo(Uo, E~(P)), i.e., speculation strategy dominates manipulation 
strategy. It contradicts to the result of Corollary 1 thaL at the first period the prior 
probability is sufficiently high, manipulation dominates speculation. Therefore, there is 
no equilibrium strategy with e = t-. • 
The intuition behind proposition 3 is clear. Since other traders cannot infer the large 
trader's action in the first period directly even ex post, perfect pooling is not beneficial 
to the large trader at all, and he clearly will not choose this strategy. The large trader 
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may therefore have an incentive to mimic the type I trader to a certain degree in the first 
period, and manipulate at the last stage. 
Proposition 4 There are mixed strategy equilibria if and only if the level of randomi-




where V* E (-",0), and V* is a root of the following equation: 
o = (c - 1)M2V2 + 2((c - l)M N - (2" - 1)M2)V + (c - 1)N2 
2 2 2 2 (2" - 1)V2 - 2,,(1 - ,,)V 
-(2,,-1) M -2(2,,-1)MN+(2,,-1) qoM [(V+")2(1-(V+,,))2] 
V 
-2(2" - l)qoMN[(V + ,,)(1 _ (V + ,,))] (3.20) 
where c = ~ > 1. 
Proof. From equations (3.10), (3.13) and (3.14), we have the expected utilities for the 
large trader at t = 1: 
if a lower first period delivery price is observed, 
and if a higher delivery price is observed, 
We wish to find the optimal values of () such that the large trader i~ indifferent 
between the first period speculation and the second period manipulation, and the first 
period manipulation and the second period manipulation, i.e., 
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Substituting the respective utilities into the above equation, we have: 
Writing c = ~ and rearranging equation (3.21), we have 
o = (c - 1)M2V2 + 2((c - l)MN - (2[, - 1)M2)V + (c - 1)N2 
-(2[, _1)2M2 - 2(2[, -l)MN + (2[, _1)2 M2[(2[, -1)V2 - 2[,(1- [,)V
J qo (V + [,)2(1 - (V + L))2 
V 
-2(2[, - l)qoMN[(V + [,)(1- (V + [,))J 
Solving the equation, we can find a sensible root of V, the V*, and the optimal level 
of randomisation e = [, + IV* .• 
-qO 
This result is, however, less intuitive. We provide an example to show how the mixed 
manipulation strategy depends on the level of certainty of the market and the prior beliefs 
over the large trader's type. 
Example 2 Let the value of equation (3.21) be n. The value of the first item and the 
third item is expected to be negative (by proposition 2), while the value of the second 
and the last one is positive. We can evaluate the relationships among the prior beliefs 
that the large trader is the type I (qo), mixed manipulation strategy (1 - B), and market 
uncertainty level ([,) numerically. We try to find the mixed strategy equilibrium point 
-
first, given qo: B and other exogenous variables. Suppose [, = 0.95, q = 0.94, a = 0.32, 
- -
b = 0.20, M = 25, N = 8. If B = 0.85: then n = -9.6; and if B = 0.82, then n = 5.4. 
It is feasible to find a value of B E (0.82,0.85) such that n = o. The interpretation 
is that, given the initial beliefs and certainty level of the market, we find the optimal 
mixed strategy (B) equilibrium point which belongs to the range between 0.82 and 0.85, 
i.e., it is optimal for the large trader to play manipulation with a probability which is 
between 0.15 and 0.18. From this example: we then find that, given the certainty level 
of the lllarket, the probability of intending manipulation increases with the initial prior; 
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and given the initial prior, the probability of intending manipulation increases with the 
certainty level of the market. For example, if () = 0.85, I.- = 0.95, then rl = -9.6; while 
if () = 0.85, I.- = 0.98, then n = 82.7. However, we cannot claim in general that the 
uncertainty level of a market reduces the probability of manipulation, since the value of 
the prior probability is also an important factor in determining this relationship. For a 
very high level of prior, the reduction effects may not present, which is clear from next 
proposition. 
Proposition 4 shows the existence of a mixed strategy equilibrium, but multiplicity of 
equilibrium is possible, since it appears that there is no monotonic relationship between 
the probability of manipulation and market uncertainty level, which depends on the level 
of prior beliefs on the large trader's type. It is conceivable that there may be a range of 
-
qo over which () is falling in 1.-, and there may also be a range over which () is rising in I.-
(reduction effects). More explicit equilibrium analysis and comparative statics analysis 
are a subject of further research. 
Proposition 5 A (pure) strategy of manipulation in the first period is only optimal 
when the prior probability and the uncertainty level are relatively high, i. e., given a high 
value of qo, for I.- < 1.-*, intending manipulation is an optimal strategy for the large trader. 
VVhere 1.-* satisfies the following equation: 
o a(l - 21-)2 M2[a(1 - 2qo) + (a - b)q6] - 2(21.- - l)M N[a(l - qo) + bqo] 
2 2[( 1.-(21.--1) )2 ((1-1.-)(21.--1))2] 
+(a - b)N + bM 1 _ I.- - qo + 21.-qo - I.- + qo - 21.-qo 
1.-(21.- - 1) (1 - 1.-)(21.- - 1)] 
+2bMN[1 _ I.- - qo + 21.-qo - ~I.--+-qo~-2-I.-q-o- (3.22) 
The general procedure to prove Proposition 5 is provided in Appendix at the end of 
this Chapter. 
Proposition 5 shows that, given other exogenous values of the model, a (pure) strategy 
of manipulation is optimal in the first period only if the uncertainty level is high in the 
market. The intuition is that, under this circumstance, the hedger is very likely to belie\'t' 
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that the large trader is the type I even if he observes a higher previous delivery price. 
because she knows that other exogenous factors may very likely contribute to that price. 
and therefore, the hedger in the second period may still have incentives to hedge actively. 
Example 3 This example is to show the result of proposition 5 intuitively. Assume 
that a = 0.32, b = 0.08, M = 25, N = 8, qo = 0.95. We wish to find the critical value of 
certainty level i * such that for any i < i * the equation value is strictly less than zero. 
i.e., pure strategy of manipulation dominates other strategies. We can solve the equation 
numerically and get the values of i*. By solving the above equation, we have ii = 0.946 
and i; = 0.66. For some values of i, where i E (0.66,0.946), the pure manipulation 
strategy is optimal for the large trader. This is shown in Figure 3-2. 
3.5 Conclusions 
This chapter has attempted to examine a dynamic commodity futures manipulation game 
with incomplete information. The purpose of this model is to find out how manipulation 
occurs in a market with other traders (the hedger here) who can observe the history of 
the market and opt to stay out of the market. The basic result of this simple analysis is 
thatl a manipulator in order not to destroy the market. must mimic the behaviour of a 
speculator to some extent at the initial period. The actual probability of manipulation 
is then determined by the hedger's initial beliefs on the large trader's type and the level 
of uncertainty of the market. As long as the probability of manipulation is positiyC'. 
the manipulator can benefit in both ways and hedgers lose money consistently, which 
coincides with Kyle's finding (see Kyle 1984, pp.141-142). When the prior probability 
of manipulation is low, he can manipulate and make profits; when a manipulation is 
considered to be likely by hedgers, the large trader can speculate and makes profits by 
capturing the prelnia of the futures price over the (expected) cash price. This result 







Figure 3-1: The relationships between prior probability and the level of randomization 
20-
0.2 0.3 0.4 O.~ 0.6 .7 0.8 
Figure 3-2: The relationship between the certainty level of a market and (pure) strategy 
of manipulation 
Manipulation affects the accuracy of price discovery and hedging activities. In partic-
ular, the main types of manipulation that we concern here, futures cornering or squeezing, 
push the equilibrium futures price higher than the competitive price even when there is 
no actual manipulation. 
This result also has implications for financial regulators. If manipulation is not excep-
tional in commodity futures markets and does influence the functioning of futures markets 
in the ways indicated, anti-manipulation policy should be one of the major regulatory 
concerns in futures (derivatives) regulation. This is the subject of Chapter 5. 
Another interesting result from our model is that, the uncertainty in a market can 
constrain the large trader's behaviour to a certain degree so that he will behave less 
aggressively compared with the result we derived from Chapter 2, since the large trader 
has to take this risk into account when he makes his trading decisions. It may justify 
certain existing regulatory measures with the purpose to increase the risk of manipulation, 
such as trading halts, trading for liquidation only, increase of maintenance margins for 
long (or short) position holders, arbitrary cash settlement, etc. 
This investigation is preliminary, concentrating on characterizing how a large trader 
takes advantage of his private information on his own types to manipulate a market in 
a sequential trading game. We simplify the analysis by ignoring the manipulator's cash 
market decision-making problems, such as delivery taking, burying the corpse, etc., which 




Proof. of Proposition 1: 
To prove Proposition 1, we simply check that whether the prior beliefs are sufficiently 
high such that the hedger's hedging interests exceed the deliverable stocks at the end of 
period O. 
Given each trader's rational behaviour and other exogenous parameters, the hedger 
and the type II large trader decides their optimal futures positions (ho and mo) by max-
imising their expected utilities respectively. Their maximising problems are as follows: 
for the hedger 
for the manipulator 
Optimisation of each trader's expected utility problem yields: 
the hedger'S optimal hedge at t = 0: 
and the manipulator's optimal futures position at t = 0: 
where Eh(P) = P(.) - (0 + L-qo - qoB)(P(.) - p(.)) and BTn(P) = L-P(.) + (1 - L-)p(.). 
The equilibrium futures price when the large trader attempts to manipulate subject 
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to the market clearing condition ho + rno + 'fJ = 0 at t = 0 is given by: 
fo 
A[LP(.) + (1 - L)p(,)] + K:[P(.) - (0 + Lqo - qoB)(P(.) - p(.))] 
A+K: 
(A.3.1) 
Substitute the equilibrium price and the hedger's expected delivery price to the above 
hedge's optimal hedge function, the hedger's optimal hedge becomes: 
(A.3.2) 
From equation (A.3.2), given other parameters, the hedger's hedge increases monoton-
ically with the total risk exposure and the prior beliefs that the large trader is the type 
1. Set equation (A.3.2) equal X, and rearrange the equation, we get the critical value of 
qo as in equation (3.3) .• 
Proof. of Proposition 2: 
We wish to derive the large trader's optimal strategy at t = 0 given the prior beliefs 
and the certainty level of the market. As the first step, we have to evaluate the large 
trader's utilities given that both the large trader's and the hedger's strategies are optimal. 
Assume that the type II large trader plays a random strategy of manipulation with 
probability of 1 - e at t = 0) then the hedger's expected price is Eg(j.i) = P(.) - [0 + 
Lqo - qoB][P(.) - p(.)]. Given her expectations, the hedger will maximise her utility by 
choosing a futures position. This implies maximisation of : 
(A.3.3) 
where Eg(Uo) is the hedger's expected utility for period 0 given her prior beliefs regarding 
the large trader's type. 
If the large trader speculates, he chooses an optimal amount of position So by maxi-
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mizing his expected utilities, which are given by: 
E~(Uo,E~Cp)) = [l,p(.)+(l-t-)P(.)- fo]so-O.5pVar{[t-p(.)+(1-t-)P(.)- fo]so} (A.3.-±) 
where Eo (Uo, Ei(jJ)) is the speculator's expected utility for period 0 given the hedger's 
expectations. 
If the large trader manipulates, he chooses an optimal amount of position mo by 
maximizing his expected utilities, which are given by: 
E[;(Uo, E~(jJ)) = [t-P(.)+(l-t-)p(.)- f~]mo-O.5KVar{[t-P(.)+(1-L)p(.)-f~]mo} (A.3.5) 
where E[)(Uo, EiCf5)) is the manipulator's expected utilities at period 0 given the hedger's 
expectations. 
Maximisation of equation (A.3.3) and (A.3.5) subject to the first period market clear-
ing condition So - ho + 'f} = 0 yields: 
the optimal position for the large trader: 
So = 
t-p(.) + (1 - t-)P(.) - fo 
the optimal position for the hedger: 
fo - [P(.) - (8 + t-qo - qo8)(P(.) - p(.))] 
ho = Z + A 2 
(Jc 
the equilibrium futures price for period 0 is: 
fo 
A[t-p(.) + (1 - t-)P(.)] + p[P(.) - (if + Lqo - qoB)(P(.) - p(.))J 
A+P 
Substitute So and fo back to equation (A.3.4): the large trader's expected payoffs for 
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the period (if he is the type I) are therefore, 
(A.3.6) 
Following the same procedures as the above by maximizing of (A.3.3) and (A.3.5) 
subject to the first period market clearing condition, We have the large trader's expected 
payoffs for the period (if he is the type II): 
The large trader's problem is to maximise his utility by choosing the optimal level of 
~ 




The first order condition of equation (A.3.8) with respect to e yields: 
(A.3.9) 
where a = p.!p) 2 , b = (A:K)2, M = P(.) - p(.), and N = (Z - T})AO";. 
\Vrite (1 - qo)(e - i) = V, and assume a > b, the above equation can be simplified to 
be: 
(a - b)(V M + N)2 - (2i - 1 )b[2V M2 + (2i - l)M + 2M N] = 0 
By solving the equation above, we have 
~ N (2i - 1) ( I J 2) (1 - qo)( e - i) = - - + b - \t au - b 
M a-b 
or equivalently, 
e = i _ 1 (_ N + (2i - 1) (b - vab - b2 )) 
1 - qo .AI a - b 
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• 
The procedure to prove Proposition 5: 
The proof of proposition 5 is not difficult but slightly tedious. We describe the 
general procedure of the proof and do not intend to go into details here. A pure strategy 
of manipulation implies B = 1 - i. Substitute B = 1 - ~ into equation (3.21), and let the 
value of the equation less than zero. Rearranging it, we can get equation (3.22). 
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Chapter 4 
The Economic Effects of Futures 
Manipulation: An Empirical 
Analysis 
4.1 Introduction 
It is important to lmderstand the effects of manipulation in order to define manipula-
tion, to measure the costs of manipulation: and to frame anti-manipulation legislation. 
Although several theoretical models investigated how futures manipulation could occur 
in equilibrium, such as Anderson and Sundaresan (1984), Newbery (1984). Kyle (1984); 
Jarrow (1992), Kumar and Seppi (1992), Pirrong (1995b), etc.; we have not been able 
to find a comprehensive theory to analyse the effects of manipulation. Pirrong (1993, 
1994) enlployed micro economic theory to demonstrate how manipulation affects prices, 
consumption, wealth distribution, storage and price relations, and argued that it is pos-
sible to resort to classical statistical methodology to test these effects explicitly. Hi:-; 
derivation of the economic effects of manipulation is, to my knowledge, the first rigorous 
derl1onstration on this issue by using standard econonlic theory. However. these effect:.; 
therl1selves are not new findings, and there has been controversies throughollt the long 
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history of US manipulation case laws. Empirical studies of manipulation effects are few. 
Williams (1995) provided a detailed economic analysis of the Hunt silver case based on 
its ex post effects. Minpeco v. Hunt case was unusual and interesting since the Hunt 
silver case was one of the most serious manipulation cases in the history of US futures 
trading, and the manipulation trial mobilized nine well-known economists as expert wit-
nesses to give testimony on the aspects of defining the offence, determining the causal 
connection, and inferring intent. However, experts' testimony on whether the silver price 
was artificial and whether Hunt caused that price was apparently conflicting, which once 
again showed that debates on the effects of manipulation have not been resolved. More 
recently, Barnhart, Kahl and Barnhart (1996) analysed some aspects of effects of the 
July 1989 soybean futures manipulation on the CBOT, and found that price and spread 
behaviour at the period of alleged manipulation were significantly different from these in 
other periods. 
We try to avoid getting involved in historical debates on testing manipulation effects, 
and instead, to argue more generally the economic effects of manipulation based on the 
theoretical models discussed in the previous two chapters, although the focus of those 
there was mainly on equilibrium analysis. One of the most important results we obtained 
from the models is that, the key to a successful manipulation is essentially that the large 
trader manipulates other traders' beliefs. The implications are that, manipulation may 
affect other traders' expectations, and thereby the equilibrium pricing processes. Long 
manipulation typically discourages hedging. Thus, the proper functioning of futures 
markets is impaired. More specifically from our models, given other market conditions, 
when a manipulation is considered to be very'likely in a market, hedgers will hedge less 
and the large trader will choose to speculate, such that the futures price falls beneath 
the competitive level at contract maturity; while in the converse case, hedgers will hedge 
actively, and the large trader may choose to manipulate, with the result that the futures 
price for the manipulated contract exceeds the competitive level. Futures prices will 
therefore appear to be subject to systematical forecast errors (fut.ures price les~ fut.un' 
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cash price) in the presence of manipulation. Under these circumstances, hedging is 
discouraged not only because hedgers lose money consistently, but also because they will 
expect a higher delivery price as long as there is a positive probability of manipulation 
in equilibrium. They will therefore hedge less or even go long, and the optimal hedging 
ratio will be less than that without manipulation. Furthermore, the hedging effectiveness 
is adversely affected, since hedgers are not able to predict basis behaviour anymore in 
the presence of manipulation. 
Based on these views, in this chapter we attempt to search the economic effects of 
futures manipulation empirically. We choose the London Metal Exchange (LME) as our 
object of analysis, because the LME copper market was believed to be subject to frequent 
manipulations, especially by the Sumitomo Corporation of Japan from possibly as early 
as the middle of 1980s to June 1996. Therefore, we are able to construct elegant time-
series to test the hypotheses of manipulation effects implied by our theoretical models. 
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. We begin with a brief introduction of 
the Sumitomo copper manipulation in section 4.2. Section 4.3 analyses how manipulation 
may affect the functioning of futures markets. In section 4.4, we examine the effects of 
manipulation on the price discovery function of futures markets and use LME data to 
test whether futures price becomes a biased estimate of the future cash price and the 
futures price forecast error with manipulation is positive in the presence of manipulation. 
Section 4.5 employes two widely accepted models to analyse manipulation effects on the 
risk shifting function of futures markets and use LME data to test the models developed 
in study. In section 4.6, we investigate the effects of the alleged Sumitomo manipulation 
on the LME cash price. The final section contains a brief conclusion. 
4.2 The Sumitomo Copper Manipulation 
On May 11, 1998, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) announced that 
it had reasons to believe that Sumitomo manipulated the copper market through actions 
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taken on the LME in 1995 and 1996~ which violated sections 6(c). 6(d) and 9(a)(2) of the 
Commodity Exchange Act (CEA); and ordered the company to cease and desist from 
further violations of those provisions of the CEA and to pay a total of $1.50 million as a 
civil monetary penalty. In August 1998, Sumitomo offered $99 million to settle 6 lal\'suits 
in New York. Although Sumitomo itself neither admitted nor denied these manipulati\'e 
activities, the implication of its offers of settlement was clear. 
Sumitomo has been involved in marketing of copper metal for several hundred years. 
Its copper metals business is conducted by the Copper 1tIetals Team of the Non-Ferrous 
Metals Department, whose responsibilities include supplying copper to customer (pri-
marily in Japan and Pacific region). and using futures and other derivatives markets to 
hedge price risk. The hedging activity is mainly through the LME, the major world 
futures markets for all non-ferrous metals. and the commodity exchange division of the 
New York Mercantile Exchange (Comex). Historical evidences suggest, in addition to 
the 1995 and 1996 manipulation, Sumitonlo may have manipulated opportunistically the 
world copper market since 1991, possibly since as early as the middle of 1980s (Gilbert 
1996) until the end of Mayor early June 1996, when head of the copper team was "reas-
signed" and US and Canadian-based hedge funds as well as other investors attacked the 
inflated copper price which fell from around $2800/ tonne to below $2000/ tonne shortly 
after his reassignment. Sumitomo initially estimated a loss of $1.8 billion; subsequently 
revised up to $2.6 billion. 
The Sumitomo copper manipulation appears to have been one of the largest in the 
history of futures trading; in terms either of size or of duration. Although it may also 
have involved complex strategies, diverse instruments and markets (futures, options, 
OTC, and cash markets): the Sumitomo manipulation exploited classic "corners" or 
"squeezes" (as discussed and nl0dcled in the previous chapters). Typically Sumitomo 
exploited the delivery mechanism of the L~IE copper contract, buying futures (options), 
controlling deliverable supplies and taking or threatening to take delivery when contracts 
approach maturities and then rolled market squeezes over. It is alleged that Sunlitonlo 
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took these actions for the purpose of creating artificially high absolute prices and artificial 
backwardations (premiums of nearby contracts or cash prices over more distant contract 
prices), and exploited these artificially high prices to profit from liquidations of its large 
futures positions and holding of LME warrants~ and took advantage of these artificial 
backwardations to profit from rolling squeezes over or lending forward. Creating and 
sustaining backwardations facilitated the intermittent manipulation strategies almost 
over 10 years. It is also alleged that Sumitomo manipulated the world copper market 
over the decade 1987-96, certainly over the period of 1991-96 (Gilbert 1996, p.1). In a 
'natural' backwardation market, it is cheaper and less riskier to sustain backwardations 
over a longer period of time, since a strategy of rolling over short-dated positions forward 
yields rollover gains. However, in a contango market, creating backwardations involves 
huge resources and larger risk, and this requires to buy futures, take substantial deliveries 
and pay losses and variation margins on rolling contracts over, since a trader would be 
forced to purchase deferred month futures at higher prices than the prices it could sell 
these contracts for as they approach expiration. l 
The Sumitomo copper manipulation appears to have been advised and implemented 
by its chief copper trader, Mr. Hamanaka, who v,·as made head of the copper team at the 
non-ferrous metal division in August 1987. In conjunction with others, his appointment 
coincided with Sumitomo's increasing frustration at its inability to profit from physical 
metal, which led the company to use futures and derivatives extensively.2 During 1987 
- 1989 the LME copper market generally exhibited acute backwardations (see Figure 
4-3 and Figure 4-4), which facilitated Sunlitomo. acting as a copper supplieL to profit 
even from relatively simple trading 'strategies, such as by buying futures and selling 
against backwardations, or by buying futures, taking delivery and supplying cash copper 
to its custome!s, etc. Since under these circumstances, the ilnrnediate delivery (nearby 
1 Markets in which nearby prices are above deferred-month prices are commonly referred to as back-
wardation markets. Markets in which nearby prices are below deferred-month prices are generally referred 
to as contango markets. 
2The Trader Who Beat the World's Markets - and then Lost It All. The Financial TimES, 28 June 
1996. 
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contract) gets a higher price than does a deferred contract. The possible profitability ,"as 
clear from the company president's award on the profitability of the non-ferrous division in 
its 1991 annual report (see also footnote 2). It is also possible that Sumitomo occasionally 
squeezed the LME and realised substantial profits, although it did not take significant 
deliveries over that period. But backwardations can provide little direct evidence of 
manipulation in this situation, since it is difficult to distinguish ex post between high 
spot premiums arising from supply shocks and those resulting from manipulation. 
From 1990 to 1993, metals were in over-supply in the face of relatively slack demand 
growth, and the LME copper market in general was in contango. In order to support 
copper cash prices, Sumitomo appears to have manipulated intermittently. For example: 
in October 1991 it was reported that Sumitomo controlled the majority of the LME's 
London warehouse stocks, which led to the intervention in the market of the LME chief 
executive in November 1991; in the latter half of 1993, after a steep fall in copper price: 
Sumitomo apparently arranged a large buy order to push up copper prices and create 
large backwardations (the cash/three month backwardation at a time was more than $80 
per tonne) which led to the LME emergency action that limited daily backwardation to 
$5 per tonne on September 8, 1993 (see appendix A for relevant summarised news reports 
from financial press). 
It was unclear from the market performance whether or not Surnitomo manipulated in 
1994. It was alleged that in January and February of 1994 Sumitomo had large purchase 
activities which forced the Codelco, a Chilean state-own company to take a huge loss. It 
is also suspected that Sumitomo may have attempted to manipulate from circumstantial 
evidence, for example, entering purchase agreements with a New York based US copper 
merchant that contained unusual minimum price and price participation provisions in 
June 1994. FroIn late 1993. Sumitomo engaged in an unprecedented volume of copp~r 
put and swap transactions which provided financing and also supplied Sumitomo with 
another large financial incentive to force copper prices to higher levels.3 However, it 
3It is alleged that from late 1993 Sumitomo engaged S\l;ap transactions \\'ith Chase Manhattan Bank 
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seems likely that Sumitomo was running a large long position (in cash market or both in 
cash and futures market) over this period and may have not undertaken a squeeze, and 
therefore, failed to realise profits. From the latter half of 1994, demand growth in the 
world copper market started to slacken. This left Sumitomo with a large long position 
in the market which was prone to price fall, and made manipulation more expensive and 
riskier. 
In order to support prices and sustain backwardations from the end of 1994, Sumit-
omo acquired larger cash position or take larger futures position, or both. This forced 
Sumitomo subsequently to realise substantial losses from these operations. In Sumitomo's 
Merrill Lynch account, it held 78,000 tons of the copper in LME exchange warehouses at 
the end of March, 1995, which amounted to approximately 32% of the total LME stocks. 
According to the CFTC's Order announced on May 11, 1998, Sumitomo, together with 
the announced US copper merchant, owned and controlled approaching 100% of LI'vIE 
stocks at various times in the fourth quarter of 1995 and also maintained large and con-
trolling LME futures positions. Under these circumstances, Sumitomo's position became 
more vulnerable and the manipulation scheme became more exposed to the public which 
prompted inquiries at the end of 1995 initiated by the LME, the Securities and Investment 
Board (SIB, later became the Financial Services Authority or FSA in October 1997) (in 
May 1996), the principal UK financial market watchdog, and the CFTC, the US futures 
market regulator. Pressures from LME and regulatory authorities forced Sumitomo to 
remove Mr. Hamanaka from day-to-day trading in the middle of TvIay, and the manipula-
tion scheme eventually collapsed at the end of May and the early June of 1996 resulting 
from intense speculative attacks by US hedge funds and the large Canadian speculator 
Herb Black. 
N. A. pursuant to which Sumitomo effectively borrowed approximately $500 million in order to finance 
Sumitomo's manipulation of copper exchange contract prices; it also engaged in extraordinary copper 
and gold swap transactions and selling large quantities of copper and gold puts to J. P. ~o~gan. These 
transactions financed Sumitomo's manipulative activities (estimated in excess of $300 milhon) and re-
sulted in disciplinary action by the Federal Reserve Board against J. P. Morgan, etc. See In Re Sumitomo 
Copper Litigation, 96 Civ. 4584, New York, pp.26-27. 
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4.3 Futures Manipulation and the Functions of Fu-
tures Markets 
The CFTC Order asserted that the Sumitomo manipulation had three types of effects on 
copper prices and markets: artificially high copper prices; distorted price relationships 
between cash and forward prices; and distorted price relationships between the LME 
and the US copper cash and futures markets. However, the CFTC did not provide 
detailed evidence. Although we do not intend to discuss the legal aspects of the CFTC 
case, assertions of this sort have been subject to controversies in the long history of US 
manipulation case laws,4 in which it has been argued that it is almost impossible to 
establish testable criteria for price "artificiality" or artificial price relationships. Indeed, 
these types of evidence sometimes failed to be persuasive, for example, in the Cox case. 5 
This view was intensified in the Hunt silver case (Williams 1995). It is not our intention 
to comprehensively investigate the effects of the Sumitomo manipulation here. Instead, 
we concentrate on testing the results implied in our theoretical models, i.e., whether 
manipulation affects adversely the economic functions of futures markets, namely "price 
discovery" and "risk shifting" . 
The adverse effect of manipulation on price di~covery is that manipulation may in-
terfere with the ability of a futures market to provide a useful price discovery tool. In 
other words, manipulation may cause producers and consumers to make incorrect price 
forecasts based on current futures prices, and as a consequence, unwise production or 
4The earlier case involving the debates on price r.elationships dated back to Peto v. Howell, which 
was brought under the Sherman Act in July 1937. Later cases involved price artifitiality and price rela-
tionships included Greater Western Food Distributions Inc. v. Brannan, Volkart Brothers v. Freeman, 
Cargill v. Hardin, etc. 
5Irl establishing price "artificiality", the courts used in several cases the historical price comparisor..s 
(including spreads), such as in Great Western Food Distributions Inc. v. Brannan, Cargill v. Ha,rdin. 
Because courts could not have set up a criterion on how large a deviation from typical price relations 
constitutes price "artificiality", and this kinds of evidence therefore even did not persuade the CFTC 
commissioners which led the court to ignore historical comparisons altogether in Cox. The CFTC 
commissioners'then concluded: "the prospective behaviour of a normal market is not necessarily bounded 
by the market's historical experience". See Cox, [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 
23,768, at 34, 064 (July 15, 1987). 
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investment decisions. 
The forecast mechanism works through the relationship between futures price and the 
expected future cash price. Futures markets serve society by providing a mechanism for 
market agents to form expectations about future cash prices. Some researchers start from 
the premise that the futures price equals the expected future cash price, i.e., the current 
futures price will be an unbiased predictor of the future cash price - the futures price 
will convey all information currently available to market participants or observers, thus, 
production or consumption decisions made on the basis of current futures prices will be 
socially optimal. However; the dominant view on the relationship between futures prices 
and the expected cash prices has been that the two are in general not equal. The most 
usual situation is that the futures price is below the expected cash price, which is termed 
the Keynes-Hicks hypothesis of "normal backwardation". This theorem originated with 
John Maynard Keynes more than 60 years ago, as he put it: "In other words, the quoted 
forward price, though above the present spot price, must fall below the anticipated future 
spot price by at least the amount of the normal backwardation". 6 The Keynes-Hicks 
hypothesis takes speculators as being net long and hence hedgers as net short, and the 
difference between futures price and the expected cash price is the risk premium which 
induces speculators to absorb the price risk transferred by hedgers, which is referred to 
be a negative bias or forecast error in futures price. In this situation, if producers and 
consumers use the futures prices to predict the future cash prices, the forecasts will not 
be optimal. Nevertheless, optimality may be achieved if futures prices are adjusted for 
the expected biases (Edwards and Edwards 1984, p.346). 
Keynes-Hicks theory does not incorporate diversification opportunities. Some more 
recent models, for example, Dusak (1973), Grauer and Litzenberger (1979), Bodie and 
Rosansky (1980), Breeden (1979, 1980), etc., have studied the question of a risk premium 
within the CAMP. Within these models the risk premium required on a futures contract 
does not depend on the variability of futures prices, but on the degree to which futures 
6Keynes J.M., A Treatise on Money, Vo1.2, London: Macmillan, 1930. 
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price changes are related to the normal returns on the market portfolio. The results 
from Dusak (1973) and Bodie and Rosansky (1980) indicated that futures prices bear no 
systemic risk. Breeden (1979, 1980) proposed that backwardation would occur if random 
spot price at maturity is positively related to real aggregate consumption, and found 
that some futures contracts have significant systemic risk which would result in a risk 
premium. Grauer and Litzenberger (1979), and Richard and Sundaresan (1981), and 
several hedging models, such as Anderson and Danthine (1981), confirmed the existence 
of a risk premium in futures markets. 
Our Bayesian game-theoretic models with incomplete information, as developed in 
the previous chapters, predicted that in the presence of manipulation the futures price is 
a biased estimate of the future cash price from the point view of all market participants 
except market makers, although the severity of the bias may differ for different types 
of traders (hedgers and the large trader). When a manipulation is not considered to 
be very likely by the hedger and market makers, i.e., their beliefs on the probability 
of manipulation are low, the large trader may establish a huge long position at lower 
prices, and profitably manipulates as the contract approaches maturity. The futures 
price is therefore, below the large trader's expected cash price, and should rise over time 
by contract expiration; while a manipulation is considered to be very likely by other 
market participants, the large trader will typically short futures instead of undertaking 
a manipulation, and the futures price will therefore be above the large trader's expected 
cash price, and should decline to the competitive price level at delivery. The large trader 
makes profits both ways. Actually, this two scenarios are closely related in practice, 
and the relationship between the futures price and the expected future cash price for 
the manipulator in the presence of manipulation is as follows: futures price is below the 
expected cash price for the manipulated contract; while the futures price is above the 
expected cash prices for other contracts simultaneously traded on the exchange. 
It is sometimes alleged that manipulation usually takes place at the end of delivery 
month, and usually exists only for a short period of time, and therefore, the effects on 
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immediate production or consumption decision-making may be not substantial. because 
people using futures prices for decision-making purposes typically have a decision hori-
zon longer than several days or weeks (Edwards and Edwards 1984, p.346; Johnson 1987, 
p.747). But this argument does not hold when we consider the effects of manipulation on 
other traders' expectations, and therefore the price formation processes of other contracts 
on the same commodity traded on the same exchange or other exchanges, especially when 
markets are subject to frequent manipulations. Manipulation may permanently distort 
the relationships between futures price and the expected cash price. These effects may be 
substantial (the magnitude of distortion depends on the delivery market characteristics. 
how often manipulation occurs and how government or exchanges regulate the market). 
The equilibrium futures price will be changed as a result of manipulation. We show 
(Chapter 2) that it will be a weighted average of the expected marginal cost of delivery 
and the competitive price, where the weight depends on market makers' posterior prob-
ability that the large trader is a manipulator. Obviously, it is higher than that without 
manipulation as long as there is a positive probability of manipulation and the supply 
of deliverable stocks in the delivery market is less than perfectly elastic. Since there 
are more uncertain factors introduced into the price formation process, there will be an 
increase in variances of futures and cash prices. Therefore, in the presence of manipula-
tion, it is difficult for people to adjust the futures price for the ordinary expected bias to 
achieve optimal forecasts, and hence manipulation has adverse effects on the accuracy of 
price discovery. 7 
The LME trading structure and trading practice are significantly different from those 
of a standard futures market in many aspects. In particuiar, it has a daily contract struc-
ture, resulting in a large number of contracts ( approximately 81 contracts per metal each 
day); the practice of borrowing and lending; a large number of large trad2rs. These Inay 
have important implications on the vulnerability of a futures market to nlanipulation. 
70ur argument is different from that of Edwards and Edwards (1984), \V~o argue? that, with stuchas-
tic but predictable probabilities of manipulation price discoverers could .still e~ec~l\·ely. r('~y on futures 
prices to predict expected cash prices, but the variance in t he error of thIS predictlOll WIll lI1crea."(~. 
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The daily contract structure with a few officially reported prices (official price accessi-
ble to public only relate to cash, 3 month, 15 month and 27 month, closing price are 
available for some other contracts (1, 2, 6, 9, 12 months) limits the market transparency 
in the LME. This may facilitates a manipulator in concealing relevant information, and 
additionally, daily expiration of contracts facilitates the manipulator concealing the infor-
mation of which contract is manipulated because at least several contracts share the same 
information of deliverable stocks at expiration. The practice of borrowing and lending 
can extend the manipulation effects to other contracts and longer periods. For example, 
lending could transmit these high price forward by sale of a near date and simultaneous 
purchase of a date further forward for a long position holder, and similarly, by purchase 
of a near date and simultaneous re-selling of a date forward for a short position holder. 
These may suggest that the LME is more prone to manipulation than a standard futures 
markets, and more important, manipulation on the LME can have far more devastating 
effects than that on a standard market. 
Manipulation discourages hedging activities, and may affect the risk-shifting function 
of a futures market. The effect of manipulation on the risk-shifting of a futures market 
works through its effects on the basis, especially basis risk. The temporal basis refers 
to the current cash price of a particular commodity at a specified location minus the 
futures price of the same contract for the same commodity. The basis is uncertain from 
the time when a hedge is made to the time when it is removed, and this gives rise to 
basis risk (Hull 1993, pp.33-36). For most futures markets, when the futures contract 
is at expiration, the futures price and the spot price of the contract must be the same 
(without transaction costs), i.e., the basis must be zero. The LME is different, since 
LME contracts have daily expiry dates, and trading is concentrated on the cash and 
three month contracts, so that effectively a new futures contract is traded each trading 
day. As a consequence, we are not able to isolate the convergence characteristic of the 
basis from publicly available LME data, but basis risk still exists. The effecti\'e price a 
hedger obtains is the futures price at the time the hedging is made plus the basis at the 
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time the hedger closes out her contracts. For a short hedger on a backwardation market, 
if the basis has unexpectedly strengthened, her position worsens; whereas if the basis has 
weakened unexpectedly, her position improves. 
Basis risk arises, firstly, in the case in which a commodity, the price of which is to 
be hedged, may not correspond exactly to the asset underlying the futures contract; and 
secondly, the hedger may be uncertain as to the date when the asset will be bought or sold. 
Basis risk is therefore important for most hedgers because few commodities have exactly 
matching futures contracts which would give as perfect hedges (Anderson and Danthine 
1981, p.1183). In the case of perfect hedges, short hedgers will not suffer seriously from 
manipulation in terms of real financial losses, but manipulation increases their costs 
of hedging. A hedger's cost may be defined in terms of her opportunity cost, i.e., the 
difference between the futures price and the cash price she would have paid or received had 
she not hedged. If manipulation raises futures prices, cash prices or both to "artificial" 
levels, a short hedger will suffer opportunity losses in the presence of manipulation. If 
the physical commodity or the date the hedger buys or sells a commodity differs from the 
characteristics of the futures contract, manipulation may worsen the hedger's position, 
and additionally, it may expose the hedger to a greater basis risk. The worsening of 
her position results from the fact that, on a delivery-settled market, in the presence of 
manipulation, the short has either to acquire the already over-valued commodities from 
the long or to close out her positions at a substantial premium, in which cases, the short 
suffers real financial losses. Common measurements of basis risk are basis volatility and 
hedging effectiveness. Historical experiences suggest that, manipulation usually makes 
the basis more volatile, and as suggested by Edwards and Edwards (1984), and this 
may alter the effectiveness of a hedge. With basis risk, a common definition of hedging 
effectiveness is the degree to which the futures price and the cash price are correlated. 
The lower this correlation, the lower is the hedging effectiveness. Thus, if manipulation 
lowers the level of this correlation, we may conclude that it decreases hedging effectiveness 
(Edwards and Edwards 1984, p.349). 
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Furthermore, if manipulation causes hedgers to suffer higher opportunity costs, real 
financial losses or decreased hedging effectiveness, it will discourage hedging acti"ities, 
i.e., it makes futures markets less attractive to hedgers. Manipulation may therefore 
harm market liquidity, especially where those markets are used primarily by commercial 
traders. 
4.4 Manipulation and Price Discovery 
As discussed earlier, to investigate manipulation effects on price discovery flllction of a 
futures market is essentially to see whether manipulation affects the relationship between 
the futures price and the expected future cash price. We use LME daily data to test this 
relationship for the copper market with the objective of investigating whether a positive 
probability of manipulation increases the futures price forecast errors (the futures price 
minus the future cash price) 1 and furthermore, whether these forecast errors, in line with 
what our models predicted, are invariably positive for long manipulations. 
4.4.1 Methodology and hypothesis 
The futures price forecast error 
We try to avoid getting into the difficulties associated with examining the effects of 
manipulation on futures price behaviour of the manipulated contracts, and instead, we 
investigate whether the futures price is systematically above the future cash price during 
the periods of alleged manipulation. Since it is more interesting to look at whether 
manipulation affects equilibrium futures pricing process and changes the relationship 
between futures price and the future cash price through its effects on other traders' 
expectations. If this is true, we may conclude that the effects of manipulation on "price 
discovery" are enormous. It not only affects the price behaviour of the manipulated 
contract, but also affects the pricing of other contracts, especially the pricing processes of 
the further nearby contacts. Therefore, we are interested in looking at whether the futul'('~ 
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price forecast error ('!9) is positive for periods of manipulation or alleged manipulation, 
l.e., 
'!9 = FO,l - 81 > 0 
where FO,l denotes the futures price of a contract traded at period 0 with 1 period for 
expiration; 8 1 denotes the actual cash price for the same contract at period l. 
The approach of testing futures price forecast errors is essentially similar as that of 
testing "normal backwardation" or market efficiency, which has been performed by many 
researchers (for example, Houthakker 1957; Fama and French 1987; Kolb 1992, etc.). In 
a classic futures market, Keynesian "normal backwardation" implies that futures price 
should rise over time for the contract which has specific delivery months, and the excess 
of future cash price over the current futures price is the reward for speculators for bearing 
risks. The hypothesis is therefore simplified to test whether mean daily futures returns 
are positive prior to contract expirations. Empirical evidences on "normal backwarda-
tion" are mixed,8 and the more recent result of Kolb (1992) using a large US database, 
supported this view for some commodities, especially for copper. By contrast, we argue 
that the futures price forecast errors should be negative for the manipulated contracts 
when a manipulation is not initially considered to be very likely, but they become positive 
in the periods when other traders anticipate a high probability of manipulation. This im-
plies that futures prices should rise until contract maturity for the manipulated contracts, 
but should decline over time for other contracts for the same commodity traded simulta-
neously on the exchange or other related exchanges. A natural difficulty in testing these 
hypotheses is that, it is almost impossible to know from publicly available LME data 
exactly which contracts are manipulated and when a manipulation starts. It is therefore 
more reliable to refer to financial press or other sources of information to identify the 
periods when a manipulation was publicly suspected. Thus, we only consider the second 
side of test here. 
8For a detailed description of empirical evidence on backwardations, see Kolb (1992, pp. 76-78). 
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Computation of mean return error 
Trading practices on the LME where a new contract is traded each day: make tests of 
futures price forecast errors more straightforward than those on standard futures markets. 
Testing whether futures prices exhibit positive forecast errors is equivalent to determining 
whether mean futures prices are systematically above the mean future cash prices when a 
manipulation is publicly suspected or acknowledged. Mathematically, the average futures 
price forecast error can be expressed as: 
n 
L (Ft - 8t+k ) 
average forecast error = _t=_l ____ _ 
n 
(4.1 ) 
where Ft is the futures price at time 1, 8 t+k is the cash price at the kth period. Since we 
propose to use daily data to test the three month forecasting bias, hence k is 63 in this 
case. n represents the length which a manipulation or alleged manipulation lasts. 
We choose to use the percentage difference between FO,l and 8 1 instead of the arith-
metic difference. The test then becomes out of examining whether there exists systematic 
positive mean return errors during the periods where manipulation is publicly acknowl-
edged or suspected. Mathematically, the daily simple ({is) and log ({it) mean return 
errors are given by: 
n n 
L (Ft-~t±k) L In(Fd St+k) 
{is = _t=_l ____ or {it = _t=_l ____ _ ( 4.2) 
n n 
Hypothesis 
The null hypothesis is fornlally formulated to test the impact of manipulation on the role 
of futures price as a tool to predict the futures cash price: i.e., the daily mean return 
error is not statistically significantly positive over the periods of alleged manipulation. 
If the hypothesis is rejected, we may conclude that there exists positive forecast error 
in the periods of alleged nlanipulation, so that nlanipulation affects the futures priccs 
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as a tool to predict the future cash prices. The effects can be interpreted as a positi\'e 
probability of manipulation inducing market participants to systematically over-estimate 
the future cash prices. In this sense, we may claim that manipulation pushes the futures 
price to an "artificial" level. 
4.4.2 Manipulation identification 
Ex post identification of manipulation may be conducted either through examination of 
its causes or of its effects. Long manipulation typically involves the creation of market 
power, i.e., dominant long positions in futures markets or both in futures and cash mar-
kets, which lead to an artificial shortage of deliverable supply in the delivery market, and 
hence artificial prices and artificial price relationships. To establish manipulation in a 
US court, one also needs to show the manipulator intentionally causes this "artificiality", 
and the element of intentionality is normally inferred from circumstantial evidences. Ac-
curate identification of a manipulation is therefore non trivial, since from public available 
information we do not have reliable information regarding a manipulator's position and 
sufficient circumstantial evidence on whether the trader's large position has intentionally 
influenced the copper prices or price relationships. 
In identifying the alleged Sumitomo manipulation from publicly available informa-
tion, we may focus on the ex post effects of these manipulations. Specifically, two sources 
of publicly available information are considered to be inlportant. First, comparing back-
wardations in copper market with the deliverable stocks reported in LME warehouses. 
If there are serious backwardations, while the cash market supply is not considerably 
"tight", then a manipulation is suspected. Second, comparing the behaviour of backwar-
dations in copper market with that in the LIv1E aluminium market. Since both metals 
are the two most liquid LME contracts, and are regarded to share broadly common con-
sumption time paths. If copper exhibits backwardations: while aluminium does not, then 
a manipulation is suspected, see Gilbert (1996). In manipulation identification by conl-
paring backwardations with deliverable stocks in the L~IE warehouses, we calclllatc the 
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weekly changes of copper convenience yields and the changes of deliverable stocks over 
July 1991 to July 1996. If the positive signs of changes of convenience yields coincide 
with positive signs of deliyerable stocks for over 3 weeks, a manipulation is suspected. 
Relying on this source of information, 4 periods of manipulation stand out. These are: 
July 19, 1991 - December 6, 1991; August 13, 1993 - September 16, 1993; October 13, 
1995 - January 19, 1996; and April 12 - June 1996. We also compare the backwardations 
in copper market with that in aluminium market by calculating the basis differentials 
(copper basis - al umini un1 basis), and graph it in Figure 4-7. From Figure 4-7, mani p_ 
ulation may be suspected over the following periods: August -December 1991; June _ 
September 1993; May - August 1995; October 1995 - January 1996; and April - June 
1996. But it is not easy to draw any conclusion on manipulative activities in 1994 and 
the beginning of 1995 fron1 the relative basis behaviour since there was a large hangover 
of aluminium stocks resulting from Russian exports over the previous years. 
Alternatively, one may look at relevant reports on manipulative activities in financial 
press, especially the Financial Times, to identify whether the LIvIE copper market was 
manipulated. Since in this study our purpose here is effectively to investigate whether 
publicly suspected manipulation influences traders' expectations and therefore pricing 
processes, and price relationships, and we may therefore rely on the relevant reports and 
analysis from financial press (see the relevant summarised news reports in appendix A 
at the end of the chapter). and the two sources of information from publicly available 
information in manipulation identification from ex post effects are only used to see to 
what extent the suspected market behaviour conforms to the reported manipulated ac-
tivities and then to determine the length of manipulation more accurately. Interestingly, 
we find that the reported manipulative activities are highly correlated with data-based 
manipulations. Based n1ainly on the press 1 eports, four periods of manipulation in the 
LME copper market from July 1991 to the middle of 1996 are identified, which \vill be 
used in our econometric analysis throughout this Chapter. These are: 
• August 2, 1991 - Decelnber 6, 1991 
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• August 11, 1993 - September 16, 1993 
• October 13, 1995 - January 19, 1996 
• April 11, 1996 - June 14, 1996 
4.4.3 Data and results 
We use daily data on LME settlement prices, 3-month futures prices and deliverable 
stocks from January 1991 to September 1996. Data on stocks in LME warehouses were , 
at that time, available only on weekly or twice-weekly basis. Data on prices are dollar 
prices. Prior to July 1 of 1993, prices were denominated in Sterling, and these have been 
converted from sterling prices to dollar prices using the official LME daily dollar-sterling 
exchange rate. 
We calculate daily log and simple mean return errors from January 1991 to June 
1996, in which period the LME copper market was regarded as having been subject to 
frequent manipulations by the metal trading arm of Sumitomo Corporation. 
Since our sampling time interval is finer than the futures contract interval, in order 
to get rid of the overlapping data problem, we use the methodology suggested by Hansen 
and Hodrick (1980) to estimate the asymptotic variance-covariance matrix, and then 
calculate the modified standard deviations. 9 The results are reported in Table 4.1.10 
We do not see any substantial differences between log and simple mean forecast errors 
except that the simple forecast error in 1992 is negative but positive for the log forecast 
error, though both are not statistically significant. We do find evidence on the effects 
of manipulation on the relationships between futures price and the future cash price. 
From Table 4.1, for all the 4 periods of identified manipulation, all the mean log and 
k-l 
2 L i(k-i) 
9The modified standard deviation ((T) is k;tl - i=~n2 (T, where n is the number of observations, k 
is the interval of forecasting, and (T the standard deviation of prediction errors. For details of derivation, 
see the appendix B at the end of this Chapter. 
laThe standard errors reported were modified by the approach proposed by Hansen and Hodrick(1980). 
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period log forecast error simple forecast error 
mean st.error t-value mean st.error t-value 
1991-June 1996 0.0022 0.023 0.09 0.0039 0.023 0.17 
1991 0.0136 0.029 0.47 0.021 0.023 0.91 
1992 0.0028 0.042 0.06 -0.006 0.041 -0.15 
1993 0.046 0.061 0.76 0.033 0.058 0.56 
1994 -0.109 0.042 -2.54 -0.119 0.048 -2.48 
1995 0.009 0.028 0.32 0.0035 0.026 0.13 
Jan.-June 1996 0.102 0.091 1.13 0.016 0.081 1.45 
Aug.2-Dec. 6, 91 0.043 0.023 1.80 0.047 0.020 2.33 
Aug.l1-Sept.16, 93 0.151 0.042 3.59 0.127 0.036 3.53 
Oct.13-Jan.19, 96 0.055 0.033 1.67 0.064 0.037 1.74 
Apr.ll-June 14, 96 0.217 0.084 2.58 0.218 0.081 2.71 
Table 4.1: Copper futures price forecast errors (January 1991-September 1996) 
simple forecast errors are positive. The positive figures are large, and all exceed 3%. The 
largest one exceeds 20% (for the period from April 11, 1996 to June 14, 1996). All values 
are statistically significant at 5% (where t = Vii{) / s > 1.65, and s / Vii is the standard 
deviation, n is the number of observations). 
One immediate implication is that due to the effects of manipulation on expectations, 
we expect that the annual mean forecast error in the year where manipulation occurred 
is positive or at least larger than that without manipulation. We therefore calculate the 
annual log and simple average forecast errors from January 1991 to the end of June 1996, 
and the result which is also reported in Table 4.1 supports our conjecture. Although 
most daily mean forecast errors are not statistically significant, we find all annual daily 
means with manipulation occurred during the year are positive and annual daily means 
with manipulation are larger than that without manipulation. Further, daily means for 
1992 (simple mean) and 1994 (without identified manipulationll ) are negative and the 
latter is statisticaily significant. 
Our results differ from those reported by Kolb (1992). Kolb used US data from 1959 
llThe CFTC alleged that Sumitomo attempted to manipulate from the third quarter of 1994. From 
the market performance, Sumitomo may have not undertook manipulation in 1994, but possibly have 
acquired large long postions both in the futures and cash markets. 
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to 1988 to test the Keynes hypothesis of "normal backwardation" in futures markets, and 
found 52.64% of copper futures prices were below their terminal prices, and significant 
negative forecast errors for 50 days prior to contract expiration. We should not conclude 
that our results contradict Kolb's. But we do claim in general the copper futures prices 
on the LME are significantly above the cash prices for the periods of manipulation or 
alleged manipulation. 
It is customary to assume that manipulation raises both cash and futures prices and 
price volatilities. We do not find unequivocal evidence for the raises of futures and cash 
prices. Of four identified manipulations, the mean futures price during manipulation was 
higher than that prior to manipulation for one case, and other four cases show that mean 
futures prices during manipulation were even lower than those prior to manipulation. 12 
This result may suggest not all manipulations raise absolute prices, and that relying solely 
on historical price comparisons as the way to establish manipulation case may not be 
generally reliable, because prices are determined by current and prospective fundamentals 
that are not necessarily limited by the historical market experiences. 13 The view that 
manipulation raises absolute prices is based on the assumption that the manipulator must 
profit from the liquidation of his futures positions. This assumption is not necessarily 
true given that a manipulator may utilise complex dynamic strategies to maximise his 
profits by using different instruments and markets. For example, Sumitomo, as a major 
copper supplier, may manipulate the copper futures market by sustaining the cash prices 
above a certain level, so that it can profit from supplying cash commodity to customers 
at a price which is higher than the competitive level, but possibly suffers a loss from 
futures trading alone. We also 'perform F-tests to s'ee whether the mean prices during 
the alleged manipulation are not significantly different from those prior to manipulation 
for each identified manipulation. We fail to reject the hypothesis at 5% significance level 
12The validity of this statistical results is subject to the accuracy of manipulation identification and 
we will employ an alternative approach to examine the effects of the alleged Sumitomo manipulation on 
the LME copper cash price. 
13 A similar argument was raised in t he discussions of some court cases, for example, the Cox case, see 
also footnote 5, 
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for all the four manipulations. We do not find unequivocal evidence for the elevation 
of cash price volatilities and increase of deliverable stocks either. It appears that the 
weekly cash price volatilities for all manipulation cases are raised by at least 20%, and 
deliverable stocks in the LME warehouses increase from 14% to more than 30% (the 
1995 manipulation) during manipulation, see Table 4.2. But F-tests show that we can 
only reject the hypotheses of equality of price volatilities for the August - September 
manipulation and the October 13, 1995 - January 19, 1996 manipulation, and of the 
equality of deliverable stocks for the October 13, 1995 - January 19, 1996 manipulation. 
In Table 4.2, futures prices and cash prices are denominated in dollars, while stocks are 
weekly deliverable stocks announced by the LME on every Friday and the unit is million 
tonnes; volatilities are measured as weekly standard deviations of daily prices; the length 
for each period prior to manipulation was chosen as the same as that of manipulation, 
and therefore, the mean and standard deviation prior to manipulation were comparable 
to those during manipulation. 
Furthermore, we find that copper cash price volatilities do not exhibit any systematic 
changes over the period 1981 to 1996. This suggests manipulation may affect price 
volatilities only in short run. We calculate both annual average monthly and weekly 
volatilities through the sample period, and the results are reported in Tablp 4.3, where 
the measurement of volatility is standard deviations of daily price returns, and weekly 
average of volatility is the mean of weekly standard deviations for the period, whereas 
monthly average is the mean of intra-month standard deviations for a specific period. 
The annual mean volatilities in the periods of manipulation (we consider in 1991, 1993, 
and 1995-1996) do not appear to be significantly higher either than annual average in 
whole sample period or than that in the 1990s. This result is in accordance with the 
argument made by Brunetti and Gilbert (1995). 
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manI- cash futu stocks cash futures 
date pula- item pnce -res In m volati- volati-
tion pnce tones lity lity 
Aug. 2 before mean 2308 2275 0.252 0.0119 0.0138 
to std.dev. 0.027 0.0038 0.0043 
Dec. 6, during mean 2324 2287 0.299 0.0141 0.0153 
1991 std. dey. 0.012 0.0044 0.0045 
Aug. 11 before mean 1932 1934 0.459 0.0083 0.0073 
to std.dev. 0.008 0.0034 0.0041 
Sept.19, during mean 1954 1915 0.515 0.0152 0.0134 
1993 std. dey. 0.024 0.0093 0.0082 
Oct.13, before mean 2982 2917 0.16 0.0133 0.0106 
1995 to std.dev. 0.032 0.0056 0.0054 
Jan.19, during mean 2862 2691 0.222 0.0159 0.0112 
1996 std. dey. 0.037 0.0063 0.0058 
April 11 before mean 2540 2516 0.336 0.0077 0.0064 
to std.dev. 0.009 0.0039 0.0035 
June 14 during mean 2591 2491 0.336 0.0238 0.0175 
1996 std. dey. 0.017 0.0212 0.0181 
Table 4.2: Manipulation effects on copper prices, deliverable stocks and price volatilities 
year average year average 
weekly monthly weekly monthly 
1981 0.130 0.013 1990 0.022 0.022 
1982 0.014 0.013 1991 0.011 0.012 
1983 0.013 0.012 1992 0.007 0.008 
1984 0.011 0.009 1993 0.012 0.014 
1985 0.014 0.013 1994 0.0136 0.014 
1986 0.009 0.012 1995 0.013 0.014 
1987 0.018 0.019 1981-1995 0.0146 0.015 
1988 0.027 0.028 1991-1995 0.0114 0.012 
1989 0.021 0.021 
Table 4.3: Copper cash price volatilities (January 1981- December 1995) 
123 
4.5 Manipulation and Risk Shifting 
In the previous section, we have already examined the effects of manipulation on the price 
discovery function of a futures market, focusing on the relationships between the futures 
price and the future cash price. Now we turn to investigate the effects of manipulation 
on the risk-shifting function of a futures market, especially the basis and basis risk. 
Although it is commonly alleged that manipulation usually pushes a market from a 
normal market to an inverted market, and causes the basis to be more volatile, rare 
empirical studies have been done on this issue. Barnhart, Kahl and Barnhart (1996) 
studied manipulation effects on the July 1989 soybean futures contract in the CBOT 
market by looking distortions in futures price structures which are not explainable in 
terms of seasonality. The suggested methods and information used may not generally be 
applicable in examining the basis behaviouI in the LME market. 
4.5.1 Analysis of basis and basis risk 
The basis is expected to change over the life of a hedge. For a storable commodity, 
the basis should reflect the storage costs oyer the period. Basis risk means unexpected 
changes in the basis, which affects the riskiness of hedging. It is obvious that basis 
risk is important for hedging and production decisions. Consider a simple example of a 
perfect hedge. Suppose a producer enters a short futures position at t = 1 to hedge his 
production level at t = 2. Assume that the cash price and futures price are C1 and II 
at t = 1, C2 and 12 at t = 2 respectively. He will close out his futures position at t = 2. 
Therefore, the producer'S profits are: (C2 - C1) + (II - 12)' i.e., b2 - bl, where b1 and b2 
are the basis at t = 1 and t = 2 respectively. Thus it is clear that changes in basis affect 
the producer'S profits directly. 
Some theoretical work has been undertaken on the impact of basis and basis risk on 
hedging, production, and investment decisions. Anderson and Danthine (1981) presented 
a theoretical analysis on this issue that included the existence of basis risk and the 
12-1 
availability of more than one hedging instrument. They showed that basis risk implies 
that the optimal hedging ratio is less than one. Without basis risk, an agent will hedge 
the entire cash position, while in the presence of basis risk, he/she will hedge only a 
portion of the cash position. Paroush and Wolf (1989) compared production behaviour 
in the presence of basis risk. They found that in the absence of basis risk, the production 
decision is unaffected by the distributions of cash prices and the attitude towards risk, 
and production is a function only of the cost parameters and the period 1 deterministic 
futures price. This occurs because the futures market completely eliminates price risk. 
When there exists basis risk, agents trade-off price risk with basis risk, and the optimal 
production decision depends on the level of risk aversion and the variance of the spot 
price. Paroush and Wolf also showed that production level and optimal hedge ratio in 
the presence of basis risk are both less than those in the absence of basis risk, and as the 
basis risk increases, production falls. 
Various attempts have been also made to search the determinants of basis. At least 
part of the contemporaneous differences of futures price and cash price can be explained 
by the costs of storage between the time periods to which the prices refer. This is 
that, if the cash price refers to commodity traded now and the futures price is for a 
commodity traded three months later, the two prices should differ by the costs of storing 
the commodity for three months. It is termed the Cost of Carry model or the Carrying 
Charge theorem, which was first proposed by Working (1949), and then developed and 
empirically tested by Brennan (1958), Tester (1958), French (1986), Brennan (1991) and 
Bailey and Ng (1991), etc. Carrying charges are the total costs of carrying a commodity 
forward, including storage costs, insurance costs, transportation costs and financing costs. 
If the basis matches the carrying costs, we say the market is in full carry. But in practice, 
futures prices vary from full carry for mC1ny commodities. In general, the Cost of Carry 
model fails to apply when an asset has a convenience yield - a return on holding the 
physical assets. This convenience yield may arise because inventory can ha':e productive 
value, for example, holding inventory may allow the agent to meet unexpected demand. 
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When holding an asset has a convenience yield, the futures price will be below full carry. 
In extreme cases, the market can be so far below full carry that the cash price can exceed 
the futures price, i.e., the market is in backwardation. 
Another dominant theory to explain the basis and basis movements is the Supply of 
Storage theory (Kaldor 1939; Working 1949; Brennan 1958; Fama and French 1987, and 
Williams 1986). The Supply of Storage theory states that the price difference (basis) can 
be explained in part by supply and demand conditions applicable to each commodity. 
If there is a supply shock or some other incidents which may influence the supply and 
demand conditions, the basis will change accordingly. 
Both theories have been considered to be important to explain basis and basis risk 
empirically. We attempt to apply these theories to test whether the basis and basis 
movements on the LME copper market are explainable by theories in periods of alleged 
manipulation. If we find the basis behaviour during the periods of manipulation is sig-
nificantly different from what the models implied or different from that in other periods, 
then we may conclude manipulation has adverse effects on hedging through its effects on 
the basis and basis risk. 
4.5.2 The econometric models 
Following Fama and French (1987), Brennan (1991) and Bailey and Ng (1991), in the 
Cost of Carry model, the basis is a function of interest forgone (R t ), marginal storage 
costs (Wt ), and marginal convenience yield (Crt). Mathematically, 
(4.3) 
The' contribution of interest foregone and storage costs to basis is negative, whereas 
the contribution of convenience yield to the basis is positive. 
We propose to examine the three-month copper basis behaviour on the LME, and to 
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use 3-month Libor14 as the risk free interest rate in study. LME warehousing costs are 
quoted as a fixed amount per metric tonne of the metal and adjusted every fiscal vear. 
The common approach to calculating convenience yields is the formula (4.5) below. \Ye 
first calculate 3-month futures yields excluding warehousing costs, and then calculate the 
associate convenience yields. The effect of storage costs on the basis is therefore captured 
by the adjusted convenience yields. 
The annualised ex-cost 3-month yield (yt) is: 
( 4.4) 
The convenience yield is calculated by: 
Cyt = e[ln(l+Rt}-ln(l+Yt)] - 1 ( 4.5) 
where Ft ,3month is the 3-month futures price observed at time t, St is the cash price at 
time t, and Wt ,3month is the storage costs for storing cash commodities for 3 months at 
time t. 
The relationship between convenience yield, interest rate, and commodity futures 
yield is that, the higher the interest rate, the lower is the commodity futures yield, and 
the higher is the convenience yield. We calculate the convenience yield for copper from 
January 1981 to September 1996, and it is graphed in Figure 4-6. However, this approach 
of measuring convenience yield may be inappropriate for our econometric analysis, since 
the explained variable and the convenience yield are based on the same information set. 
Proxies for storage costs and convenience yield are therefore used. Variables such as 
current stocks, expected production or expected demand could serve as proxies. Since 
current price nlay incorporate the effects of these variables, price is therefore used as 
a proxy for convenience yield. Following Brennan (1991), Bailey and Ng (1991) and 
Barnhart, Kahl and Barnhart (1996), we choose a lagged log futures price LN(Ft- 1) as a 
14The 3-month libor data are from Datastream. 
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proxy. The use of the lagged futures price, rather than current price may reduce possible 
manipulation effects. This is particularly the case on the LME, since the lagged futures 
price and the basis refer to different contracts. 
In order to get rid of manipulation effects, we also employ a more intuitive method 
of measuring convenience yield based on Ward and Dasse (1977). Convenience yield 
(CY SCt) at time t is explained in terms of 
0< sct/SCt < 1 
SCt/sct > 1 
(4.6) 
where SCt is the deliverable stocks at time t, and SCt is the average level of deliverable 
stocks up to 2 months backward from time t. 
This function form implies that the higher the marginal convenience yield, the lower 
is the level of stocks compared to normal (the previous 2-month average level), and zero 
for stocks above normal. 
We add a dummy variable (D1 ) in each period where a manipulation was identified. 
Conforming to previous studies, we use the negative basis RBt (log cash price - log 
futures price) instead of basis B t in the empirical model. Durbin-Watson test shows that 
there is a serial autocorrelation, in the specification of the econometric model, a lagged 
explanatory variable (RBt-d is therefore added. If the lagged futures price is used as a 
proxy for convenience yield, the econometric model of equation (4.3) can be rewritten as: 
(4.7) 
and if equation (4.6) is used to measure the convenience yield, then equation (4.3) 
becomes: 
RBt = 130 + f31RBt- 1 + f32 Rt + f33 CYSCt + BDI + 7]t (4.8) 
where DJ = { ~ if manipulation is identified 
otherwise 
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In the Supply of Storage theory, as suggested by Working (1949) and Williams (1986), 
the basis is a function of deliverable supply and deliverable supply squared. 15 Mathe-
matically, 
(4.9) 
We add a dummy variable (D 1 ) to see whether manipulation contributes to the basis 
in addition to deliverable stocks which reflect market fundamental aspects. The variable 
- lagged basis is also included in the model. The empirical model of equation (4.9) can 
then be written: 
(4.10) 
Because the variable of deliverable stocks is non-stationary (see Table 4.4 and Table 
4.5), we use a market indicator at time t (MIt) as a proxy. The market indicator is 




If the market indicator is used, the econometric model of equation (4.9) then becomes: 
( 4.12) 
According to Cost of Carry theorem, in equation (4.7) and (4.8) ~ the coefficients for 
interest rate are expected to be positive, reflecting the fact that the higher the opportunity 
costs of storage, the higher is the futures price exceeding the cash price, and the larger 
is the negative basis. While the coefficients for convenience yield are expected to be 
15The Supply of Storage theory actually argues that the relationship between the basis and deliverable 
supply is nonlinear. In the specification of the econometric model, one may add a cubic term (i.e., 
deliverable supply cubed). However, as suggested by Barnhart et al. (1996), the general results are 
similar regardless of whether a cubic term is included. Moreover, the coefficients of the cubic t('rm in 
the estimation of this model are all not well-determined, we therefore exclude this term as \\"cll. 
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negative, suggesting that in the case of supply shortage, the difference of the futures 
price exceeding the cash price should diminish. In extreme supply shortage cases, negative 
basis may become zero, even negative. The coefficient for manipulation dummy should 
be negative, because manipulation raises cash price higher relatiye to forward price. 
But in equation (4.10) and (4.12), the coefficients for deliverable stocks are expected 
to be negative (i.e., the market is in backwardation), since the greater physical supply 
in the delivery market, the smaller is the basis. If manipulation influences the basis, 
the coefficient for manipulation dummy is expected to be positive; which implies that 
manipulation exacerbates the basis, even to the extent of pushing a normal market into 
an inverted market. 
4.5.3 Data 
The sample period is from July 1991 to September 1996. Data on deliverable stocks in 
LME warehouses is only available weekly or twice-weekly over the sample period. Hence 
we construct weekly copper and aluminium observations on basis Bt (log cash price less 
log futures price), negative basis RB t (log futures price less log cash price), 3-month 
Libor, and deliverable stocks in million tones in LME warehouses. Aluminium data is 
used only as a comparison to see to what extent copper basis is departure from aluminiunl 
basis, because copper and aluminium may be seen as sharing similar consumption time 
paths and are the two most liquid LME contracts (Gilbert 1996). Since Dickey-Fuller 
tests show all variables in the study are stationary with the exception of SC and LSC, 
the deliverable stocks (in million tones) for copper and aluminillnl respectively, level 
equations are used. Summary statistics for all variables are reported in Table 4.4 and 
Table 4.5. See also Figures 4-3 - 4-6. 
4.5.4 Results 
We estimate equation (4.7), (4.8), (4.10), and (4.12) for copper and aluminium respec-
tively over the whole sample and sub-samples from 1991 throughout September 1996. 
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B libor CY CYSC SC MI 
mean 0.0835 0.0708 0.1377 0.0184 0.3249 1.004 
std.dev. 0.0216 0.0282 0.1102 0.0320 0.1112 0.056 
skewness 2.0462 0.6215 2.1688 2.8579 1.0329 -0.069 
kurtosis 5.8633 -0.777 7.9664 11.217 0.6186 1.226 
normality (X2 ) 261.4* 81.9* 203.64* 564.5* 102.8* 17.4* 
stationarity I(O) I(O) I(O) I(O) I(l) I(O) 
*denotes significant at 1%. 
Table 4.4: Summary statistics of variables for copper 
B CYSC SC MI 
mean -0.0184 0.0154 1.3288 1.008 
std.dev. 0.0048 0.0316 0.7186 0.038 
skewness 2.0596 2.161 0.4044 -0.735 
kurtosis 7.294 3.559 -1.072 0.5792 
normali ty (X2) 179.6* 887.9* 56.9* 31.4* 
stationarity I(O) I(O) I(l) I(O) 
*denotes significant at 1%. 
Table 4.5: Summary statistics of variables for aluminium 
Estimation of these models for aluminium is performed for the purpose to see to what 
extent the results for aluminium differ from those for copper. 
The results of estimating equation (4.7) for copper are given in Table 4.6. The esti-
mated coefficients for the lagged futures price and Libor except for the sub-sample (1995 
to September 1996) are well-determined, and the signs are as expected. The signs for the 
manipulation dummy are correct and the coefficients are well-determined. The negative 
coefficient for manipulation dummy suggests that manipulation has positive effects on 
the basis (recall that RBt represents negative basis). 
Estimation results of equation (4.8) for copper are given in Table 4.8. The coefficients 
for convenience yields and the manipulation dummy are well-determined, and t.he signs 
are as expected. But coefficients for Libor are less well-determined for the sub-sample 
(1991 to 1992) and the sub-sample (1995 to September 1996), and the sign for sub-sample 
(1993 to 1994) is not as expected, which may be due to acute backwardations at that 
tinle, and convenience yields and nlanipulation dummy nlay donlinate this relationship. 
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period constant RB t 1 libor LNFt 1 Dl RL sample size 
1991- 0.043 0.601 0.017 -0.052 -0.098 0.71 103 
1992 (0.32) (8.52) (2.08) ( -0.28) (-4.37) 
1993 0.1065 0.610 0.282 -0.014 -0.014 0.82 104 
1994 (3.41 ) (9.56) (0.61) ( -3.16) ( -5.58) 
1995- -0.042 0.562 0.224 0.003 -0.017 0.61 92 
Sept. 96 (-1.42) (6.59) (0.32) (0.18) ( -3.28) 
1990 0.123 0.695 0.078 -0.017 -0.011 0.75 299 
Sept. 96 (3.58) (18.7) (2.73) (-3.69) ( -5.82) 
Note: values in parentheses are t-values 
Table 4.6: Estimation results of equation (4.7) for copper 
period constant RBt - 1 libor LNFt- 1 Dl R:2 sample size 
1991- -0.004 0.879 0.037 0.001 0.000 0.79 103 
1992 ( -0.23) (14.4) (0.32) (0.52) (0.75) 
1993- 0.025 0.745 0.011 -0.003 0.000 0.70 104 
1994 (2.09) ( 10.2) (0.65) (-1.79) (0.25) 
1995- 0.042 0.732 0.135 -0.004 0.000 0.61 92 
Sept. 96 (0.81) (9.75) (0.83) (-1.08) (0.23) 
1990 0.018 0.767 0.009 -0.002 0.000 0.69 299 
Sept. 96 (2.46) (19.8) (1.45) ( -2.08) (1.01) 
Note: values in parentheses are t-values 
Table 4.7: Estimation of equation (4.7) for aluminum 
The coefficients for manipulation dummy are larger than those in equation (4.7), which 
may suggest the measurement of convenience yields in equation (4.8) is better than that 
in equation (4.7). 
We also estimate equation (4.7) and (4.8) for aluminium, and the results are reported 
in Table 4.7 and Table 4.9. The coefficients for Libor are not well-determined in either 
equations, but all coefficients for the convenience yield except for the sub-sample (1995-
September 1996) in equation (4.7) are well-determined and the signs are correct. It is 
interesting to note that, the coefficients for the manipulation dumrny are extremely small 
(close to zero) and none of the coefficients are significant even at 10% significance level. 
This may offer reassurance of the fact that manipulation influences the copper basis 
changes. 
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period constant RB t - 1 libor CYSC Dl R2 sample size 
1991- 0.002 0.598 0.003 -0.046 -0.011 0.70 103 
1992 (0.32) (8.64) (0.05) ( -1.72) ( -4.48) 
1993- 0.008 0.707 -0.112 -0.035 -0.013 0.81 104 
1994 (3.62) (12.9) (-2.86) ( -1.94) (-5.06) 
1995- -0.029 0.533 0.424 -0.074 -0.019 0.63 92 
Sept. 96 (-0.89) (6.32) (0.75) (-1.93) ( -3.93) 
1990 -0.002 0.732 0.004 -0.064 -0.012 0.75 299 
Sept. 96 (-0.82) (20.1 ) (1.46) ( -3.07) ( -5.98) 
Note: values in parentheses are t-values 
Table 4.8: Estimation results of equation (4.8) for copper 
period constant RB t - 1 libor CYLSC Dl R2 sample size 
1991- 0.003 0.862 0.001 -0.010 -0.003 0.78 103 
1992 (1.97) (16.9) (0.01) (-1.82) (-0.24) 
1993- 0.006 0.638 0.021 -0.044 0.0002 0.71 104 
1994 (3.61) (7.91 ) (1.24) (-3.17) (0.31) 
1995- 0.058 0.644 0.033 -0.039 -0.000 0.65 92 
Sept. 96 (0.58) (8.15) (0.18) (-2.51) ( -0.83) 
1990 0.005 0.699 0.011 -0.029 -0.002 0.76 299 
Sept. 96 (6.34) (17.1) (1.74) (-4.59) (-1.12) 
Note: values in parentheses are t-values 
Table 4.9: Estimation results of equation (4.8) for aluminium 
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period constant Bt - 1 SC (SC)~ Dl R~ sample size 
1991- -0.059 0.546 0.466 -0.936 0.011 0.72 103 
1992 ( -1.77) (7.60) (1.88) (-1.98) ( 4.74) 
1993- 0.005 0.687 -0.026 0.004 0.012 0.81 104 
1994 (0.44) (11.9) ( -0.48) ( -0.08) (4.71 ) 
1995- 0.011 0.535 0.036 -0.186 0.020 0.63 92 
Sept. 96 (0.45) (6.43) (0.14) (-0.37) (3.99) 
1990 0.015 0.709 -0.067 0.062 0.009 0.75 299 
Sept. 96 (2.49) (19.2) (-2.05) (1.79) ( 4.99) 
Note: values in parentheses are t-values 
Table 4.10: Estimation results of equation (4.10) for copper 
In examining manipulation effects on the basis using the Supply of Storage model, we 
estimate both equations (4.10) and (4.12). The estimation results for copper are given in 
Table 4.10 and 4.11 respectively. The signs of coefficients for all variables except those 
for SC in the sub-samples (1991 to 1992) and (1995 - September 1996) are as expected. 
The "wrong signs" for those sub-samples might be that the effects of manipulation on 
deliverable stocks are not well captured by the manipulation dummy. The significant 
positive values of the coefficients for manipulation dummy imply that manipulation has 
positive effects on the basis. However, all the coefficients of the non-manipulation dummy 
in both equations are negative except for the sub-sample (1990 - 1992), and are not 
statistically significant. We estimate both equations for aluminium during the same 
periods. Although signs for manipulation dummy are almost positive as well (but negatiye 
in equation (4.10) for sub-sample (1993 - 1994) and sub-sample (1995 - 1996)), they are 
very small and not statistically significant. The results are reported in Table 4.12 and 
4.13. The stati6uically significant coefficients of the manipulation dummy in equations 
(4.10) and (4.12) for copper, but not for aluminium, suggest that copper manipulation 
has indeed influenced t.he copper basis behaviour. 
In searching manipulation effects on the basis and basis risk, "\ye also calculate the 
basis basis volatilities the correlation coefficients between cash prices and futures prices. , , 
and the correlation coefficients between the basis and deliverable stocks for all identified 
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period constant Bt - 1 MI (MI)2 Dl R2 sample size 
1991- -0.432 0.687 -0.339 0.136 0.010 0.81 103 
1992 (-1.59) (8.72) ( -4.10) (3.73) ( 4.24) 
1993- -0.343 0.754 -0.639 0.376 0.012 0.81 104 
1994 ( -1.94) (14.4) (-2.11) (2.08) ( 4.83) 
1995- 0.342 0.534 -0.648 0.311 0.022 0.63 92 
Sept. 96 (1.56) (6.01 ) (-1.56) (1.40) (3.75) 
1990- 0.156 0.739 -0.278 0.121 0.011 0.75 299 
Sept. 96 (2.22) (19.4) ( -1.84) (1.86) (5.78) 
Note: values in parentheses are t-values 
Table 4.11: Estimation results of equation (4.12) for copper 
period constant Bt - 1 LSC (LSC)2 Dl R2 sample size 
1991- -0.005 0.791 -0.001 0.006 0.000 0.81 103 
1992 ( -3.39) (12.8) (-2.61 ) (1.61) (0.48) 
1993- -0.019 0.806 0.016 -0.004 -0.000 0.70 104 
1994 ( -1.88) (14.2) (1.61) (-1.58) (-0.72) 
1995- -0.003 0.768 -0.002 0.001 -0.001 0.60 92 
Sept. 96 (-0.62) (10.9) ( -1.34) (0.211) (-0.61) 
1991- -0.002 0.835 -0.008 0.001 0.001 0.76 299 
Sept. 96 (-1.87) (30.4) (-1.78) (1.76) (0.71) 
Note: values in parentheses are t-values 
Table 4.12: Estimation results of equation (4.10) for aluminium 
period constant Bt - 1 MI (MI)~ Dl RL sample size 
1991- -0.076 0.732 0.163 -0.081 0.001 0.81 103 
1992 ( -1.97) (10.4) (0.91) (-1.98) (1.01) 
1993- 0.413 0.678 -0.817 0.398 0.000 0.71 104 
1994 (1.23) (8.73) (-1.56) (1.16) (0.027) 
1995- 0.239 0.654 -0.465 0.219 0.000 0.64 92 
Sept. 96 (0.905) (8.28) ( -0.86) (0.79) (0.82) .-
1990- 0.076 0.704 -0.138 0.056 0.001 0.74 299 
Sept. 96 (1.00) (17.8) (-1.68) (1.73) (0.36) 
Note: values in parentheses are t-values 
Table 4.13: Estimation results of equation (4.12) for aluminium 
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manipulation periods from 1991 to 1996. The middle two are commonly considered as a 
measure of basis risk, and the last one is regarded as negative in normal case in terms 
of the Supply of Storage model. The results confirm to the discussions in section 4.3. 
The results for copper are reported in Table 4.14 and for aluminium in Table 4.15. The 
period length prior to manipulation is tailored to be the same as that of manipulation. 
We find that the average weekly basis for copper increased by 194%, 576%; 126% and 
412% respectively for 4 identified manipulations from 1991 to 1996. The average weekly 
basis volatilities increased by 242%, 175%, 125% and 239% respectively: hmvever, the 
correlation coefficients between cash and futures prices decreased uniquely, although to 
variant extent. One interesting aspect is that most of the correlation coefficients between 
the basis and deliverable stocks for copper change from negative to positi\'e values due to 
manipulation which are not explainable in terms of standard economic theory. This once 
again suggests that manipulation causes the basis movements departure from normal. 
But we do not find the similar patterns for aluminium. 
4.6 Manipulation and the LME Copper Price 
The previous sections examined the effects of the alleged Sumitomo manipulation on 
the LME relative price relationships, i.e.: the futures forecast errors and the basis. \Ve 
found that the manipulation not only produced systematically positive forecast errors, 
but also exacerbated the basis and basis risk on the L~IE. This may undermine the 
functioning of the LME copper market. In this section, \ye proceed to look at whether 
the manipulation also affected the absolute copper price level on the Ll\IE. This pOInt 
was raised by the CFTC Order in Ivlay 1998, but without providing evidence. It is of our 
interests since the LME is the major world futures nlarket for non-ferrous metals, and 
forms the pricing basis for physical copper trading throughout the world. The influence of 
the manipulation on the Ll\1E price has important implications on the worldwide copper 
production, consumption and investnlent decisions. This section therefore in\'estigah':-; 
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valati- corr . coeff. corr .coeff. 
Date manIpu- item basis lity of B/W cash B/W basis 
lation basis /futures /stocks 
Aug. 2 before mean -0.016 0.004 0.969 -0.544 
to std.dev. 0.0048 0.003 
Dec. 6, In mean 0.0145 0.005 0.944 0.291 
1991 std.dev. 0.0133 0.005 
Aug. 11 before mean 0.0030 0.002 0.974 -0.613 
to std.dev. 0.0045 0.001 
Sept.16 In mean 0.0203 0.003 0.935 0.619 
1993 std.dev. 0.0045 0.001 
Oct. 10 before mean 0.0249 0.005 0.935 -0.881 
1995 to std.dev. 0.0158 0.003 
Jan. 19, In mean 0.0563 0.012 0.970 -0.130 
1996 std.dev. 0.0259 0.009 
April 11 before mean 0.0093 0.005 0.928 0.084 
to std.dev. 0.0051 0.001 
June 14 In mean 0.0476 0.016 0.792 0.432 
1996 std.dev. 0.0371 0.012 
Table 4.14: The effects of manipulation on the basis and basis risk (July 1991- September 
1996) 
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marnpu- valati- corr. corr. 
Date lation item basis lity of coefi. coeff. 
basis BjW CjF BjW BjSC 
Aug.2 before mean -0.023 0.009 0.997 -0.733 
to std.dev. 0.0019 0.004 
Dec. 6 In mean -0.024 0.001 0.998 0.434 
1991 std.dev. 0.001 0.001 
Aug. 11 before mean -0.018 0.005 0.998 -0.028 
to std.dev. 0.0006 0.001 
Sept.16 In mean -0.018 0.001 0.998 0.758 
1993 std.dev. 0.0009 0.001 
Oct.10 before mean -0.013 0.001 0.996 0.758 
to std.dev. 0.004 0.001 
Jan. 19 In mean -0.017 0.026 0.956 0.523 
1996 std.dev. 0.008 0.004 
Apr. 11 before mean -0.018 0.003 0.996 -0.662 
to std.dev. 0.003 0.004 
June 14 In mean -0.021 0.013 0.994 -0.301 
1996 std.dev. 0.002 0.001 
Table 4.15: The basis and basis risk for aluminium (July 1991 - September 1996) 
date manipulation cash price futures price 
mean std. dev. mean std. dev. 
Aug. 2 to In 2320 66 2286 39 
Dec.6, 1991 after 2198 44 2207 38 
Aug. 11 to In 1956 42 1917 34 
Sept.16, 1993 after 1706 25 1723 24 
Oct. 13 to In 2855 135 2690 99 
Jan. J 9, 1996 after 2571 72 2553 47 
Apr. 11 to In 2591 176 2484 198 
June 14, 1996 after 1933 65 1917 48 
Table 4.16: Copper price behaviour in the presence of manipulation 
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the effects of the Sumitomo manipulation on the LME copper cash price. 
4.6.1 Methodology 
In order to explore the effects of the manipulation on the copper price level, first of all, 
we need to determine what would have been the copper price. In pract.ice, there may be 
several ways to attempt to determine such a price in the absence of manipulation. Based 
on standard micro economic theory, for instance, one can compute an equilibrium price 
by modelling the fundamentals of supply and demand. Alternatively, one can look at the 
data directly and estimate the average price level for the relevant period. We choose to use 
the latter approach. We therefore estimate a reduced form VAR for relevant variables, 
then forecast ahead out of sample using the estimated VAR parameters, and finally 
compare the forecast prices with the actual LME cash prices. The forecast period (from 
the second half of 1994 to June 1996) is chosen since during this period the manipulation 
was most seriously alleged, and Sumitomo has offered to settle allegations for this period 
with the CFTC and other civil lawsuits. 
4.6.2 Data 
We consider four variables: LME cash copper price, LME copper deliverable stocks, world 
refined copper consumption, and OECD industrial production. Industrial production 
provides a measure of industrial act.ivity, which may be seen as driving the demand for 
the refined copper. 
The data set used for the estilnation consists of quarterly observations for world 
refined copper consumption, quarterly observations for OECD industrial production and 
the Ll\1E copper settlement price O\"er the period of the first quarter of 1954 - the fourth 
quarter of 1997, and quarterly observations of LME copper deliverable stocks over the 
period of the fourth quarter of 1969 - the fourth quarter of 1997. The data for refined 
copper consumption, LME deliverable stocks and cash prices are taken from the "\ \"orl( 1 
I\Ictal Statistics" published b~" the \Vorld Bureau of I\Ietal Statistics. Data for OEeD 
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LRP LSS LOEIP 
Mean 7.806 0.121 4.540 
Std. dev. 0.317 0.097 0.094 
Skewness 0.698 1.489 -0.032 
Excess Kurtosis 0.392 1.404 -0.312 
Minimum 7.298 0.007 4.324 
Maximum 8.744 0.399 4.770 
Normality (X2 ) 10.9** 108.7** 0.113 
** denotes 1% significance level 
Table 4.17: Summary Statistics (1969 - 1997) 
industrial production are from OEeD "Indicators of Industrial Activity". 
The LME copper price is deflated by the quarterly average of US producer price 
index (data source: IMF, International Financial Statistics), and this gives rise to the 
real LME copper price. By taking the log form of the real copper price and OECD 
industrial production, we obtain the log real LME copper price (LRP) and log OECD 
industrial production (LOEIP). Dividing log LME copper stocks by log world refined 
copper consumption, we obtain the copper stocks/consumption ratio (LSS) ~ 16 where the 
world refined copper consumption is adjusted by using the fitted values from linear trend 
estimation over the period of the first quarter of 1954 - the fourth quarter of 1997. Vve 
therefore have three variables: LRP, LOEIP and LSS. The summary statistics for these 
three variables over the period of the fourth quarter of 1969 - the fourth quarter of 1997 
are reported in Table 4.17. 
4.6.3 Estimation 
The methodology is based on the following simple VAR system, 
A(L)Xt = Et (4.13) 
16The copper stocks/consumption ratio is used to make the stock time series approximately stationary. 
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p 
where A(L) = 1- E AiLi, E(ct) = 0, E(ctc~) = 0 for t =I s, E(ctc~) = ~~ E(Xtc~) = O. 
This is a standard VAR representation in which Xt is a (1 x n) vector of variables, A is 
an (n x n) matrix of coefficients, L denotes the lag operator and Ct is an (n x 1) vector 
of white noises. 
In our context, X t in equation (4.13) includes three variables X t = (LRPt , LSSt , LOE! Pt )', 
and A becomes an (3 x 3) matrix of coefficients. 
We additionally impose two restrictions on the system: A31(L) = 0 and A32 (L) = O. 
These imply that the LME price and stock/consumption ratio haye no impact on the 
OECD industrial production level, but not the other way round. This reflects the fact 
that copper is relatively unimportant in the world economy. We start from a lag length 
of p = 8, and using the likelihood ratio tests, F-tests, the Schwardz and Hannan-Quinn 
information criterion to evaluate the model. The procedure yields lag lengths of 5 quarters 
for each of the three variables. The estimated results using the observations up to the 
second quarter of 1994 are reported in Table 4.18. The statistics of the model are recorded 
in Table 4.19. 
We then proceed to use the estimated VAR parameters to undertake forecast of the 
LME cash price for 8 quarters ahead until the second quarter of 1996. In order to get a 
better measure of the price effects of the manipulation, in this forecast we condition the 
price forecast on actual industrial production, since Sumitomo was not likely to influence 
the level of OECD industrial production. The actual LME cash prices, forecast prices 
and forecast errors over this period are recorded in Table 4.20. In Table 4.20, the forecast 
variable is LRP, the variable of interest is the forecast price which is inflated by the US 
producer index, and so that it corresponds to the actual LME cash price. The residual 
is the difference between the actual price and the forecast price. As one can see from 
Table 4.20, the actual LME prices during the period from the third quarter of 1994 to 
the end of 1995 were above the forecast prices, and some times the actual price was 10% 
more than the forecast price. This may suggest that the manipulation increased the L~lE 
price, but not substantially. The negative residuals in the first two quarters of 1996 lll;t~r 
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Explanatary LRP LSS LOEIP 
variable 
LRP 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
LRP-1 0.8394 (0.122) 0.0424 (0.023) 0.0000 
LRP_2 -0.1022 (0.160) -0.0264 (0.031) 0.0000 
LRP_3 0.0841 (0.162) 0.0160 (0.031) 0.0000 
LRI' -4 0.0006 (0.163) -0.0371 (0.031) 0.0000 
LRP_5 0.0096 (0.117) 0.0266 (0.023) 0.0000 
LSS 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
LSS_1 -1.1378 (0.605) 1.4754 (0.116) 0.0000 
LSS_2 1.0174 (1.063) -0.4256 (0.204) 0.0000 
LSS_3 0.6342 (1.074) -0.0167 (0.206) 0.0000 
LSS_4 -0.7751 (1.065) -0.1749 (0.204) 0.0000 
LSS_5 0.1556 (0.626) 0.0804 (0.120) 0.0000 
LOEIP 1.4501 (0.496) 0.0760 (0.095) 0.0000 
LOEIP -1 -0.3072 (0.632) -0.1946 (0.125) 0.8921 (0.099) 
LOEIP -2 -0.5511 (0.726) 0.1946 (0.126) 0.0356 (0.128) 
LOEIP -3 0.0438 (0.658) -0.1636 (0.127) -0.1322 (0.128) 
LOEIP -4 -0.0741 (0.670) 0.0775 (0.128) 0.1346 (0.179) 
LOEIP -5 -0.6485 (0.519) 0.1507 (0.099) -0.0754 (0.086) 
Constant 1.0069 (1.072) -0.1680 (0.206) 0.6859 (0.698) 
Trend -0.7672 (0.001) 0.0167 (0.000) 0.1615 (0.003) 
Seasonall 0.0993 (0.089) 0.0125 (0.017) -0.0670 (0.086) 
Seasonab 0.0356 (0.055) -0.0000 (0.011) -0.0412 (0.043) 
Seasona13 0.0876 (0.091) 0.0411 (0.018) -0.0849 (0.093) 
a 0.1109 0.0212 0.0273 
DW 2.00 2.03 1.98 
standard errors are in parentheses 
Table 4.18: VAR parameter estimates 
LRP LSS 
ARCH test 4 lag~, Chi Square (4) 7.59 (0.14) 6.81 (0.15) 
Portmanteau test 10 lags 4.06 6.95 
Error autocorrelation lags 1-5, Chi Square 4.25 (0.52) 14.5 (0.15) 
Heteroscedastic error, Chi Square (32) 38.4 (0.21) 36.7 (0.26) 
Table 4.19: Statistics of the model 
1-l2 
actual forecast LRP residual 
period pnce pnce $ % 
1994-3 2456 2296 7.6995 161.2 6.79% 
1994-4 2779 2381 7.7322 397.4 15.44% 
1995-1 2937 2604 7.8047 332.7 12.02% 
1995-2 2891 2598 7.7900 293.0 10.69% 
1995-3 3009 2867 7.8871 141.7 4.82% 
1995-4 2906 2696 7.8236 209.3 7.48% 
1996-1 2572 2677 7.8092 -105.6 -4.03% 
1996-2 2476 2638 7.7824 -161.9 -6.34% 
Table 4.20: The actual LME prices, forecast prices and forecast errors 
arise from the declining of L11E prices at that time, since the manipulation became more 
exposed, and this probed investigations by the CFTC, SIB and the L11E itself. 
In order to evaluate the robustness of the forecast of the LME cash price, we perform 
a simple Monte Carlo simulation experiment. We add an additive error to both the price 
and stock/consumption equations. The error term is assumed to be normally distributed 
with zero mean and standard deviation equal to the standard error of the specific esti-
mated equation, and the two error terms are assumed to be a (correlated) joint normal 
distribution. Table 4.21 records the results of Monte Carlo simulations. Ii The results 
from the simulation suggest that the alleged Sumitomo manipulation may increase the 
LME cash price level by 5-15% during the period from the third quarter of 1994 to the 
end of 1995, and therefore confirm our previous results. 
However, from Table 4.21 it is clear that the actual LME prices over the period 
of alleged manipulation were not significantly different from the mean sinlulated prices 
at 5% significance level. This implies that the piice effects alone may be inconclusive 
about a manipulation, and "artificial" price therefore may only offer weak evidence in 
etltablishing a manipulation case. Indeed, in the real world not aJl nlauipulations are 
intended to raise absolute price level (for a discussion, see Section 4.4.3). 
17The number of simulations is 2411. 
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mean simulated residual standard error 
period pnce $ % $ % 
1994-3 2314 141.9 6.57% 258.9 11.18% 
1994-4 2412 360.8 15.15% 382.7 15.81% 
1995-1 2645 291.9 11.87% 445.6 16.76% 
1995-2 2627 263.1 11.05% 461.5 17.35% 
1995-3 2909 99.9 4.99% 526.3 17.97% 
1995-4 2730 175.7 7.91% 501.7 18.32% 
1996-1 2715 -143.3 -3.68% 510.3 18.65% 
1996-2 2665 -190.4 -5.68% 499.5 18.58% 
Table 4.21: Results of Monte Carlo simulations 
4.7 Conclusions 
Futures markets have been vigorously developed due to their two social benefits to econ-
omy, "price discovery" and "risk shifting". We focus on these two basic functions of 
futures markets and look at whether futures manipulation interferes the functioning of 
futures markets. We found that the alleged Sumitomo manipulation had adverse effects 
on both the "price discovery" and the "risk shifting" functions of the LME copper futures 
market. 
This study has tested the simple models set up in the previous chapters to show how 
manipulation affects the relationships between futures price and the future cash price. 
We used the LME daily copper price data from January 1991 to September 1996 to 
test our hypothesis, and found that the results conform with what our models implied. 
Our main findings are that, the effects of long manipulation on "price discovery" are 
typically that manipulation pushes futures prices above the future cash prices system-
atically, i.e., producing positive futures price forecast errors. Manipulation also affects 
cash price volatilities and patterns of commodity flows to delivery markets. Under this 
circumstance, the futures price becomes a biased estimate of the future cash price, and 
may mislead producers, hedgers or investors into making unwise decisions. 
This research also employed two standard basis theories - the Cost of Carry model and 
the Supply of Storage model which have both been considered to have empirical relc\",Ul('(' 
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by previous researchers in examining the contemporaneous relationships between futures 
price and cash price - the basis and basis risk, to investigate the effects of manipulation 
on the basis and basis risk using weekly LME data. We found that manipulation may 
be an important factor in affecting the basis and basis movements in addition to factors 
that have been noticed by previous researchers. We found that, typically. the effect of 
long manipulation on the basis is that manipulation strengthens the basis - raises the 
cash price relatively higher than the futures price. Manipulation also makes the basis 
more volatile. This may be caused by the uncertainty in manipulation probability and 
manipulated price. 
The price effects of manipulation are to push futures price relatively higher than the 
future cash price, while the basis effects of manipulation are to raise cash price higher 
than futures price during the manipulation or alleged manipulation, in line of reasoning, 
as noticed by many observers, cash prices are expected to collapse immediately after 
manipulation. Copper price behaviour on the LME conformed to this fall of the cash 
prices. As shown in Table 4.16, comparing daily average prices during manipulation with 
those immediately after manipulation for two months, we found that cash price after 
each period of manipulation was lower than that during manipulation, and sometimes 
the fall was very large. The largest one was April-June 1996 manipulation where the 
average price was depressed by nearly 23%. 
Finally, we examined the effects of the alleged Sumitomo manipulation on the LME 
cash price by using a simple VAR approach, and found that the actual L1IE cash prices 
over the period of the third quarter of 1994 - the fourth quarter of 1995 were generally 
above the forecast price. This may suggest that the manipulation has raised the LME 
cash prices over the period, but not substantially. We also performed simple Monte Carlo 
simulations, and the results from the simulations confirmed this pric2 impact. However, 
the actual LME prices were not significantly different from the mean simulated prices at 
5 % significance level. 
It is important to lmderstand and measure manipulation effects in order to define 
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and identify manipulation which have debated for more than a century. The economic 
effects of manipulation have important policy implications for futures market regulators. 
However, this research does not answer all questions regarding to the effects of manipu-
lation, for example, how, and to what extent manipulation affects different market users, 
how futures manipulation affects the pricing and basis behaviour of the OTe markets 
and options markets, whether manipulation in one market affects the pricing process and 
price volatilities of the other markets where the same commodity is traded, etc. To an-
swer these questions, which is important in understanding and measuring the real costs 
of manipulation, is an issue of future research. 
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Figure 4-4: Copper Basis and Deliverable Stocks (January 1981 - September 1996) 
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Figure 4-7: Differential Backwardations, Copper Basis less Aluminium Basis (July 1991 
- September 1996) 
Appendix A: 
Summary of News Reports Relating to the Sumitomo 
Manipulation 
1. The alleged manipulation in 1991 
I. On July 30, 1991, under the title "Market operators squeezing copper price", the 
Financial Times reported that a report released by the Banque Indosuez Group that 
Influential market operators have been able to maintain a squeeze on London Metal 
Exchange copper supplies and thus to keep price artificially high, ... the Japanese Group 
(Sumitomo Corporation) has been purchasing substantial quantities of copper to meet 
its customers requirements, although some traders would argue that it (Sumitomo) wa 
manipulating the market. 
II. On December 4, 1991 , the Financial Times reported that a "squeez " gnpIng 
th market was believed to have been caused by Sumitomo's taking of the L~lE opp r 
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stocks: "What caused all this turmoil? Traders says that Sumitomo, possibly with five 
other Japanese trading houses, has taken of a big of the LME's copper stock - estimates 
range from 30 - 60 percent". 
III. On December 6, 1991, the Wall Street Journal reported that David Trelkeld, a 
trader in the United States, had alerted the LME in writing that Hamanaka had asked 
him to confirm nonexistence traders. 
2. The alleged manipulation in 1993 
I. On July 23, 1993, the Reuter European Business Report noted that a copper squeeze 
"was going to be July, but they rolled it forward". 
II. On August 2, 1993, the Independent reported that: "metal traders are speculating 
about the presenC8 of a large Far Eastern player, possibly powerful Sumitomo Corpo-
ration, whose control of a large amount of LlVrE copper stocks may be pushing prices 
higher" . 
III. On September 8, 1993, the Reuter European Business Report under the headline 
"World copper market squeeze prompts exchange curbs" reported that "A squeeze on 
world copper supplies prompted a London commodity exchange to impose price curbs 
on Wednesday but traders did not believe the market would fall in the near term" . 
IV. On September 9, 1993, the Financial Times reported under the tittle "LI\IE moves 
to relieve copper squeeze". 
V. On September 11, 1993, the Financial Times reported that: "the London Metal 
Exchange threw out a lifeline this week to investors struggling against the tide of support 
buying that has distorted copper market prices throughout the summer", ... "(T)he 
culprit, the LME traders alleged, was the Japanese Sumitomo metals group, ,,·hich they 
suggested might be preparing for a large-scale physical copper deal" . 
VI. On September 18, 1993, the Financial Times proclaimed that "(T)he copper 
. " squeeze IS over . 
3. The alleged manipulation in 1995 
I. On Oct 17, 1995, the Financial Times reported under the tittle "Copper prices 
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tumble as squeeze fears evaporate" that "(F)ears that the copper market was about to 
be squeezed and prices sent soaring proved groundless yesterday as speculators made 
enough metal available to ease supply tightness and send London Metal Exchange price 
tumbling. ... That was accompanied by rumours that most of the 39,000 tonnes of 
copper in LME warehouses at Long Beach, California - more than 20 percent of total 
LME stocks - had been sold to Sumitomo, the Japanese trading house". 
II. On Oct 25, 1995, the Financial Times reported that: "The LME is the only 
reservoir of surplus refined metal that we know of, which is why some market reports 
say that about 30,000 tonnes of the Long Beach (LME)stocks are already controlled by 
Asian merchants" . 
4. The alleged manipulation in 1996 
I. On May 11, 1996, the Financial Times reported under the tittle "Copper tight-
ness continues:Week In The Markets" that "(T)he tightness continued to be reflected in 
a large cash premium, called a 'backwardation' because it is a reversal of the normal 
situation where cash prices are at a discount reflecting costs of holding physical metal -
storage, insurance and lost interest. The backwardation eased by Dollars 13 yesterday to 
Dollars 105 tonne, compared with Dollars 116 at the end of last week". It continued that 
"(T)he depth of the LME authorities' concern about the tightening supply squeeze was 
underlined in mid-week when Mr. David King, the chief executive, announced that the 
board had decided to impose a limit on the cost of carrying forward a short position for 
one day. Since Thursday holders of short positions who are unable to deliver copper have 
been required to pay a penalty equivalent to 1 per cent of the previous day's settlement 
price. At present that works out at around Dollars 28 a tonne, well above the Dollars 2 
borrowing cost obtaining on the market before the LME board's action'. We can only 
assume that Mr. King saw something in the confidential daily reports which alarmed 
him and the action was to pre-empt a disorderly situation,'one analysts commented". 
II. On June 8, 1996, the Financial Times under the headline "L~IE pledges action 
on copper turmoil" that "(A)s battle raged yesterday between those detennined to driw' 
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copper prices down on the London Metal Exchange and those equally determined to push 
them up, Mr. David King, the LME's chief executive, promised that action was being 
taken to deal with the turmoil being created". 
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Appendix B: 
Estimation of Forecast Errors with Overlapping Data 
Consider a k-step forecast error at date t et,k = ft-E(St+k l<I>t), where ft is the forward 
price at t, and E( St+k l<I>d is the expected price at t + k conditional on the available 
information at t. Since the sampling interval (daily here) is finer than the forecast interval 
(3-month)~ then E(et,ket+h,k) will be serially correlated. Following Hansen and Rodrick 
(1980), we estimate the asymptotic covariance matrix. The procedures are as follows: 
1. Calculate the daily k-step forecast errors and the mean forecast error. 
k 
et+1 = ft+1 - E(St+k+1 l<I>d = L Et+i+1 
i=l 
k 
et+2 = ft+2 - E(St+k+21<I>d = L EHi+2 
i=l 
k 
et+n = h+n - E(St+k+n l<I>d = L Et+i+n 
i=l 
where n is the number of observations, and Et+i+n is the one-step forecast error for 
date i. 
The mean forecast error is: 
n n k k k 
e= 1 L et+i = 1 L [I: EHi+ L Et+i+1 + ... + L Et+i+n] 
n n.. . . . 1 
i=l 1=1 1=1 1=1 1= 
2. Derive the asymptotic variance-covariance var(e). 
Assume E( Et+i) = 0, E( E;+i) = 0";, and E( Et+iEt+i+h) = 0 for h =I- 0, therefore, 
1 n 
= 2 var(L et+i) 
n . 
. ,. 1=1 
0"2 k - 1 k - 2 
-E[n+2(n-1)( )+2(n-2)( k )+ ... 
n 2 k 
1 
+2(n - k + l)(k)] 
( k + 1) 0"2 _ 20"; [( k _ 1) + 2 (k - 2) + ... + 2 (k - 2) + (k - 1)] n E kn2 
k-1 
2 L i(k - i) 
[k + 1 _ i=l ]0"; n kn2 
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Should Futures Regulation Raise 
Special Concerns: A Comparative 
Study of Futures Regulation in the 
US and the UK 
5.1 Introduction 
Formal futures trading has the longest history in the US and the UK. \Yhile futures 
contracts in these two countries are similar in nature, and functions performed by the 
futures markets are the same, but the objectives of regulation and major regulatory 
concerns have been different and the evolution of futures regulation in each country has 
followed distinct paths. Futures manipulation, excessive speculation and the welfare costs 
associated with sudden and unreasonable price fluctuations resulted from these activities 
have been the n1ajor concern in US futures regulatio!l since the enactment of the first 
Federal futures legislation - the Grain Futures Act of 1922. But UK financial services 
(including futures) regulation was motivated by a series of financial failures in general 
financial services markets, and therefore its major objective was, not surprisingly, mainly 
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investor protection. The implication is that the cost-effectiveness of futures regulation 
and the behaviour of market participants might be different, and this could influence the 
structure and functions of futures markets, and affect their comparative competitiveness 
of futures trading business globally. The significantly different approaches to regulating 
futures trading in the US and the UK and the dramatic changes that have been occurring 
in futures trading, including the continuously increased size and scope of futures markets, 
globalisation of futures trading, the fast growth rate of OTC trading compared with on-
exchange trading, and recent events (for example, the collapse of Barings, the alleged 
Sumitomo copper manipulation, etc.) which have occurred in world futures markets, 
have prompted many questions with regard to futures regulation. What is the precise 
rationale for futures regulation? Why are there two significantly different regulatory 
systems in these two countries? Is self-regulation sufficient in regulating futures markets? 
How may these two regulatory systems be evaluated? Are these systems sufficiently cost-
effective to meet the challenges of futures trading? If not, which kinds of reforms might 
be desirable? 
Futures regulation has been under debate for a long time in the US and the UK. In the 
US, there is growing scepticism about the importance and effectiveness of government 
regulation. Recent legislation pending before the Congress to amend the Commodity 
Exchange Act (CEA) involved dramatic deregulation of government oversight over futures 
markets, although this was resisted by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission 
(CFTC).l In the UK, by contrast, futures regulation has been criticised because futures 
trading was motivated by the same rationale (investor protection) and formed part of the 
same framework of regulation as other financial sectors. The new Labour government 
has been considering putting financial regulation on a statuary basis and giving more 
1 Born, Brooksley, Chairperson, The Commodity Futures Trading Commission, The Dangers of Dereg-
ulation. Remarks before the Futures Industry Association's 22nd Annual International Futures Industry 
Conference (March 1997). The main proposed changes on federal government's. oversight over future 
markets include: professional exemption; the Treasury Amendment; the exemptIOn from the CEA for 
certain OTC derivative transactions. 
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emphasis to government regulation,2 and announced a fundamental set of changes of 
the institutional structure of financial regulation in May 1997. The merger of banking 
supervision and financial services regulation in a single body, the Financial Services 
Authority (FSA), may signal a step to a more direct regulatory system in the CK. 
However, in debates on financial regulation both in the US and the UK, little attention 
has been given to the precise rationale for futures regulation, and comparative studies of 
the two contrasting futures regulatory systems are rare. It is therefore not surprising that 
there is little consensus on the direction of regulatory reforms. Stone (1981) analysed the 
principles of futures regulation. His "tripod" theory suggests that regulation of futures 
markets lies in: (i) protecting customers; (ii) regulating against the potential of abuses of 
concentration by large position holders; and (iii) regulating natural monopoly in futures 
exchanges and clearing houses. In spite of its briefness, Stone's "tripod" theory that 
generalises reasons for regulating futures markets may be still valid today. Edwards 
(1981) gave the first comprehensive analysis of the rationale for futures regulation, which 
provided a maybe useful tool to evaluate the potential role of government regulation. 
However, he did not provide any guidance in explaining and evaluating the two existing 
regulatory systems in the US and the UK. Gemmil (1983) examined the economics of 
regulating futures markets in general and reasons why the approach to futures regulation 
in the US is so different from that in the UK. He suggested that main justifications for 
futures regulation are, protection of fraud and prevention of manipulation. While the 
less small investors and more internationalised products in the UK than those in the US 
may explain the need of greater regulation in the US. Anticipating the enactment of the 
FSAct of 1986, Anderson (1986) surveyed futures regulation as practised in the US and 
the UK, but he did not explore the rationale for futures regulation, and therefore he 
was una.ble to· explain why there p-xist differences between these two futures regulatory 
systems. In any case, the futures markets and futures regulation have both changed 
2Mike O'Brien, Shadow Treasury :"Iinister, claimed: "We will be ending self-regulation and creating 
direct-regulation". the Financial Times, October 19, 1996. 
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drastically in both countries since these papers were written. Edwards and Edwards 
(1984) and Easterbrook (1986) specifically investigated the regulation of futures markets 
in relation to manipulation, but their views on whether self-regulation is sufficient to 
prevent manipulation differ significantly. Edwards and Edwards were inclusive on this 
issue, while Easterbrook concluded that exchanges could offer the optimal amount of 
precautions. However, Pirrong (1995a) argued that self-regulation is not sufficient in 
regulating futures markets. Their different conclusions on this issue are not surprising, 
since it appears that there has not been a comprehensive theory to explain either the 
susceptibility of a futures market to manipulation or the effects of manipulation. Based on 
the theoretical analyses and empirical evidences of futures manipulation in the previous 
chapters, here we proceed to explore the regulatory implications of manipulation on 
futures markets and undertake a comparative study of futures regulation in the US and 
UK. We aim to answer the following questions: 
• Should futures manipulation raise special regulatory concerns? 
• What is the rationale for the existence of the two contrasting regulatory systems 
in the US and UK? 
• How may futures regulation in these two countries be evaluated? 
• How may cost-effective futures regulation be achieved in the UK? 
• Are both regulatory systems sufficiently cost-effective to meet the challenges cur-
rently taking place in financial markets? 
• What kinds of reforms are desirable currently in the two countries? 
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 5.2 discusses the objectives of 
financial regulation and the precise rationale for futures regulation. Section 5.3 contains 
a comprehensive comparison between the two futures regulatory systems in the US and 
the UK and also an eyaillation of these systenls based on the theory of futllr('~ regulation. 
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In section 5.4, we analyse especially how the UK futures regulation should be modified 
to concern futures manipulation, and also discuss potential regulatory reforms facing the 
US and the UK. The final section provides brief conclusions. 
5.2 The Rationale for Futures Regulation 
5.2.1 Justifications for financial regulation 
We first consider the objectives of financial regulation in general. These are widely held 
to be: 
• Protection of the payments system. 
• Prevention of financial collapse, sometimes described as the avoidance of systemic 
risk. 
• Curtailment of monopoly power and encouragement of competition. 
• Customer protection, specially protection of the interests of the clients of a partic-
ular institution from fraud, negligence or excessive risk taking. 
• Encouragement of best practice. 
The first and second objective are held to be more relevant to banking regulation 
than to the regulation of financial services sectors, while the last three, possibly together 
. with the second (which is considered as relevant to some specific non-bank financial sec-
tors, see Mayer, 1994) have been seen as the objectives of regulation or supervision for 
financial services markets. In fact, the final issue is not specifi~ to financial markpts. The 
reasons for regulation and supervision of banks have four main dimensions: the central 
position of banks in the smooth functioning of an economy; the vulnerability of banks 
to run (Bernanke 1983; Diamand and Dybvig 1983; Baltensperger and Dermine 1987, 
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etc.); the nature of bank contracts; and the problems of moral hazard and adverse se-
lection associated with the lender-of-last-resort role (Benston and Kaufman 1986; Lewis 
and Davis 1987). The issues involved in the regulation of non-bank financial services 
are largely different. The probability of systemic problems is believed to be considerably 
lower compared with banks. and in some areas, it does not exist at all (for example, fund 
management, life insurance business) etc., see Mayer, 1994); contagion and potential dis-
ruption of payments systenl are less likely; and the nature of contracts are different to 
those of banks. The nlarket failures that justify bank regulation do not in general apply 
to most financial services business. It is therefore generally believed that the reasons 
for regulating non-bank financial services3 mainly lie in: problems of asymmetric infor-
Illation; under-investment in information by investors because of the free-rider problem; 
potential principal-agent problems; and issues related to conflicts of interest and the 
highly complex nature of financial contracts where consumers are not equally equipped 
with an ability to assess quality. In fact, one type of financial services may differ greatly 
from other financial services~ but little attention has been given to the precise rationale 
for regulating different financial services markets, especially futures (derivatives) markets. 
5.2.2 How are these concerns relevant to futures markets? 
Futures markets are sometinles considered as conforming closely to the textbook model 
of perfect competition. In futures nlarkets , the products (futures contracts) traded are 
standard, every contract (for a given underlying asset and time) is exactly the same, 
the performance of contracts is guaranteed by a clearing house, entry and exit are easy, 
t.ransaction costs are small compared with other forms of trading, the supply of contracts 
is unlimited (at least prior to the maturity month), and information on prices is available 
prior to or immediately after each trade. This appears to leave little roem for market 
failure and therefore, correspondingly little need for regulation. But in the real world, 
3 Although systemic threats under certain circumstances may exist in some specific markets (see, for 
example, Goodhart et al. 1998. pp.12-14). 
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futures markets are the most heavily regulated markets. This gives rise to the questions: 
• What is the precise rationale for futures regulation? 
• How and to what extent are systenlic risk, asynlmetric information and natural 
monopoly concerns relevant in justifying the regulation of futures nlarkets? 
Asymmetric information 
Investor protection concerns arise mainly from information asymmetry. It is widely be-
lieved that financial markets are likely to be particularly prone to information problems 
for the following reasons. Firstly, unlike in the purchase and sale of goods~ financial ser-
vices involve on-going relation~ between clients and firnls. Secondly, financial contracts 
are usually highly complex, and the quality of services supplied is frequently difficult to 
evaluate. Finally, financial services are typically associated with confidentiality, which 
may result in frauds with a greater likelihood than in other markets. These arguments 
remain valid in futures markets, although the first may be less relevant in futures (deriv-
atives) markets than, for example, in securities markets. 
As in other financial services sectors, in\"estors in futures markets are in need of spe-
cial protection, because investors are usually exposed to certain types of risk, including 
uncompensated wealth transfers (nlainly fraud and misuse of investor funds); incompe-
tence resulting from principalj agent problenls; and negligence. Firstly, a futures market, 
like other financial sectors is particularly prone to fraud and misuse, because an investor 
delivers cash today in return for cash to be returned, under certain conditions, in the fu-
ture. In virtually all other cases the buyer can inspect the good or service before parting 
with his money, but this is impossible in futures markets. Segregation of client money is 
therefore commonly used to overconle this problem. Secondly, pri:acipal/agent problems 
arise when the funds handed over by the principal to agent are used by the later in a 
way that benefits itself, rather than the principal. For example, a principal is advised to 
place his funds into large long (or short.) positions which are in the same direction with 
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the agent's; front-running; churning, etc. Finally, there is the probability of poor and 
negligent advice. This is not unique to financial sectors, and is also a problem in other 
professions, e.g. medicine, accOlmtancy, etc. 
Front-running, churning, dealing at off-market pnces and pocketing the difference 
could be checked by proper rules of disclosure and a fully recorded trading process. 
Poor advice and negligence can be overcame by a combination of specialist education 
and authorisation. However, in practice, some principalj agent infractions, negligence in 
particular may be difficult to prove: and setting and enforcing rules, standards and codes 
of conduct is liable to be expensive and to some extent arbitrary. 1/Ioreover, attempts to 
compensate for these three types of risks may create adverse selection and moral hazard 
problems. Therefore, the balance between benefits and costs may in practice be hard to 
determine. 
There are two opposite argument.s on the issue of investor protection in futures mar-
kets. One is that futures markets are particularly complex such that small investors 
cannot expect to acquire sufficient knowledge to protect themselves, and it therefore 
seems necessary to protect the unsophisticated against losing money. Another is that 
futures participants are relatively more sophisticated than participants in other finan-
cial sectors, for exanlple, securities industry, and therefore, the less protect.ion will be 
needed in futures markets ("markets for consenting adults"). Both arguments are not in 
general valid. Finance is necessarily about risk, and therefore to regulate to eliminate 
risk from investors would be a policy of regulating away the essential functions of futures 
markets and futures contracts. Huwever, this does not mean that some inyestors do not 
need to b(t protected. just because they are sophisticated. The main reason motivating 
investor protection is to correct the market failure which arises from asymmetric infor-
mation problems, and which may result in fraud, misuse of client funds. incompetence 
and negligence. 
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Externalities in futures markets 
Systemic risk is a form of negative externality, and the existence of systemic risk provides 
the primary rationale for banking regulation. By analogy with banks. a prima-facie case 
for regulation exists where the functioning of one part of the financial system is essential 
to the remainder of the economy, and where interlinkages exist between the performance 
of different financial institutions. Systemic problems appear relevant to futures (as well 
as other derivatives) markets, although to a less extent than in banking. 
Failures of one or more clearing members or large traders could seriously jeopardise 
the functioning of a clearing association and the operation of a futures market and the 
entire financial system. Bankruptcy of one or more sizeable clearing members or traders 
by imprudent behaviour may threaten the solvency of a clearing association, and all 
futures contracts which is backed by the clearing association may become worthless, 
and therefore, clearing associations act essentially like central banks to futures markets 
(Edwards 1984). The failure of a clearing house might undermine the futures market, 
and could have impact on the entire financial system. This was clearly one of the major 
concerns during the Barings event and over some serious manipulation cases~ such as the 
Maine potato manipulation on the Nymex in 1976, the 'silver crisis' of 1980, the alleged 
Sumitomo copper manipulation,4 etc. However, the risk resulting from the failure of 
dealer/brokers or clearing members or large traders to the stability of futures markets 
or whole financial systenl should not be over-estimated in futures markets. since margin 
requirements and marking-to-market practice provide the first line of defence against j his 
risk. The probability of this risk is limited to the situation where there are large price 
jumps during a single trading day and some traders holding huge positions. HoweveL 
the contagion effects fronl the failure of one member or large trader on other members 
or traders obviously exist in futures and other derivatives mCtrkets~ because there exist 
significant linkages between brokers, dealers or clearing members and traders. The failure 
of one broker, dealer, clearing member or large trader may have serious consequences for 
.1International Effort Seeks to Avoid l\leltdown, the Financial Tunes, June 17. I ~J<)t i 
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others (see also Mayer 1989 and Miles 1992). For example, bankruptcy of a large trader 
may cause large jumps in futures prices, which increases the possibility of failure in other 
similar financial entities who hold large positions which are in the same direction as the 
large trader's. 
Additionally, futures markets have become an integral part of financial system, and 
futures contracts or other derivatives are highly liquid financial instruments and increas-
ingly traded and held by sizeable firms, including banks. Although highly leveraged trad-
ing and highly varied contracts facilitate efficiency of risk management, they posed im-
portant challenges to bankers. Futures (other derivatives) markets may increase systemic 
risk of banks if banking regulation sticks to the traditional balance-sheet supervision. 5 
Releasing on-exchange pricing information may be viewed as another form of external-
ities. Accurate information benefits everyone in the market or outside the market, since 
the marginal cost of reproducing the information is zero and it is almost impossible for 
the exchange to exclude someone from enjoying the information. Thus everyone should 
share its production costs, but there are clearly incentives to be "free-riders", which may 
undermine the exchange's efforts to ensure the exchange to produce pricing information 
accurately and timely. 
Futures manipulation can be seen as a type of externalities. This may be the most 
important externality in futures markets and will be considered in details in Section 5.2.3 
and 5.2.4. 
Regulators, exchanges, and clearing associations have recognised these problems. Sev-
eral rules and regulations have been designed to insure the solvency of clearing members, 
clearing associations and broker-dealers. Capital adequacy, marking-to-market proce-
dures, margin regulations, trading halts, price limits, position limits are some of them. 
Proposed property rights of on-exchange information (Lee 19~4) may enhance th8 ex-
5Such a concern was clearly reflected in the remarks of Hendry Gonzalez (1993), the former ~hairman 
of the Banking Committee of the US House of Representativ~s: "I ~ave long bel~e~ed that growmg bank 
involvement in derivative products is, as I say and repeat, lIke a tmderbox waltmg to explode. In t~e 
case of many market innovations, regulation lags behind until the crisis comes, as it has happened III 
our case \"vith S & L's and banks ... " . (Gonzalez, H. 1993, H3322). 
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change' incentives with regard to the release of reliable information, but may also limit 
the access to the information. 
Natural monopoly 
Organised futures exchanges produce transaction services. liansaction services are pro-
duced more effectively in a liquid market. It is well known that the greater the trading 
volume, the more liquid the market is, and liquidity tends to be inversely related to the 
unit transaction costs in the market (Stone 1981; Edwards 1981; Telser 1981; Fischel and 
Grossman 1984 and Pirrong 1995a). Exchanges tend to incur fixed costs in monitoring a 
market, and in addition, there are increasing returns to scale in various other exchange 
operations, such as transmission of information about transaction prices, research and 
development of new products; clearing functions, etc. Most clearing houses are functional 
departments of the exchanges; although some clearing houses are separate organisations 
(for example, the London Clearing House Ltd. (LCH)). There are even stronger reasons 
to believe that there is potential for natural monopoly in clearing (Fischel and Grossman 
1984). 
If there is a continuous positive relationship between market liquidity and trading 
volume, a classic natural monopoly market failure presents. There may be three aspects of 
natural monopoly in futures markets: increasing returns to scale in a particular contract; 
increasing returns to scale in a particular futures exchange; and increasing returns to scale 
in clearing if the clearing function becomes a separate organisation. We have little well-
established theory or clear evidence on these issues, but it is safe, at least, to conclude 
that unit costs of transaction decline with trading volume, and hence trading volmne has 
important cost-reducing effects. Although natural monopoly is not necessarily immune 
to competitive entry, there are strong reasons to believe that it is costly to enter a market 
already served by an established contract, or to run a new or smaller futures marke1 that 
faces a well-established market with high liquidity (recent mergers of futures exchanges 
in the UK and US provided good examples). 
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The implication of the existence of increasing returns to scale for futures regulation 
IS that regulators find themselves in a dilemma in designing regulation with respect 
to the relationship between entry, competition, and market efficiency. Restriction of 
entry may exacerbate problems associated with economies of scale. Instead, free entry 
increases competition (with respect to both a specific competing contract and a particular 
competing exchange), but may result in a less liquid market, and hence a less efficient 
market. 
5.2.3 Manipulation should be a major concern in futures regu-
lation 
Systemic risk, asymmetric information and natural monopoly problems are not unique to 
futures markets, but futures markets are specifically susceptible to manipulation, which 
should become a major concern in futures regulation. Certain types of manipulation 
also exist in other financial markets, such as manipulation based on actions that change 
the actual or perceived value of the assets, or based on releasing false information or 
spreading rumors, etc., but these types of manipulation are clearly defined and made 
illegal by various rules of either government or exchanges and certainly by the CEA (see 
Section 1.5, Chapter 1). Market power manipulation which is the most significant form of 
manipulation in futures markets, especially a futures "corner" or "squeeze", is the focus 
of our attention. This type of manipulation is most likely to occur in commodity futures 
rnarkets, and potentially also in interest rate futures markets. Futures manipulation is 
a means of creating and exerting monopoly power to achieve super profits by exploiting 
futures delivery mechanism. Futures manipulation has been the major regulatory con-
cern in the Unit8d States, which clearly has ,been the majn purpose of federal futures 
legislation. However, since the start of futures trading there has been a controversy as to 
whether manipulation is inherent to futures markets, and whether it constitutes a serious 
nlar ket failure. 
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Futures markets are prone to manipulation 
Several theoretical works have been done on the issues of whether futures manipulation 
is an equilibrium phenomenon or just an exception and on what determines the suscep-
tibility of a futures market to manipulation, see for example, Anderson and Sundaresan 
(1984), Newbery (1984), Kyle (1984), Jarrow (1992), Kumar and Seppi (1992): Pirrong 
(1995b), etc. But most of these models rely on some specific assumptions which are not 
realistic in the real world. In Chapter 2 and 3, we explored these issues more generally 
and demonstrated theoretically using two game-theoretical models that futures manip-
ulation can occur in equilibrium under weak conditions: firstly, there is a large trader 
with market power in the market, and other traders have imperfect information about 
the presence of the large trader; and secondly, the marginal cost of increasing deliverable 
stocks to an amount which exceeds the competitive level is positive. The first condition 
is essentially the very function of futures trading, and the second one prevails in most 
commodity markets. Given these conditions, a large long trader can take ad\Tantage of 
the anonymity of futures trading, the camouflage of noise trading and the other traders' 
uncertainty about his presence in the market, to amass a large long futures position that 
exceeds normal level of deliverable stocks at the delivery point, and stand for delivery 
when the contract approaches maturity. The shorts, who are committed by the contracts 
have to pay the marginal cost of delivery or, equivalently, to deliver some quantity of the 
commodity, where the marginal cost of delivery has been inflated. The large long profits 
even after he takes into account of the costs of "burying the corpse". Moreover. whenever 
there is a positive probability of manipulation, the large long can profit in both ways: 
when a manipulation is not considered to be very likely by other traders, the large long 
can manipulate the market profitably; while the perceived probability of manipulation 
is high, he can speculate a market by shorting profitably. The susceptibility of a futures 
market to manipulation therefore depends on to what extent a manipulator can hide 
behind other traders and the delivery market characteristics. 1'\'lore importantly, asym-
metric information and noise trading nlay facilitate a large trader's dynamic manipulatiw' 
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strategies in a futures market (as modeled in Chapter 3). 
In the real world, an ingeniously constructed manipulative scheme can be very com-
plicated, which may involve several markets and financial instruments. As a US court 
observed that "(the) methods and techniques of manipulation are limited only by the 
ingenuity of the man".6 Manipulative schemes tend to become more complex as deriv-
atives markets develop, and this may facilitate a manipulator in better concealing his 
manipulative initiatives better. 
Manipulation affects adversely the "price discovery" and "risk-shifting" func-
tions of a futures market 
These models also predict that manipulation has pronounced effects on the equilibrium 
pricing process through its effects on other traders' expectations about the future cash 
prices. The equilibrium futures price is always the probability-weighted price of the 
marginal cost of delivery and the competitive price, and this will be a biased estimate of 
the future cash price from the point view of all market participants except the market 
makers. The unbiasedness for the market makers results from that fact that they are 
able to condition their trading strategy on their private information in relating to the net 
order flow. Since new uncertainty (probability of manipulation) is introduced into the 
pricing process, the variance of futures price is expected to increase due to manipulation. 
Manipulation also discourages hedging activities, which has important implications on 
the risk-shifting function of futures markets as well as on market liquidity. Manipulation 
affects welfare and the wealth distribution as well- there are dead-weight losses due to the 
... 
distortion in patterns of consumption, transportation, and storage, and manipulation may 
elevate cash prices in the delivery market as well as the whole markets for the commodity, 
so owners of the deliverable stocks benefit, while purchasers of the stocks lose. Moreover, 
when there are frequent manipulations in a futures market, these effects are potentially 
enormous. In Chapter 4, we also tested the effects of Sumitomo copper manipulation 
6Cargiil, Inc. v. Hardin, 452 F. 2d 1154, 1163 (8th Cir. 1971). 
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on the equilibrium pricing process and hedging, and found that manipulation affected 
the relationships between futures price and the future cash price, basis and basis risk 
consistently, thereby largely undermining the functions of the LME. 
Futures manipulation is essentially the monopolisation in futures markets. In cash 
markets, monopoly means controlling the supply. By controlling supply below the opti-
mal level, a monopolist sells his products at higher prices and earns monopoly profits. 
Monopoly thereby creates dead-weight losses for the whole society. A futures market 
is a slice of the market in the underlying commodity. A standard contract entitles the 
buyers to demand delivery of a specific commodity in a specific delivery point at some 
contracted period of time. Thus cross-substitution and intertemporal substitution are 
limited. The specific delivery date, narrow definition of the deliverable commodity and 
a large open interest compared with usually little actual delivery7 as well as less deliv-
erable stocks, are the very features that makes futures markets attractive to all types 
of traders. Due to the intrinsic characteristics, futures markets appear more simple to 
monopolise (Easterbrook 1986). Manipulation is monopolisation of futures markets, the 
consequence of manipulation is welfare loss, and this is a market failure in classic sense 
(Edwards 1981). 
5.2.4 Is self-regulation sufficient in regulating futures markets? 
Market failures in futures markets do not themselves suggest the form of regulation, nor 
who should be the regulator - self-regulatory bodies or government? External regulation 
is believed to be more costly than self-regulation, and hence external regulation is only 
desirable if it forces the regulated to do something they would not have done voluntarily 
anyhow. The crucial question is whether the private costs and benefits of self-regulatory 
bodies in correcting market failures in futures markets closely approximate social costs 
and benefits. 
7Hieronymus (1977, p.340) stated: "In [futures] markets that work, delivery is rarely made or taken, 
futures contracts are entered into for reasons other than exchange of title". 
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Self-regulatory organisations in futures markets include futures exchanges, clearing 
houses, and industry associations, such as the National Futures Association (NFA) in the 
US, the Securities and Futures Authority (SFA) in the UK. Let us focus on the exchange 
and clearing house for the moment. Numerous scholars (Edwards and Edwards 1984, 
Fischel and Grossman 1984, Easterbrook 1986, Kyle 1988, Fischel and Ross 1992, etc.) 
argue that an exchange, which may be seen as acting as a trading volume maximiser, 
is (almost) sufficient and efficient in ensuring the best practices of its members. It is 
undoubtedly true that an exchange or clearing house internalises many externalities that 
occur across its members, but our perception is that there is still a divergence of private 
and social costs (benefits) to regulation, which suggests self-regulation is not sufficient, 
and external regulation may be necessary in the area where the divergence exists. 
There may exist systemic risk in an exchange or clearing house. Significant costs 
from the failure of an exchange or clearing house may be borne by parties who are not its 
members, although it is generally believed that its members bear most of the costs. The 
implication is that the exchange or clearing house may not have incentives to establish 
sufficient rules to prevent systemic risk. 
The divergence of private and social costs may be significant in the case of manipu-
lation. The major costs arising from futures manipulation are a reduction in the quality 
of hedging services, loss of accurate price discovery and an increase of volatility. Hedging 
services are accessed by direct or indirect (i.e. via OTCs) purchase of exchange products. 
A common view is that a deterioration in the quality of hedging services will reduce the 
demand for hedging, which will necessarily reduce trading volume, and that therefore an 
exchange has appropriate incentives to control the actions of its members and investors. 
This argument is not in general true. Firstly, manipulation does not necessarily result 
in a reduction of trading volume. Manipulation impairs hedging activities and reduces 
hedging volume, but it is possible that manipulation may invite speculators to the market 
because of the possible increase of volatility. It is therefore difficult to gauge whether 
lnanipulation reduces trading volume, since this depends on the structure of traders in 
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the market. Secondly, even if manipulation does reduce trading volume, it does not fol-
low that exchange members bear the full costs. A backward shift in the demand for the 
services of the exchange due to manipulation may reduce producers' (exchange members) 
surplus, but it also reduces consumers' surplus. Therefore the exchange members share 
the costs from the reduced volume with their customers (Pirrong 1995a). Thirdly, even 
if conflict-of-interest pro blerns do not exist to such an extent to prevent an exchange 
or clearing house from optimal actions against manipulation, and if there is no strong 
relationship between a reduction of trading volume and manipulation, manipulation may 
hurt the shorts, but not necessarily all other members even in the long run, and this 
creates conflict-of-interest among exchange members. One should not therefore expect 
an exchange to vote to put sufficient procedures in place which prevent manipulation. 8 
Furthermore, an exchange or clearing house may fail to pass or enforce anti-manipulation 
rules because of rent-seeking activities which result from huge profits from manipulation. 
Under these circumstances, the manipulator may pay higher than competitive prices to 
avoid detection by the self-regulating authority, and this may also exacerbate conflicts of 
interests. 
Price discovery is more problenlatic. The information is freely disseminated and 
exchange prices are accessible to firnls and individuals who are not the members or even 
not the users of the exchange. If a price is widely disseminated but distorted due to 
manipulation, the commodity will be consumed at a point at which its marginal use 
value differs from its marginal social production cost, and there will be welfare losses. 
Therefore, price discovery generates an element of externality. An exchange may be 
insufficiently vigilant in suppressing manipulation, not because it is compromised, but 
because it bears the entire costs of regulation but does not capture all benefits. This 
suggests an exchange should be compelled to regulate manipulation somewhat more 
strongly than the exchange would itself choose. 
BIt is more doubtful that an exchange will pass sufficient rules against manipulation when floor 
traders, who are motivated to become members by the substantial variations of prices, constitute an 
important parts of membership of an exchange. 
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The arguments above apply to most traditional futures exchanges which are run as 
co-operatives, in other words, they are run on behalf of their members, the people who use 
the exchanges (market makers, brokers, etc.). However, more recently some exchanges 
have been transformed onto public companies (such as the Stockholm Stock Exchange, 
the Stock Exchange of Amsterdam,etc.), and several other large securities and futures ex-
changes are rethinking their structure. The question is whether an exchange with outside 
ownership can do better in manipulation prevention than a co-operative. The general 
answer is yes, but still not sufficiently. One major distinction between a co-operative 
structure and outside ownership is that an exchange maximises different objective func-
tions (for detailed discussions on the differences between the two ownerships, see Hart and 
Moore 1995). An outside owner simply instructs his manager to maximise profit, while a 
co-operative has a more complex objective, which most likely is to maximise the payoff 
of the median voter. This has important implications on the way of making decisions, 
rules, the fee structure, etc. The members of a co-operative exchange are interested in 
maximising their objective function and are interested only in so far as this contributes. 
If they earn more from manipulation than they lose through their share of the possibly 
diminished value of the exchange, they will continue to manipulation, or connive in ma-
nipulation. The shareholders of an externally owned exchange, by contrast, will only be 
interested in the value of the exchange. The outside ownership may therefore be more 
efficient in manipulation prevention if it expects that manipulation may diminish the 
value of the exchange. Moreover, outside ownership, such as public companies, as a form 
of exchange governance may reduce or eliminate the divergence between private and so-
cial costs than a co-operative under certain circumstances, for example, in a market with 
a greater competitive and a greater diversity of market users. But our view is that an 
exchaage with outside ownership lnay be not sufficient in manipulation prevention, sillce 
certain amount of manipulation may not necessarily reduce the value of an exchange 
which depends on the structure of the traders in the market, and most exchanges are 
actually run under less competitive environment than an ordinary public company, \vhich 
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limits the advantages of an outside ownership as a form of exchange governance. Firstly, 
there is natural monopoly problem in exchange market. Secondly, in practice it is costly 
to enter a market which is already served by an established contract, or to run a ne\\' 
futures market that faces a well-established market. 
The above discussions show an exchange or clearing house may fail to internalise all 
externalities that occur across its members. The last question is whether the futures 
industry self-regulation can make up for these defects. It appears that industry self-
regulation cannot do much better. It cannot internalise those externalities which spill 
over to other industries and non-members, such as the externalities discussed above which 
result from systemic risk, and manipulation, even though the industry self-regulation 
can be a mechanism to resolve inefficiencies arise from externalities across exchanges, 
and members. Moreover, industry self-regulation may indeed provide better protection 
for the public, but it has been criticised in that it always leads to a danger of capture, 
resulting in a situation in which regulators and practitioners collude to reduce potential 
entry and competition. 
5.3 Futures Regulation in the US and the UK 
5.3.1 A comparison of futures regulation in the US and the UK 
Generally speaking, both futures regulatory systems in the US and the UK are, to a 
greater or lesser extent, a blend of statutory regulation and self-regulation, although the 
US system is considered to place more reliance on statue. However, the organisational 
aspects of these two regulatory systems are quite different. 9 One significant distinction 
is that futures regulation in the US has been t.reated separately from regulation of seCll-
rities and other investment business, while the UK system does not giye special status to 
concern relating to futures markets (as well as other derivatives markets). Furthermore, 
gIn the appendix of this chapter, we proyide a detailed description of the futures regulatory structures 
in the US and the UK. A brief comparison is listed in Table 5.1. 
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the backgrounds motivating regulation are different (in the US the motivation of the 
GFA and CEA was futures manipulation and excessive speculations, while in the UK the 
motivation of the passage of FSAct was the significant financial failures which resulted 
in misappropriation of client funds), and futures markets in the US and in London tra-
ditionally exhibited distinct characteristics. It is therefore not surprising that there exist 
significant differences in the aspects of specific regulations under these two regulatory 
regImes. 
The scope of futures regulation 
The CEA provides statutory basis for US regulation of futures markets and deri\"atives 
markets. Under the CEA, all goods for which contracts are for future delivery are con-
sidered as commodities with only a few exclusions,1O and must be confined to designated 
exchanges. The CFTC has exclusive jurisdiction 'with respect to accounts, agreements, 
and transactions involving' futures contracts and options traded on or subject to the 
rules of exchanges and other markets.ll But a precise definition of "contracts for future 
delivery" is not given legislatively, and this has given rise to a number of problems in 
determining whether a particular contract is a regulated commodity futures or umegu-
lated commodity forward contract. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that the CFTC has 
authority to regulate all on-exchange futures markets in the US. The UK futures leg-
islation follows a rather different path from the US counterpart. The FSAct does not 
assume that the best means of regulating futures (including forward) contracts is to en-
sure that they are undertaken on an exchange. The fact that a contract is entered into 
off-exchange does not prevent it from being regarded as an "investment" .12 Whether a 
10Th,=, CEA contcjns two exclusions: the forward contr2-ct exclusion and the Treasury Amendment. 
The first excludes the CFTC's jurisdiction over the "sale of any cash commodity for deferred shipment 
or delivery". The second provides that: "nothing in this Act shall be deemed to govern or in any way 
be applicable to transactions in foreign currency ... unless such transactions include the sale thereof for 
future delivery conducted on a board of trade" (the CEA s 2(a)(1)(A)). 
lICEA, s 2(a)(1)(A). 
12The main provision (paragraph 8, schedule 1) of the FSAct which refers to futures covers forward 
contracts as well as futures. The SIB interpreted that the contract in that paragraph is a contract: (i) 
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forward contact should be excluded from the FSAct provisions depends on whether its 
purpose is commercial or investment. The FSAct provides that if delivery is intended to 
be given or taken, then that is an indication of commercial and not investment purpose. 
However, there are difficulties in distinguishing between the two because the criteria in-
volve intent.
13 
The FSAct requires that certain types of transactions be regarded 'as 
made for investment or commercial purposes', and then sets out certain 'indications' as 
to whether other types of contracts are to be so treated. The Securities and Investment 
Board (SIB)14 regards them as conclusive investment contracts if they are either made or 
traded on a 'recognised' investment exchange, or made otherwise but expressed to be as 
traded on such an exchange or on the same terms as those on which an equivalent con-
tract would be made on such an exchange. 15 In theory, the UK's approach to regulating 
futures under the 'investment' is therefore much broader and less subject to controversy 
than that of the US under the 'commodity'. 
From the above discussions, there seems to have a little difference in these two regu-
latory systems on the treatment of on-exchange futures, and an attempt has been made 
to exclude commercial contracts from regulation both in the US and the UK. But the 
implication of these different regulatory approaches on how to regulate the rapidly in-
novated OTe derivatives markets is dramatic. Obviously, if an OTe contract did not 
fall within one of the two exclusions, it would be unenforceable in the US, and this has 
plagued the US markets in currency swaps and other modern inter-bank instruments that 
are settled without delivery or bear similarities to exchange-traded futures and options. 
for the sale of a commodity or property of any other description; (ii) under which delivery is to be made 
at future date; (iii) at a price agreed upon when the contract is made (SIB Guidance Release 3/88). 
13Schedule 2 of the FSAct provides that a contract is deemed commercial: (i) it invoh-es a party that 
produces or uses the goods; (ii) it is traded off of a recognised futures exchange; (iii) delivery is intended; 
anti (iv) some of the terms in additiG~l to price are negotiated by the partiss. . . 
14In October 1997, the SIB was renamed to the Financial Services Authority (FSA), the slllgle finanCIal 
regulator in the UK. However the FSA will not assume full responsibilities until the enactment of a 
proposed financial regulatory reform bill (expected to be late 1999). Before that, the other constituent 
bodies (for examples, SIB, SFA, etc.) will continue to have legal responsibilities fo~ regul~ting their 
firms under the original statutory or contractual arrangements. Therefore, we some:lmes stIll. refer to 
the constituent bodies' original names when discussing and describing the UK finanCIal regulatIOn. 
ISSIB Guidance Release 3/88, Note 2. 
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Internal pressures from the markets~ and competitive disadvantage in global markets. led 
to gradual exemption of almost all of OTC contracts from jurisdiction under the CEA. 
OTC forward contracts, such as swaps, caps, fioors, collars, interest rate options~ cur-
rency and debt securities options are therefore excluded from the CFTC's jurisdiction. 
The situation in the UK is somewhat complicated. In order to avoid being caught by 
the definition of futures, a contract governed under the FSAct must be entered into for 
'commercial and not investment purposes' and must not incorporate terms typical of an 
exchange-traded contract. Additionally, it must not be a 'contract for differences'16 or an 
option on financial instruments. The major exceptions to the FSAct are spot. forward 
currency contracts and listed money market institutions. Therefore, the UK regulation 
of OTC forward markets is in principle more inclusive than the current US model. 
One important feature of US futures regulation is that special concerns have been 
given to the regulation of extra-territoriality. Although there is no restrictions except 
for a small number of exceptions17 on the types of non-US futures products that may be 
offered or sold to US customers, a non-US person who seeks to trade futures in the US 
must become a customer of an FC}'I and must execute a large number of agreements and 
acknowledgments. If the number of futures positions carried by that customer exceeds 
the CFTC or contract market specified reporting levels, the FCI\1 is required to furnish 
the identity of the customer to the CFTC and the applicable contract market, and 
advise them of such positions and changes. A non-US person is therefore subject to 
the same types of large-position regulation as US customers. l'vloreover, the CS courts 
have jurisdiction over a non-US person's trading on a US contract market, regardless of 
the status of the intermediary under the CEA (whether the intermediary is a non-US 
branch office of a US FCM, or non-US agents of a US FCM, or a non-US subsidiary of 
16 A contract for differences is a contract whose purpose is to secure a profit or avoid a loss by reference 
to fluctuations in the yalue or price of [any] property .. .index or other factor designated for that purpose .... 
17There are two exceptions: (i) non-US stock index futruesfutures may be offered or sold in the US 
only if the CFTC has issued on-action letter (provided on a case-by-case basis); (ii) future~ contr~cts.on 
non-US Government Debt Obligations may be offered or sold in the US only if the underlymg oblIgatIon 
is designated as an excempt security under SEC, Rule 3a 12-8. 
177 
a US FCM). In addition, US courts have been liberal in subjecting non-US parties who 
engage in the transactions with US persons to sue in US courts. In general, regulation of 
non-US persons engaging in futures transactions in the US contract markets is inclusiye 
in the CEA and CFTC regulations. However, this is not true in the UK. With the 
exception of non-investment business engaged in the UK by non-UK persons, many types 
of investment business which are actually carried on the UK fall out side the scope of 
the FSAct if the firm does not have a UK office from which it carried on the investment 
business. 
Manipulation 
The significant different approaches to regulating securities markets and futures markets 
in the US are premised on the contention that futures manipulation is significantly dif-
ferent from manipulating securities markets. For this reason, the fundamental concern 
of futures regulation in the US is futures manipulation. The Grain Futures Act, the 
first statue on the regulation of futures markets took the view that "futures transactions 
are susceptible to manipulation and control, and may generate sudden and umeasonable 
price fluctuations" .18 The fundamental purpose of the CEA is "... to provide a measure 
of control over manipulative acti-vity... that demoralise(s) the market to the injury of 
producers and consumers and the exchanges themselves"; that price fluctuations due to 
manipulation " ... are a burden upon interstate commerce and make regulation essential 
in the public interest" .19 The CEA and all futures regulations that proceeded it in the 
US explicitly make manipulation a felony. Section 9(b) of the CEA makes it a felony 
punishable by a fine up to $500,000 ($100,000 for individuals) and imprisonment of not 
more than five years, for any person "to manipulate or attempt to manipulate the price of 
any commodity in interstate commerce, or for future delivery on or subject to the rules of 
18Grain Futures Act, Pub. L. 331, 42 Stat. 998 (1922). 
19Futures Trading Act of 1978, Committee Print, Committee on Agriculture, NutitionNutrition, and 
Forestry, US Senate, 95th cong., 2nd sess., 136 (Jan. 1979); Senate Report No. 95-850, 95th Cong .. 2nd 
Sess., 5-13 (1978). See also Edwards and Edwards (1984, p.333). 
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any contract market, or to corner or attempt to corner any such commodity ... '~ .20 How-
ever, manipulation is not explicitly defined by statue, and the task of interpreting the 
term is left to regulators and courts. Edwards and Edwards (1984, p.336) summarised 
the US judgements as interpreting manipulation as "the creation of an artificial price by 
planned action, whether by man or a group of men" ;21 these actions must be "calculate 
to produce a price distortion" ;22 and the "intent of the parties during their trading is a 
determinative element of a punishable manipulation" .23 Put in other words, in order to 
prosecute manipulation, three elements are necessary: (i) price artificiality; (ii) causation; 
(iii) intentionality. Unfortunately, the relevant court decisions have not established firm 
and defensible criteria for whether a particular price is artificial, or whether an accused 
trader intended to cause that price. 
The CFTC was authorised and has established several measures to deal with ma-
nipulation. The most important of these include: (i) the CFTC imposes daily trading 
and position limits for speculators; (ii) the CFTC imposes upon all boards of trade, as a 
condition for designation as a contract market, that their governing boards must provide 
for "the prevention of manipulation of prices and the cornering of any commodity by the 
dealers or operators upon such board" ;24 (iii) the CFTC is legislatively instructed not to 
authorise trading in a new futures contract unless the exchange has demonstrated that 
the contract terms are not prone to manipulation; (iv) the CFTC is empowered under 
the Section 8a (6) of the CEA to communicate to the contract markets "the full facts con-
cerning any transaction or market operation, including the names of the parties thereto, 
which in the judgement of the Commission disrupts or tends to disrupt any market ... 
", and Section 8a (7) to alter or supplement contract market rules under various circum-
stances, including "for the protection of traders or to insure fair dealing in commodities 
t,raded for future delivery en such contract market". Under Section 8a (9), the CFTC is 
2°7 U.S.C. Section 9. 
21 General Foods Corporation v. Brennan, 170, F.2d.220, 231 (7th Cir.1948). 
22 Volkart Bms. Inc. v. Freeman, 311, F. 2d. 52, 58 (5th Cir. 1960). 
23 General Foods Corporation v. Brennan, 201, F.2d. 476,479 (7th Cir. 1948). 
24CEA, Section 5( d). 
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given emergency powers to intervene directly into contract markets where there is .. 
threatened or actual market manipulation and corners ... "; (v) Section 4i of the CEA 
makes it unlawful for any person who owns or controls an open futures position which 
equals or exceeds an amount fixed by the CFTC, to trade on a contract market, unless 
such person files large trader reports with the CFTC, and keeps books and records of 
cash or spot transactions relating to his futures position. 
In contrast to the US position, where manipulation is illegal under the CEA, and 
where the CFTC has an explicit obligation to act against this practice, it does not ap-
pear that the relevant provisions in FSAct makes futures manipulation illegal. However, 
whether futures manipulation is explicitly prohibited by the FSAct is subject to further 
legal intepretation. Moreover, it seems unlikely that other relevant laws relating to fu-
tures trading in the UK have been made manipulation illegal. The main law with regard 
to prosecuting investment frauds is the Prevention of Frauds Investment Act of 1958 
(PFI), but is not applicable to futures business. 25 Prosecuting authorities have therefore 
to rely on general offences under the Companies Act 1985, and Thefts Acts 1968 and 
1978. It remains true, however, nowhere is futures manipulation explicitly mentioned in 
any of the relevant Acts. The SIB took the view that manipulation is covered by Section 
47 of the FSAct (SIB 1996, p.21). The three subsections in Section 47 of the FSAct, 
which do not explicitly refer to futures manipulation, make the following activities illegal: 
(1) knowingly or recklessly making misleading, false or deceptive statements, promises 
or forecasts or dishonestly concealing facts; 
(2) engaging in any course of conduct which creates a false or misleading impression 
as to market price or value of any investment if done for the purpose of inducing another 
person to trade in these investments, or refrain from doing so; 
(3) provided that the person accused of an offence Uilder the above subsection calIDot 
show that he reasonably believed that these consequences would not follow. 
These provisions clearly make certain forms of equity market manipulation illegal, 
25 See also footenote 51. 
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such as "fan club" and "concert party" manipulations in which agents are induced to 
purchase shares with the effect that their prices exceed underlying values. It also makes 
the first two categories of manipulations as classified by Allen and Gale (1992),26 unlawful. 
It seems doubtful whether the courts would sustain a more general interpretation of this 
Section of the FSAct such as would make futures corners and squeezes illegal. 
:Futures corners and squeezes typically do not involve a manipulator in making state-
ments, promises or forecasts, and since there is no obligation on futures clients to reveal 
their positions (unless they are covered by certain large position reporting systems, such 
as the CFTC's large position reporting program. There is no official reporting program 
in the UK, however, there are some relevant requirements imposed by some exchanges, 
such as the LME, which requires its members to report both proprietary and custolller 
positions over a certain size in both futures and options), they cannot be accused of 
dishonestly concealing facts. In fact, concealment of a trader's position is one of the 
most attractive features of futures markets, which may be beneficial to every trader in 
the market. Concealment of speculators' positions may be useful in obtaining profits 
from their ability to predict futures demand and supply, while hedgers may also need 
this secrecy to avoid revealing their commercial policy (Fischel and Ross 1992, p. 545). 
Subsection 1 is therefore largely irrelevant to futures markets. The questions remained 
therefore are: (i) whether a corner or squeeze constitutes a conduct which might create 
a false or misleading impression as to market prices or values; (ii) whether the conduct is 
with the purpose of inducing another person to trade in these investments, or to refrain 
from doing so. 
It is arguable that the first part of this condition is satisfied, since "price artificiality" 
is an essential element of the US juridical definition of manipulation. However, it is more 
difficult to argue that the intention of manipulation is to induce or inhibit trades. It 
26 Allen and Gale classify market manipulations into three categories: action-based manipulation, 
where manipulation based on actions that change the actual or perceived value of the assets of the firm; 
information-based manipulation, where manipulation based on releasing inside information or spreading 
false rumersrumours; trade-based manipulation, where manipulation due to transactions, \\"it hOllt taking 
any actions to alter the "alue of the firm or to release fsalse information which changes its yalue. 
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is clear that the intention of manipulation is to create favourable terms of trade~ which 
does not necessarily involve any actions of inducing or inhibiting shorts to trade, since 
shorts are motivated to futures markets by their expected future cash price at the time 
of contracting, their risk aversion and their risk exposures in cash markets. It might 
be argued that the shorts would be normally wish to close out their positions, but are 
obliged by the manipulator to deliver. In practice, however, successful manipulations 
typically result in the shorts closing out their positions before contract expiration, but on 
considerably less favourable terms than they had anticipated. This suggests that futures 
manipulation, at least the most common form of manipulation - the futures "corner" 
or "squeeze", will not in general fall under the FSAct. This is however subject to legal 
interpretation of the FSAct by its designated regulatory body and English courts. 
An alternative possibility is that manipulation may be deemed illegal as conflicting 
with the SIB Principles. In particular, the context in paragraph 3.18 of SIB (1996) 
suggested that there might be a conflict with the third principle which required "a firm 
should observe high standards of market conduct". The SIB (1993) interpreted this 
as requiring the firm engage only in "proper trades", and argued that trades ainled at 
manipulation would be improper. However, none of the examples of improper trades in 
this guidance is relevant to futures manipulation, and more important, this guidance was 
not a legal interpretation of the statutory manipulation ban (Gilbert 1996).27 
However, the FSA, new financial regulator in the UK, will take a big step in making 
futures manipulation illegal more explicitly in the UK. The Code of Market Conduct 
(FSA consultation paper, June 1998) set out certain types of manipulative activities as 
the breach of the basic precepts set out in the legislation (presumably the FSAct) in 
27SIB (1993) states: "In SIB's view, the guidance is also relevant to the market manipulation ban in 
Section 47(2) of the Act (the FSAct). That ban is concerned with ensuring that acts and courses of 
conduct are not intended to create a false or misleading impression as to the market in or the price or 
value of any investments. In order for the prohibition to be broken, a number of elements need to be 
fulfilled including elements concerned with the purpose of the act ont the course of conduct. One way 
in which a false or misleading impression may be created is by effecting some of the improper traded 
described in this paper ... However, this guidance does not attempt to provide a legal interpretation of 
the statutory ban". 
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paragraphs 4.3 and 4.6: abusive squeezes and demand-side manipulation: 
paragraph 4.3 A person improperly manipulates a market, where he _ 
has a significant influence over the relevant supply of a product or the delivery 
mechanisnlS of a market in the product; 
- has entered into deals on a designated market under which he has the right to 
require others either to deliver to him (or those colluding with him) quantities 
of that product or to take delivery from him (or those colluding with him) 
quantities of the product; and 
then uses the first two circumstances to dictate arbitrary and abnormal prices for 
the settlement or release of the obligations to him (or those colluding with him) arising 
under those deals. 
paragraph 4.6 A person should not enter a transaction or series of transactions in an 
investment or a reference commodity the principal purpose of which would reasonably 
be regarded as the positioning of the market price of a protected investment at arbitrary 
and abnormal level dictated by that person. 
Any manipulative activity has to be assessed only on an examination of all the cir-
cumstances surrounded the conduct in question, and therefore, which kind price level can 
be deemed as abnorn1al prices and which types of activities can be seen as manipulation 
will have to be tested in actual hearings. 
It is clear, unlike the case in the US, that the FSAct did not create powers specially 
aimed at detecting and preventing futures manipulation. The SIB, the FSA in the near 
future, unlike its equiyalent part in futures regulation in the US, the CFTC, does not 
have any statutory pmyer to monitor contracts markets28 and intervene into the markets 
when necessary. It does not seem to have any expertise or personnel competence to do 
that. Therefore, all the tasks were left with the self-regulated organisations - the SFA, 
28SIB can have access to information on positions of exchange members, but this information does 
not reveal beneficial ownership. 
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and futures exchanges in the UK, however, no explicit anti-manipulation rule has been 
required by statue for a Self-regulating Organisation (SRO) or a Recognised Investment 
Exchange (RIE). 
Investor protection 
It is commonly believed that the major concern motivated the FSAct was the investor 
protection, does it follow that the futures regulatory system in the UK provides better 
investor protection than in the US? Which one provides the optimal protection? Our 
perception is that, it is not generally true that the British system provides greater investor 
protection than the US system. Some measures of investor protection are imposed by 
the British system but not in the US~ for example, 'know your customer', churning, and 
the Investor Compensation Scheme, while some are required by the US system but not 
specifically in Britain, for example, time-stamping, equal sharing rule,29 various anti-
manipulation rules, etc. It is also doubtful that whether rules relating to 'knowing your 
customer' and churning can be effectively applicable because of the nature of futures 
trading. The following analysis aims at a comprehensive but by no mean exhaustive 
comparisons of investor protection in the US and UK futures markets. 
In the US, firms and individuals handling customer funds, must apply for registra-
tion and membership with the National Futures Association, and are subject to capital 
requirements set by the CFTC, especially the Futures Commissions Merchants (FCMs). 
The NFA was authorised to monitor financial conditions of FCMs, and is responsible to 
implement the requirement that customers' funds are kept in segregated trust funds. The 
insurance protection was proposed but not adopted by the CFTC, however, the Bank-
ruptcy Act of 1978 contained provisions3o governing the insolvency of a FCM in case 
that the FCM breaks such trust - conversion of the funds. Firms carrying on investment 
29See footnote 30. 
30The provisions in the Bankruptcy Act of 1978 mainly provide for the equal sharing of all custo.m:rs 
in any remaining segregated funds, i.e., every customer will receive a pro rata share of the remammg 
customer funds, and customers have a priority over all other creditors in such funds. 
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business in the UK are ensured by the SIB Principles to maintain adequate financial 
resources, and are subject to capital requirements by the SFA for all categories of its 
members, in particular for the Ordinary Business Investors (for some firms, the capital 
requirements may be directly imposed by the SIB). In order to protect in\Oestors against 
a SFA member's default, a SFA member has to comply 'with the SFA's Client 1Ioney 
Rules unless an exception applies. 31 Under the rules, an investor's money is required to 
be held with certain approved banks and that the money in the account is, to the bank's 
knowledge, a trust fund. However, a 'non-private customer'32 may contract out of the 
protection (opt out of segregation), and a private customer with sufficient experience, 
and certain customers may be treated as a non-private customer in accordance with the 
SFA's rules. Unlike in the US, the SIB additionally established the Investors Compen-
sations Scheme in 1988, under which a private investor can claim for compensation up 
to £48,000 due to the 'default' of regulated investment firms except those investors who 
choose to opt out of segregation. 
The Futures Trading Practices Act of 1992 generally prohibits dual trading except 
where a specific exemption is granted,33 and the CFTC established regulations to ensure 
that abuses on the trading floor would be eliminated. Exchanges are required to have 
rules of prohibiting floor brokers and futures commission merchants from trading for 
their own accounts ahead of customers, from unauthorised trading, and from disclosing 
orders of customers to others except to the extent necessary for their effective execu-
31The exemptions apply to several kinds of firms, including one which is subject to the provisions of a 
Home State regulator under the passport of the European Union. Another exemption applies to money 
held by an approved bank on behalf of a customer in an account with itself. 
32Under the SFA rules, non-private customers mainly include: i) ordinary business inyestor; ii) individ-
uals who are acting in the cousecourse of carrying on investment business; iii) expert private customers; 
iv) some special small business investors. 
33The Futures Trading Practices Act of 1992 (FTPC) requires the CFTC to ban aual trading except 
where a specific exemption is granted. For examples, specific floor traders are allowed dual trading 
for the execution of spread transactions, error corrections and customer authorised transactions; dual 
trading is allowed in an exchange where its audit trail met certain requirements, including timing of 
execution "oithin one minute increments, or where dual trading was shown to be needed for liquidity 
purposes, or where the trading volume for specific contracts falls below a minimum average trading level, 
etc. 
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tion. In order to be able to detect abuses from dual trading, exchanges are required to 
have customers orders time-stamped in a manner that would allow an audit trail on a 
minute-to-minute basis.
34 
Unauthorised trading is prohibited, the CFTC requires writ-
ten authorisation from customers who gave trading discretion over their accounts to a 
commodity professional. In addition, commodity professionals are required to supervise 
their employees to prevent fraudulent practices. Dual trading has also been permitted 
since the 'Big Bang' in Britain, and one of the concerns of the FSAct is that investors 
will be adequately protected from abuses which may arise from dual trading. Under 
the SIB rules an investment firm acting as the agent for a client is obliged to assure 
that transactions are effected on the best terms available, and is required to process a 
customer's order before its own. For the abuses of dual trading to be detected, an ex-
change is required by the FSAct35 as a condition of a RIE to either itself have or secure 
the provision on its behalf of satisfactory arrangements for recording of the transactions 
effected on the exchange. In contrast to the CFTC, neither the FSAct nor the SIB rules 
specify standard procedures for the trading records taken on an exchange. As in the 
US~ discretionary futures trading is permitted in the UK and investment firms have to 
follow the SFA rules on customer agreements for such trading accounts. The CFTC pro-
posed prohibition of churning in futures trading in 1977, but this practice has not been 
adopted in the US regulatory system, while it is explicitly prohibited by the SFA rules. 36 
However, it is doubtful how effective the rule is in practice, because futures markets are 
very volatile, and a more active investment strategy is likely to be necessary in futures 
markets. 
34The CFTC in 1976 required contract marektsmarkets, at minimum, to establish a 'bracketing' 
system, under which coloured-coded order tickets were used that allowed a determination of the execution 
time within a half-hour period. In January 1986, the CFTC announced the adoption of rules that would 
require a lecord of the execution time of orders in one-minute increments, and exchanges were required 
to comply with the rule by October 1, 1986. 
35Requirements for Recognition of Investment Exchange, Schedule 4 of the FSAct. 
36Rule 5-43 of the SFA provides that a firm must not make a personal recommendation to a private 
customer to deal, or to arrange a deal in the exercise of discretion for any customer, if the dealing 
would reasonably be regarded as too frequent in the circumstances. For a detailed discussion, see Parry, 
Bettelhein and Rees (1996), Chapter 1, p.17. 
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In September 1977 the CFTC proposed a 'suitability' requirement for brokers, but 
this was not adopted, and courts have refused to imply such a duty.37 In the UK, the 
FSAct does not specially require that an authorised firm determine the 'suitability' of 
an investment for a customer, but the SIB rules contain a "know your customer" rule. 
Suitability is therefore written into the SFA rulebook,38 although there is no guidance 
as to the meaning of suitability or what level of information should have been obtained 
from investors. Both regulatory systems require the registration of trading professionals. 
In the US, the NFA is responsible for registering all categories of professionals handling 
customer funds and require them to pass a proficiency exam. There are more general 
powers to regulate professionals dealing with the public. SIB (FSA in the near future) 
directly recognises and supervises nine Professional Bodies (RPBs), which are required 
to be 'fit and proper' to do investment business with the public. 
Unlike investors in securities markets, neither in the US and UK do futures customers 
receive information about the underlying assets, nor are firms or individuals in general 
obliged to publicly reveal information about their positions. But both require that, before 
a customer can transact in futures, he must receive and sign a statement describing the 
risks or risk warning notice in futures trading. 39 There are no special provisions to 
prevent insider trading, but the CEA explicitly prohibit personnel of the CFTC from 
futures trading (Markham 1987, pp.70-71). 
It is notable that the CFTC was authorised by the CEA to imposed a maximum 
imprisonment term of five years, a civil penalty up to $100,000 for each violation of the 
Commodity Exchange Act, and special provisions in the statue governed the manner in 
37See, for example, Avis v. Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc., Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 21,379 (CFTC 
1982). 
38The SFA suitability rule provides a firm m1lst take re~s0nCl.ble steps to ensure that it does not 
make any personal recommedationrecommendation to a private customer of an investment or invest-
ment agreement, or effect or arrange a discretionary transaction with or for an customer, unless the 
recommendation or transaction is suitable for him .... See Parry, Bettlehein and Rees (1996), p.13. 
39Rule 5-30(2) of the SFA requires that in respect of a warrant or derivatives, before a firm recommends, 
arranges or executes a transaction, it mudtmust have sent the private customer a Warrants or Derivatives 
Risk Warning Notice, and obtained a copy signed by the customer. See Parry, Bettlehein and Rees (1996). 
p.1l. 
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which the amount of the penalty was to be determined, exchanges have the powers to 
fine their members. But neither the SIB nor SROs is empowered by the statue to inlpose 
civil penalties, although futures exchanges have powers to fine their members. 
The comparison of futures regulation between the US and the UK (see also Table 5.1) 
can be summarised as follows: 
• Both regulatory systems are a blend of statutory regulation and self-regulation, 
but British regulation relies less on statue and more on self-regulation. The US 
futures regulation has been developed on its own path, and has been separated 
from regulation of other financial sectors; while futures (derivatives) markets have 
not been a special regulatory concern in the UK, and it is likely to be more blurred 
under the nlega regulator - the FSA unless there will be statuary reforms (Goodhart 
et al. 1998~ p.153). 
• The scope of futures regulation is broader and less debatable in the UK. The UK 
regulation of OTe derivatives is more inclusive than the US model, but the regu-
lation of extra-territoriality falls out of the scope of the FSAct . 
• Manipulation has been a fundamental concern in the US futures regulation, and 
made unlavlful under various versions of futures legislation. The CFTC has an 
explicit obligation to act against this practice. But futures manipulation has not 
been made illegal explicitly under either the relevant provisions of the FSAct, or 
the SIB principles, but the FSA will potentially act to regard futures manipulation 
illegal. 
• Both systems have similar treatments in relating to investor protection, although 
they are not without differences. Some are covered by the GS system but not in the 
UK system, and vice versa. It is therefore difficult to judge which system provides 
broader and more effective investor protection. 
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5.3.2 An appraisal of futures regulation in the US and the UK 
The brief description of current regulatory systems in the US and the UK in the Appendix 
of this chapter shows that there exist important differences between them, both in the 
institutional structures and in the emphases and details of specific rules. It is generally 
suggested that US futures regulation under the CEA is concerned first and foremost , , 
with futures manipulation, while UK financial regulation under the FSAct is concerned 
with protecting investors from abuse, incompetence and negligence. In fact, both have far 
broader objectives; futures markets are more heavily regulated by statue and government 
in the US than in the UK; futures regulation is separated from the regulation of other 
financial sectors in the US, both by statue and by institutional arrangements, but not in 
the UK. However, it is not straightforward to answer the question of which regulatory 
system is superior. An evaluation of a regulatory system requires that we answer two 
essential questions: whether futures markets are effectively regulated to correct market 
imperfections or market failures as discussed in Section 5.2, and whether the regulatory 
system is cost-efficient to achieve its objectives. One might immediately be sceptical that 
a single statue - the FSAct - could effectively establish principles simultaneously to cover 
various investment businesses in the UK. Despite the voluminous nature and complexity 
of the FSAct, it is not surprising that criticisms and objections have been made that 
it has insufficient flexibility to address adequately the specific forms of market failures 
that arise in very different markets (Miles 1992, p.172). For example, the failure of a 
broker/dealer might trigger a systemic problem, but it is unlikely that the insolvency 
of investment managers raises systemic concerns if client funds are separated from their 
own; information asymmetry is less vital in wholesale markets than in retail markets, and 
therefore, the level of investor protection in wholesale markets should not be the same 
as that in retail markets, etc. 
Futures markets (and other derivatives markets) indeed have some characteristics 
that other financial markets do not have, for example, leveraged trading, high volatil-
ities, susceptibility to manipulation (especially in deliyery-settled markets), t he special 
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Object- Measures designed to achieve the US uK 
Ives outcome 
Recognition of futures exchanges yes yes (demostic) 
maintain Recognition of clearing houses no yes (demostic) 
competi- Financial requirements for SROs' yes yes 
tion, members 
financial Continuous (or periodic) surveilance CFTC oversees SRO no 
intergrity of financial conditions of members surveilance programs 
market Early warning program on broker / relevant person is req- no 
stability dealer's financial crisis uired to notify CFTC 
Price limits, circuit breakers within 5 days imposed exchanges 
managed by exchanges rules vary 
Emergency intervention into markets yes (the CFTC) no 
Minimum requirements for futures yes yes 
professionals 
Prohibition of dual trading yes, but with broad no 
exemptions 
Segregation of customer funds yes yes 
Prohibition of churning no yes 
protect Existence of investment insurance no yes (to pri\"ate 
investors customers) 
Requirement of 'suitability' no yes 
Requirement of disclosure no no 
Prohibition of insider trading no, but with some the EC Insider 
exceptions Dealing Direct-
ive applies 
Restrictions on fees, cold calls no but CATCH has no restriction 
guide-lines on phone on fees but 
solicitation on calls 
Existence of reparation programs yes yes 
for investors 
Is manipulation illegal by statue yes LJt explicit ly 
Measures to prevent manipulation vanous no except for 
anti- voluntary exch 
manlpu -ange actions 
lation Measures to control manipulation yes, the CFTC generally no 
by government regulation 
Prosecution of manipulators yes no 
Table 5.1: Comparison of futures regulation in the US and the UK 
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functions they serve, etc. The implication of these features of futures markets for futures 
regulation is that aspects of market failures in futures markets may be different from 
those arising in other markets, and that therefore, futures regulation may merit special 
consideration in financial regulation. It follows from the previous sections, that it is 
obviously inappropriate that futures manipulation, a special form of monopolisation in 
futures markets, is absent from futures regulation in the UK. 
Another major concern is that whether the regulatory system in the UK, which relies 
more on self-regulation and less on statue compared to the US futures regulation, is 
effective. There has been substantial debate in the UK about the structure of regulatory 
institutions and in particular about the role of self-regulation. However. our view is 
that the effectiveness of regulation is determined more by the way and measures to 
deal with potential market failures than by institutional structure. In fact, a blend of 
statutory and self-regulation on futures regulation is by no mean exceptional in the UK, 
and the advantage of the mixed regulatory system is that it is more flexible than a 
purely statutory regulatory system while is more effective than a purely self-regulated 
system. It is difficult to judge which proportion of this mixture is optimal in practice, 
and this may vary across countries and reflect the complexity of a particular national 
financial system. But in comparison to US futures self-regulation, it may be reasonable 
to be suspicious of the effectiveness of the UK self-regulation, in which the SIB has no 
substantial measures to monitor the SROs except the rule to oversee SROs in order to 
make sure the SIB's continued satisfaction of recognised requirements. \ Ioreover, the 
SIB's power to sanction a particular SRO is limited to withdrawal of its authorisation, 
but withdrawal of recognition is too draconian a power to be routinely exercised. While in 
the US the CFTC maintains continuous surveillance program to oversee the SRO specific , 
surveillance program, and the Div ision of Trading and IvIarkets con.ducts periodic reviews 
of a SRO's programs and work product. 
Regulation is not a free good, an evaluation of any regulatory system inyoh"es cost-
benefit analysis. The optimal regulation must be cost-effective, however, both the benefit~ 
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from correcting potential market failures and the costs of regulation are not all tangible 
and quantitatively measurable. The principle may be that, in considering the costs. reg-
ulation should be imposed only when significant market failures are expected (Edwards 
and Edwards 1984). The costs exist in several kinds and forms, and can be classified into 
five categories: direct resources costs; costs of compliance, costs from possibly di\"erting 
business to other countries; costs from reduced competition; and costs from stifling fi-
nancial innovation. In comparison with the traditional method of regulation in the UE:. 
the FSAct and the current regulatory system have been criticised as ignoring or gi\"ing 
insufficient consideration to the costs, hence the financial services industry tends to be 
over-regulated (Goodhart 1988). However, in comparison to UK futures regulation, it 
may be true that the US futures regulatory system may be more costly than the UK 
counterpart. The separated regulatory model certainly increases the direct resources 
costs and compliance costs of the regulated, and the CFTC's contract approval process 
has been suspected to reduce either static or dynamic efficiency (see Anderson 1981, 
Easterbrook 1986, etc.). It is hard to assess whether the benefits from wider objectives 
of futures regulation, the relatively more effective regulation, and larger \"olume of fu-
tures business can make up for the costs, we are therefore unable to conclude that the US 
regulatory system is more cost-effective. Both regulatory systems face future refornls, 
not only because of the inefficiency of the regulatory systems themselves: but also be-
cause of the potential challenges from the development of derivatives markets. However, 
our emphasis of discussion is the UK futures regulatory reform by using the US futures 
regulation as a mirror, since US regulation has evolved more than half a century. 
5.3.3 How cost-effective futures regulation may be achieved in 
the UK 
The financial services regulation in the UK, as discussed previously, has been experi-
encing radical reforms. The "two-tier" regulatory and self-regulatory systenl established 
by the FSAct in 1986 is moving to a new regulatory system under a single. all embrac-
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ing regulator, the Financial Services Authority. The FSA puts together nine regulatory 
organisations,4o and ultimately (expected to be late 1999) takes full responsibility for 
supervising banks (already in the first half of 1998), building societies, insurance compa-
nies, fund managers and investment advisors. The new regulatory system will enhance 
regulatory co-operation among various financial sectors, reduce certain amount of ineffi-
ciency, competitive inequality, inconsistency and duplications of efforts, but it is not clear 
at this stage whether this new system is more effective than the existing one. This de-
pends on the powers given to it by statue and in which way it regulates financial markets. 
However, it may be reasonable to doubt the effectiveness of the regulatory system, since 
it does not appear to respond to concern about the very different objectives of regulation 
for different financial sectors.41 For example, futures regulation does not appear to be 
a special concern under the new regulatory regime. More effective futures regulation in 
the UK may hinge on, as yet unseen, modifications of the FSAct. 
Statutory prohibition of futures manipulation 
As indicated in previous section, the FSAct does not appear to address specifically fu-
tures manipulation, the important futures market failure evidenced in the US. The FSAct 
should be amended or be legally interpreted with the purpose of making explicit that 
futures manipulation is illegal, and a specific body should be empowered to prevent and 
control manipulation. This organisation will certainly be the Financial Services Au-
thority. However, a more difficult problem remained is how to achieve this objective 
efficiently. There have been three approaches to deal with manipulation: ex ante pre-
vention; ex post prosecution and halting suspected manipulation in process. The third 
40 They are Building Societies Commission (BSC), Friendly Societies Commission (FSC), Insurance 
Directorate (ID) of the Department of Trade 3.nd Industry, Investment Management Regulatory Organ-
isation (IMRO), Personal Investment Authority (PIA), Registery of Friendl~. Society (RFS!, Securi~i~s 
and Futures Authority (SFA), Securities and Investment Board, and SuperviSIOn and Surveillance DiVi-
sion (S&S) of the Bank of England. " . 
41 A similar argument was also made by Goodhart et al. (1998, p.153). They stated: [AJ smgle 
regulator might not have a clear focus on the objectives and rationale of regulation, and might not make 
the necessary differentiations between different types of institution." 
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method (measures in the US include additional margin requirements~ trading for liquida-
tion only and other emergency measures etc.) is the least costly. However, its rationale 
has not been understood academically. Our dynamic game (Chapter 3) provides a jus-
tification for this set of emergency measures against manipulation. Although it is not 
clear whether an increase of this type of exogenous uncertainty will reduce the frequency 
of manipulation, the harmfulness of a manipulation will be greatly lessened. However, 
timely and accurate identification of manipulation is difficult, and excessive reliance on 
this method may jeopardise the proper functioning of a futures market. US experience 
suggests that ex post prosecution of manipulation has not been a successful way to deter 
manipulation, manipulation was even argued as unprosecutable crime (Markham 1991). 
This is largely because of the need to prove intentionality. The US regulatory regime 
has therefore put more emphasis on ex ante prevention of manipulation (measures in 
the US include contract approval by the CFTC, specific rules imposed by the CFTC on 
exchanges, the large trader reporting system, etc.), on the encouragement of civil actions 
against manipulation. 
Our theoretical analyses (Chapter 2 and 3) suggest that, the key to a successful ma-
nipulation is the ability of a manipulator to obtain a large futures position in relation 
to the deliverable supply, therefore, effective prevention of manipulation is necessarily 
linked to the restriction of traders' conducts, the modification of terms of contracts and 
the monitoring of manipulatory potential. Modification of terms of contracts aims at 
increasing the ability of futures market to turn cash commodities into deliverable supply, 
which may include broadening of deliverable supply and extension of delivery points. 
Modification of terms of contracts in these ways will certainly make a futures 'corner' 
difficult, but may also reduce hedging effectiveness. Since under these circumstances, 
it is harder for a hedger to hedge against specific risk against the exact quality of the 
underlying assets or delivery point. Monitoring of manipulatory potential requires regu-
latory authorities to assess the size of client positions. The US experience on this aspect 
shows that the large trader reporting system has been successful in achieving t his goal. 
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There is no client position reporting on statutory basis in the UK.42 It is beneficial for 
the Financial Services Authority to establish a similar large trader reporting system as 
the US model on statuary basis. The CFTC large trader reporting system requires each 
clients, either foreign or domestic, who holds controls or has a financial interest in an 
open futures position which equals or exceeds the fixed reporting level for that particu-
lar commodity (reporting position) must file with the CFTC until his position declines 
below the reporting level. This information is subsequently released by the CFTC In 
aggregated form in the weekly Commitments of Traders in Futures (CTF) reports.43 
In fact, it may be very difficult and maybe infeasible to extend the reporting to 
positions in cash markets and OTC markets which involves the issue of what constitutes 
relevant positions (for details, see Gilbert 1996, p.15), and also it is conceivable that such a 
strengthened system would be very expensive in terms of both direct costs and compliance 
costs, as well as the costs from possible reduction of liquidity resulting from the potential 
discouragement of large traders' trading and chasing business abroad. Therefore, it is 
doubtful whether the current system is effective in identifying all manipulative potential 
in practice. Even if so, and even if a relevant organisation is empowered to control 
manipulation when manipulation is in the course, such as the CFTC in the US, but 
not the SIB or FSA currently in the UK, one might still doubt whether the relevant 
regulatory body can take appropriate actions to control manipulation timely, because 
of the conflict of interests problem and also the rent-seeking behaviour. At the same 
time, the automatic measures, such as position limits, price limits, circuit breakers, have 
enormous side effects. 44 
42There has been a voluntary reporting system (around 95% of all large positions are currently re-
ported) on the LME where by brokers report client ownership of large positions, but there is currently 
no reporting of client positions on the LIFFE markets (Gilbert 1996, p.14). 
43 However , there are some serious limitations in the existing reporting system. First, it does not 
include the reporting of cash positions. Client cash positions can be very important to corner a market. 
Second it is confined to on-exchange positions. Traders who wish to hide their positions can do so via 
OTC t;ansactions, although many of these will subsequently translate into exchange transactions as the 
writers of the OTC positions offset their positions. Finally: it should but not currently include deltaed 
options positions with futures, since the two are nearly equivalent. 
44For a discussion on these aspects, see Brennan, M. (1986), A Theory of Price Limits in Futur('~ 
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Alternatively, it may be feasible and cost-efficient to construct a new anti-manipulation 
framework which combines the client position reporting system with a more rigorous ex 
post prosecution methodology and certain amount of emergency anti-nlanipulation fire-
powers. Under this framework, the client position reporting system only serves two 
purposes: to provide necessary information for successful ex post prosecution; to allow 
other traders to be aware of manipulation possibility from an increase in the position 
concentration, thus they will manage their positions accordingly (for a detailed discus-
sion, see Gilbert 1996, p.16). This will make manipulation more difficult and riskier for 
the manipulator. The effectiveness of this framework will mainly hinge on successful 
prosecution deterrence, which necessarily involves legal reforms: one of these is to delete 
intent element from manipulation; another is to make offence penalties more harmful. 
Intentionality is, like in other crime prosecutions, a factor to determine penalties the 
offenders deserve, but not a determinant of the nature of crime. l\lore importantly, it 
would be beneficial to realise that intentionality can be testable, as Pirrong suggested, 
by asking a different question "are there any nonmanipulative explanations for this con-
duct?" (Pirrong 1994, p.994). Manipulation or manipulation attempt is an economic 
offence, it must have sound economic effects that other commercial activities do not have, 
including price effects, quantity effects, basis effects. These economic effects are highly 
reliable to be used to detect manipulation or manipulation attempts, they can be used to 
assign responsibility to a specific trader (traders) if each client positions and strategies 
have been properly recorded. However, the third element of this framework - the optimal 
amount of intervention by regulators or exchanges when a manipulation is suspected, 
is naturally difficult to be defined. The principle may be that, the firepower is legally 
created, but should be cautiously exercised. This proposed approach is much less costly 
than the US existing one. But it is more reliable, since manipciation it) sometimes only 
detected ex post from its economic effects. 
Markets Journal of Financial Economics 16, pp.213-233; Kyle, A. (1988), Trading Halts and Price 
Limits, Review of Futures Afarkets 7, pp.427-434; Ma, C., Rao, R., and Sear, R. (1989), Volatility, Price 
Resolution and the Effectiveness of Price Limits, Journal of Financial Services Research 3, pp.165-199. 
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Disciplining customers and extra-territorial extension of regulation 
In principle, UK financial services regulation covers all investment business in the UK. 
Therefore, a non-UK firm needs to be authorised under the FSAct for investment business 
carried on in the UK. This includes all business carried on from an UK office even , 
with non-UK customers. In addition, even if it does not have a UK office, a non-UK 
firm nonetheless needs to be authorised for investment business carried on from a non-
UK office with customers or counterparties in the UK on a services basis unless the 
FSAct's overseas person exemption applies. The scope of the FSAct does not cover 
customers (including non-UK customers) who do not carryon investment business in 
the UK. This result is not surprising because the main concern of the FSAct is investor 
protection. However, it is inappropriate when broader objectives of financial regulation 
are considered. For example, in futures regulation a powerful customer may manipulate 
a market (Sumitomo, who manipulated the LME copper market, is an example), and 
can also cause concern in relation to systemic risk. 
The CEA and CFTC in the US have the power of supervision and jurisdiction over 
both US and non-US customers. Specifically, every non-US person must become a cus-
tomer of a FCM, and the FCM acts as an agent of that customer for the purpose of 
accepting delivery and services of any 'comrIlunication' (e.g., a surnrnons, complains, 
order, request for information), issued by or on behalf of the CFTC to the non-US cus-
tomer. Furthermore, if the futures positions carried by a customer (either US or non-US 
customer) exceed the CFTC or specific market reporting level, the FCM is required to 
furnish the identity of the customer to the CFTC or the applicable contract market. In 
particular, any customer with reportable positions must file with the CFTC on the CFTC 
'form 40' which includes information about the identity of the customer, the identity , 
of all FCMs through which it trades, and identity of persons who have a financi~l in-
terests of 10% or more in the account of the customer. In addition, the customer must 
also maintain books and records showing all details concerning all futures positions and 
transactions and all positions and transactions in the underlying cash comnlOdit~· or its 
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products or by-products. The CEA has jurisdictions over non-US persons \\·ho engage 
in transactions (including on US exchanges and non-US exchanges) with US persons. 
The FSAct currently in the UK neither disciplines customers, nor has extra-territorial 
jurisdiction power. The UK futures regulation may follow the US model of customer 
regulation and introduce the extra-territorial element into the FSAct. This is essential 
for futures regulation, although it may be not very important for other financial services 
regulation, because manipulation has been identified as a major form of market failures 
in futures markets, and there is no reason to believe that customers \<:ho lies outside SRO 
jurisdiction may have less tendency to manipulate a market. However, extra-territorial 
extension of regulatory power requires international regulatory co-operations, and the 
potential conflicts between regulators do not seem to be strong with respect to position 
reporting system. 
Reviewing some measures on investor protection 
UK financial services regulation mainly followed the US path of securities regulation. 
As having been argued, the objectives and methods of regulating futures markets have 
been significantly different from those of securities regulation in the US. There are even 
huge differences on investor protection in these two sets of markets. Securities regula-
tion requires more extensive disclosure, prohibits insider trading, establishes a suitability 
requirement, provides insurance against broker insolvency, and prohibits dual trading. 
However, these restrictions do not exist or just exist in the least extent in futures reg-
ulation. The comparison of UK futures regulation with the US counterpart shows that 
significant differences on investor protection exist, especially with regard to suitability 
requirement, prohibition of churning, and investment insurance, which exists in the UK 
but not in the US futures regulation. These rules are worth reviewing. The issue is 
what justifies these specific investor protection rules, are they cost-effectiye in futlues 
regulation? Our concern is that the nature of futures trading would make these rules 
unenforceable, unnecessary, and expensive, which may affect the liquidity of markets and 
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the competitiveness of firms. 
Suitability is a securities law concept where brokers are required to 'know their cus-
tomers' . Under this rule, brokers are required to recommend to their customers onl \" 
the securities transactions which the brokers reasonably believe are 'suitable' in light of 
customers' financial position and investment goals. This rule is imposed by exchanges, 
by the National Association of Securities Dealers, and in certain cases, by the SEC in the 
US. It was introduced into the SFA rules in the UK. However, it is largely inapplicable 
in futures trading. Suitability in futures trading depends on both the investor's wealth 
and reasons for undertaking a futures transaction. A hedging transaction is easier to be 
justified than a speculation, but it is a very difficult task to justify a speculative trans-
action which involves the evidence that the customer has the financial ability to absorb 
any losses which he may incur. Additionally, the difficulty of imposing the suitability 
rule arises from the fact that it is very hard for the broker himself to assess the risk 
of a futures transaction involved. The only way for a transaction to be believed to be 
'suitable' by a broker may be to require huge amount of disclosures from the customer, 
sound researches on the relevant nlarkets and underlying assets, but this will involve 
large costs. The prohibition of churning rule provides that a firm must not make a per-
sonal recommendation to a private customer to deal, or arrange a deal in the exercise of 
discretion for any customer, if the dealing would reasonably be regarded as too frequent 
in the circumstances. What is reasonable is not clear here, and more important, the 
application of this rule is also difficult because futures markets are often highly volatile, 
implying a possible justification of a very active investment policy. Accordingly: the rate 
of turnover of a portfolio investing significantly in futures may quite legitimately be much 
higher than one would expect a portfolio investing solely in securities markets. Therefore 
it may be impossible to detect churning accurately in practice. Although it is impossible 
to enforce the rules of suitability and prohibition of churning in futures markets, the~' 
impose significant costs on brokers, and importantly, they may affect the cost functions 
of different brokers (it will cost law-abiding firms more than others), and therefore~ the 
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competitiveness of these firms in futures markets. 
Investor protection in the UK was enhanced by the establishment of a compensation 
fund under Section 54 of the FSAct which provides a final 'safety net' for purposes 
of compensating investors who lose their funds as a result of an authorised business 
being unable to satisfy their civil liabilities to their clients incurred in connection with 
investment business. This is a supplement to the segregation of customer funds. However, 
the importance of the compensation fund is doubtful if segregation of client funds is 
properly enforced. It is even less useful in futures markets because relatively shorter 
terms of contracts and marking to market practice would make conversion of customer 
funds more difficult than in securities markets. Furthermore, the compensation fund is 
very costly. The costs comprise of two parts: firstly, the management and enforcement 
costs; and secondly, the costs of building the fund. Both parts of costs are eventually 
levied on customers, although the latter is not a resource cost, and it will be either 
distributed to claimants, or return in due course to those subscribing. The practices of 
futures trading makes the insurance program in futures markets less important, and the 
costs may discourage investors coming into the markets, because the demand elasticity 
of financial services is evidenced to be high. The argument that the insurance scheme 
may increase investors' confidence in futures markets, and therefore. possibly liquidity of 
futures markets, may not be valid here. 
5.3.4 The future of futures regulation 
Futures markets and other financial markets have been experiencing rapid changes over 
the last decade, including rapid market and product innovations, rapidly increased trad-
ing volume (both on-exchange trading and OTe trading), much wider range of products, 
greater accessibility to either domestic or foreign markets, etc. Such changes clearly 
present substantial opportunities for the industry as well as for investors. But they also 
pose challenges both for the industry and regulators. From the industry perspecti \'e, 
the challenges are prinlarily competitive, 'while the implications for the regulators arc 
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far dramatic, which may involve greater co-ordination of regulatory efforts. regulatory 
convergence of different markets, changes in regulatory approach. Rapid changes in fu-
tures markets as well as other financial markets are mainly brought by the advancement 
of technology and increased globalisation. These changes affect both the scope and the 
depth of products and market places. They fostered a huge variety of products and ser-
vices, while the markets were shrunk in terms of accessibility and simultaneously market 
depth was expanded in terms of available offerings. In futures markets, one of the best 
illustrations of these has been the growth of electronic trading systems as an alterna-
tive to traditional exchange/auction or dealer-based trading systems.45 Many of these 
systems permit investors to deal directly with each other at lower costs than previous 
trading systems. Moreover, internet is introduced into the markets. In June 1997, the 
CFTC permitted futures brokers to make use of electronic media in communicating with 
their customers (to deliver monthly statements, trade confirmations and other account 
statements solely by electronic media to their customers). This step should increase the 
timeliness of information flows and benefit brokers and customers by enabling them to 
reduce their administrative costs. Technology and globalisation will inevitably bring the 
following results to futures markets: 
Firstly, there will be greater needs of regulatory convergence, both domestically and 
internationally. Innovation and technology have had one obvious effect: as it becomes 
harder and harder to draw lines among the players and services in financial markets, there 
will have to be greater regulatory co-ordination of regulatory efforts and co-operation 
among regulators. This requires: (i) each agency has access to the information necessary 
to fulfil its regulatory objectives; (ii) market participants subject to multiple regulations 
are not so overburdened that they become competitively disadvantaged; (iii) financial 
products, services and markets delivering similal' benefits and risks can be subject to 
45From 1989 to 1996, volume on electronic trading systems used by futures exchanges ,vas more than 
doubled, rising from 7 percent of the world's trading volume to 8 percent. The n~mbe.r of exchanges 
worldwide that use electronic systems in varying degrees to trade futures and optIOns lll.creased fr~m 
eight in 1990 to almost forty in 1997. See Sarker, A. and Tozzi, 1\1. (1998), Current Issues III EconomIcs 
and Finance, Vol. 4, No. 1. Federal Reserve Bank of New York. 
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equivalent regulation so that econorm' t't' h h . . d" lb' , c compe I IOn rat er t an JurIS IctlOna arrlers or 
differences in supervision can determine which products, services and markets succeed 
in the marketplace. The first two requirements may be better fulfilled by establishing 
unitary regulatory organisation covering all financial markets, products and participants, 
such as the UK's FSA. However, this does not exclude other possibilities of regulatory co-
operations. The convergence of regulation does not imply a uniform regulatory structure 
for all financial markets, as there are significant distinctions in the precise rationale for 
regulating different markets. This therefore requires the law should be modified to reflect 
distinctions of market failures between different financial markets. The last requirement 
urges, particularly in futures regulation, to extend the existing futures regulation to whole 
derivatives markets, whether relating to financial assets or obligations, foreign exchange, 
or agricultural or mineral commodities, whether forward contracts or other credit-risk-
determined instruments (interest rate and currency swaps, for example). This remains a 
tough task for the futures regulatory reform in both the US and the UK. Each regulator, 
however, has currently primary and pervasive control over entities within its jurisdiction, 
international co-operation presents more difficulties. We have been seeing the importance 
and steps of information sharing and regulatory convergence among international futures 
regulators. In the 1970s regulators concentrated on addressing fraudulent activities oc-
curring on a cross-border basis by entering bilateral memoranda of understanding. Recent 
extraterritorial events, such as the failure of Barings and the Sumitomo copper manipu-
lation, prompted more co-operations on multilateral basis, and produced the Declaration 
on Co-operation and Supervision of 1996,46 and the London Communique of 1996.47 But 
it is debatable to what extent international financial regulation should converge. Should 
46Barings event gave birth to the March 1996 Declaration on Co-operation and Supervision, which has 
bten signed by 20 regulators, and its companion agreement among self-regulatory organisation::;, which 
has been executed by 62 exchanges and clearing houses. 
47Following the Sumitomo event, the CFTC, SIB and the Ministry of Intern.ational Trade and Ind~s­
try of Japan co-sponsored the International Regulators Conference in London In Nove~ber 1996, whIch 
focused on the special problems that physical delivery markets pose for contra~t deSIgn, market .sur: 
veillance and international information sharing. The 17 participating regulators Issued a Commumque 
agTeeing on certain basic principles of regulation. 
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a single international regulator for global financial markets be desirable? \\'e doubt that 
the single regulator will be realised within any relevant time frame. And additionally. the 
existence of multiple regulators having different perspectives and regulatory philosophies 
may be advantageous. Whatever it may be argued, however, enhanced international co-
operation is highly possible and desirable, and this is the appropriate direction for future 
efforts. This implies that there will be a number of international standards or accepted 
parameters of futures regulation for example, the approved generic risk disclosure in the 
US and the UK, the proposed client position reporting system in the UK, etc. 
Secondly, the traditional regulatory philosophy needs to be changed. The faster pace 
of market and product innovations requires more flexible regulation, and an increased 
emphasis by regulators should be on objective oriented regulation rather than on the 
regulatory approach dictating specific process that the regulated must follow. This is 
a serious challenge facing futures regulators as well as other financial regulators. The 
difficulty lies in how to balance between the effective regulation and the flexibility that 
allows the market for services and the market for providers of services to continue to 
evolve. Moreover, the market and product innovations themselves make the markets 
and products particularly complex, which may pose additional difficulty for regulators. 
Such a bal8nce is critically important but very hard to attain. In order to realise this 
balance, it is essential for regulators to: (i) understand the fundamental economic theory 
of a market or market participants' behaviors, and how the behaviour of markets or 
participants are interacted; (ii) anticipate how a rule or an instrument of regulation 
affects long-run behaviors of markets or market participants; (iii) permit the regulated 
enough flexibility to comply with the regulation and to encourage best practice of the 
regulated. For example, the traditional funds-based approach of capital requirements 
does not meet very well the need to estimate accurately how much capital is required 
to protect the public and wider financial system from a firm's failure in today's market 
environment, where a firm's risk profiles are dramatically changed due to vast invoh"ement 
in sophisticated derivatives trading. Value-at-Risk Models (VaR), which have been firms' 
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internal risk management tool, have been used or proposed to be used as regulatory 
purposes in replacement of traditional capital requirement. This VaR approach, based 
on more sophisticated statistical risk management methodologies and modern option 
and portfolio theory, calculates a firm's capital requirement more flexible to reflect the 
size, scale, strategies of the firm, and creates incentives for a firm to seek better risk 
management policy. However, the Value-at-Risk rvlodels employed by firms are different, 
and it is therefore possible for different firms' models to produce significantly different 
Value-at-Risk numbers for the same portfolio. In order for this approach to be effective, 
regulators have to impose a number of key parameters, such as the observation period 
over which model relationships are calculated, the confidence level which is applied, the 
acceptability of correlation within or among product types, etc. 
5.4 Summary and Conclusions 
The rationale for futures regulation is to correct market failures or market imperfections in 
futures markets, some of which are different from other financial sectors. These differences 
warrant special consideration for the regulation of futures markets. Futures manipulation 
is one of the most serious market failures, which is essentially a special form of temporal 
monopoly of supply in futures markets. Susceptibility of manipulation in futures markets 
suggests futures manipulation should be a special concern in designing futures regulatory 
framework. Other types of market failures which exist in other financial markets, such 
as externalities, natural monopoly, and information asymmetry, still present in futures 
markets but are more or less different '{rom other financial sectors. , 
Self-regulatory organisations in futures markets, including futures exchanges, clearing 
houses, and industry associations, such as the NFA in the US, the SFA in the UK, nlay 
not have sufficient incentives to correct all types of market failures. Since under some 
circumstances, the private costs and benefits of self-regulatory organisations in correcting 
market failures are obviously divergent from social costs and benefits, for example, in 
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the case of futures manipulation. Therefore, external regulation in futures markets is 
justified. 
Approaches to regulating futures markets are different in the US and the UK. These 
differences exist both in the organisational structure and in the aspects of specific regu-
lation. Futures regulation in the US has been separated from regulating other financial 
markets, while financial services markets in the UK are regulated under the single statute 
(FSAct) and single body (FSA). Futures manipulation has been one of the greatest con-
cerns in futures regulation in the US since the start of formal Federal futures regulation 
in 1920s, while it does not appear to have been a significant objective of futures reg-
ulation in the UK. The UK's purpose to regulate financial services markets is mainly 
investor protection, and this approach seems to have followed the US model of securities 
regulation. Even with regard to investor protection, futures markets are different from 
those in securities markets since futures markets have their own characteristics. Some 
measures of investor protection in the UK, absent in the US futures regulation, such as 
the suitability requirement, prohibition of churning, and investor compensation scheme, 
appear to have little value and to be unenforceable, while adding significant costs to 
investors, and probably distorting competitiveness among dealer/brokers. 
It is necessary to carry out regulatory reforms in order to establish a possible cost-
effective futures regulatory system in the UK. These require: 
• The FSAct should be modified or legally interpreted to make futures manipula-
tion illegal explicitly, and some provisions should be established in order for the 
Financial Services Authority to fight against manipulation - these may include in-
troducing the large trader reporting system into UK and endowing the FSA with 
anti-lnanipulation firepowers. 
• Futures regulation should be extended extra-territorially, as did in the US. 
• Measures of investor protection should be reviewed, and some of them. in particll-
lar, the suitability rule, prohibition of churning, and investor insurance which an' 
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extremely expensive, less valuable and unenforceable in futures markets, should be 
removed. 
Futures regulation in the US requires urgent enforcement reform as well, especially in 
the case of manipulation. The element of intentionality should only be a factor in con-
sidf'ring the seriou3ness of the crime involved but not in determining the nature of crime. 
Nevertheless, manipulation is a form of economic offences, and intent should be econonl-
ically testable. At the same time, both regulatory systems are required to be refonned to 
meet the current and potential challenges in the futures markets, including rapid market 
and product innovations, rapidly increased trading volume, and globalisation. These irrl-
ply the requirements of greater co-ordination of regulatory efforts both domestically and 
internationally, regulatory convergence of different markets, and changes in regulatory 
approach. The recent UK merger of financial regulation into one single body - the FSA 
may enhance the efficiency of co-ordination, but domestic regulatory co-ordination in the 
US appears likely to be more problematic in the future reform. 
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Appendix: 
Futures regulatory frameworks in the US and the liK 
1. The US futures regulatory framework 
The Commodity Exchange Act and the Commodity Futures Trading Com-
mission Act The first legislation on future trading in the United States dated back to 
the adoption of the Grain Futures Act of 1922 (GFA). The GFA established a licensing 
system that requires commodity exchanges to be designated by the Federal Government 
(Department of Agriculture) as "contract markets", and sought to prevent price manip-
ulation by requiring exchanges to act to prevent such conduct. Although the GFA was 
subsequently replaced by the Commodity Exchange Act of 1936 (CEA) \vhich became 
the principal regulatory legislation of futures trading in the United States until 1974, it 
nevertheless formed the core of the regulatory framework. The "fundamental purpose" 
of the CEA was "to ensure fair practice and honest dealing on commodity exchanges and 
to provide some measure of control over these forms of speculative activity \"hich so often 
disrupts the markets to the damage of producers and consumers and even the exchanges 
themselves" . 48 
Since futures trading played an increasingly important role in the pricing and mar-
keting of US commodities, and futures markets extended to coffee, sugar, cocoa, lumber, 
plywood, precious metals, and markets in a number of foreign currencies, home mort-
gages, government securities, etc., where many of these markets were not covered by the 
CEA. Therefore, in 1974, the new legislation - the Commodity Futures Trading Commis-
sion Act (CFTCAct) was enacted. This legislation created an independent five-member 
regulatory commission - the Conlmodity Futures Trading Cornmjssion (CFTC). which 
was endowed with increased power for rule making and enforcement, and extended scope 
of jurisdiction over options and futures contracts. 
4BU.S. Congress, House, Amend Grain Futures Act, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 1934, H.R.Rept. 16'13. p.l. 
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The Commodity Futures Thading Commission The CFTC was established as an 
independent regulatory agency, comprising a chairman and four commissioners appointed 
by the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate. The purpose of the agency 
is to ensure the financial and market integrity of the US futures markets, and to pro-
tect market participants against manipulation, abusive trade practices, and fraud. Its 
responsibilities include: reviewing the terms and conditions of proposed new futures and 
options contracts; conducting daily market surveillance and, in an emergency. ordering 
an exchange to take specific action or to restore orderliness in any futures contract that is 
being traded; protecting customers by requiring companies and individuals who handle 
customer funds or give advice to apply for registration through the National Futures 
Association (NFA) , and by requiring registrants to disclose market risks and past per-
formance to perspective customers; monitoring registrant supervision systems, internal 
controls and sales practice compliance programs. The CFTC has five major operating 
units: the Division of Economic Analysis, whose responsibility is to ensure that markets 
remain competitive and responsive to underlying supply and demand factors by detect-
ing and protecting against price manipulation; the Division of Trading and :rvlarket~, 
which oversees the compliance activities of the commodity exchanges and the NFA; the 
Division of Enforcement, which is responsible for investigating and prosecuting alleged 
violations of the CFTC regulations; and the Office of the General Counsel, the Office of 
the Executive Director. 
Self-regulatory Organisations As a matter of policy, the CFTC has delegated much 
of its direct regulatory responsibilities to self-regulatory organisations whi~h are subject 
to the CFTC's oversight. Self-regulation in US futures markets is carried out by three 
types of self-regulatory organisations: futures exchanges, clearing houses and the NFA. 
Organised futures exchanges are membership organisations, and impose regulation on 
their members. Futures exchanges as self-regulatory organisations originated a century 
ago. They establish rules of conduct that ensure that futures trading takes place in a 
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manner that promotes inte t f b . res s 0 mem erships as a "whole. Exchange members com-
prising different commercial groups have diverse interests and motivations, and the rules 
and policies adopted by exchanges, are therefore expected to reflect these characteristics. 
Under the CFTCAct, a futures exchange will gain CFTC designation only if it demon-
strates that it can perform certain self-regulatory functions in pursuit of a wider public 
interest, and the exchange is required to demonstrate that futures contracts are not liable 
to manipulation. 
Futures clearing associations in the United States are also membership organisations 
and are almost all affiliated to the specific exchanges. They clear futures trades made on 
those exchanges, although their organisational structures may differ. 49 Clearing associa-
tions set minimum requirements for their members to maintain financial integrity of all 
clearing members which are, in turn, important in determining margin requirements for 
non-clearing members. Unlike futures exchanges, no specific statutory requirements are 
imposed on clearing associations. 
Because the reach of futures exchange or clearing association self-regulation is limited 
to its members, non-member futures professionals may escape scrutiny. The CFTC cre-
ated the National Futures Association in 1981, which is mainly responsible for these kinds 
of regulatory responsibilities. As a self-regulatory organisation authorised by the CFTC, 
the NFA requires firms and individuals who conduct futures-related business with the 
public to apply for registration and membership with the NFA. The NFA has extensive 
rules governing the conduct of its categorised members: Futures Commission Merchants 
(FCJ\lIs), Introducing Brokers (IBs), Commodity Pool Operators (CPOs), Commodity 
Trading Advisors (CTAs) and Associated Persons (APs). The NFA sets standards and 
conducts proficiency tests for all categories of members. The NFA's rules for members 
include the conduct of sales and nlarketing, treatment of customer funds, execution of 
customers orders, and the adequacy of record keeping and reporting. The CEA further 
49For a discussion of clearing associations, see Edwards, F. R. (1984), the Clearing Association in 
Futures Markets: Guarantor and Regulator, in Anderson ed., The Industrial Organisation of Flltures 
Markets, Chapter 7, pp.225-54. 
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stipulates that no NFA member may do business with any firm or indi\"idual \\-ho is not 
an NFA member. To avoid overlap regulatory organisation, each market professional has 
a primary self-regulatory organisation, referred as a 'designated self-regulatory organisa-
tion' (DSRO). NFA is the DSRO for CTAs and CPOs and for FCMs and IBs that are 
not member firms of a contract market. But all market professionals except Floor Bro-
kers (FBs) and Floor Traders (FTs) must be members of the NFA. In essence, the NFA 
assumes some regulatory responsibilities of the CFTC, and shows a significant increased 
responsibility in regard to investor protection matters.50 
Discussion of the US regulatory regime naturally extends to the Securities and Ex-
change Commission (SEC), another federal regulatory agency which has jurisdiction over 
the trading of securities and investment contracts in interstate commerce, including the 
operations of investment management companies organised under the laws of the US or 
a US state, and the US activities of foreign investment management companies, since in 
some futures-related transactions SEC regulations also may apply. This gives rise to con-
flicts and disputes in jurisdiction between the CFTC and the SEC. The major conflicts 
arise from the CFTC's exclusive jurisdiction on certain financial instrument options and 
stock index futures contracts. Although the CFTC and the SEC reached an accord in 
1982, in which the CFTC dropped its claim to exclusive jurisdiction over foreign currency 
and debt securities options and its rights to a few specific futures contracts in exchange 
for SEC recognition of CFTC authority over derivative contracts not exempted by the 
accord, the two agencies clashed again soon after the accord (Kane 1984, pp.378-80). Fu-
tures regulation also relates to the Federal Reserve Board ("Fed") in relation to margin 
requirements on futures contracts. The CFTC has no authority to review futures con-
tract margin rules employed by exchanges except for the power to establish temporary 
emergency margin levels. Instead, the "Fed" is empowered under securities laws as the 
margin authority. The "Fed" has asserted, but has not attempted to exercise authority to 
50NFA began operation with memberships in 1982, started to register IBs and APs i~l 1983, and 
extended its cover to the other member registration in 1984. In 1986, the NFA was authonsed to deny. 
revoke, condition, restrict and suspend registrations for all member categories. 
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prescribe margin requirements for futures on stock indices. Potential conflicts on margin 
rules in futures markets may arise, but ha\"e not been tested. Common practice is that 
exchanges inform the "Fed" of their intended margin requirements, and the "Fed" in 
turn has taken the view the margin levels in futures markets appear adequate (Anderson 
1986, p.45). 
2. The futures regulatory framework in the UK 
The Financial Services Act The legal framework for the regulation of futures n1ar-
kets as well as other investment business in the UK was established with the passage 
of the Financial Services Act (FSAct) in 1986. The scope of the FSAct is enormOllS, 
covering the activities of all securities dealers, brokers, pension funds, investment and 
unit trusts, futures and options traders, investment managers and financial ad\'isers as 
well as some activities carried on by banks and life insurance companies. The Act also 
establishes criteria for the recognition of investment exchanges and clearing houses. Prior 
to the FSAct, the regulation of futures markets was informal, and was typically based 
on self-regulation of exchanges. Regulation of some investment business was covered in 
certain aspects by the Prevention of Frauds Investments Act 1958 (PFI), the Companies 
Acts and the Thefts Acts 1968 and 1978, but the PFI was not generally applicable to 
futures trading. 51 
The FSAct followed the publication of Gower Report, which in turn was prompted 
by the financial failure of a number of financial businesses. The concern of the Gower 
Report was investor protection: and the objective of the FSAct was to correct deficiencies 
in existing legislation relating to inyestor protection. The regulatory tasks set by the 
FSAct are authorisation of investment business, rule making and enforcement. Under 
the FSAct institutions undertaking investment business in the UK require authorisation 
51 813 of the Prevention of Frauds Investment Act 1958 provided that inducing or attempting to 
induce another person to enter into an agreement for the acquisition or disposal of securities by means 
of misleading statements was a criminal offence subject to a term of seven years' imprisonment, but 
futures contracts were clearly not "securities:' for the purposes of this section. 
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or exemption. Firms will be authorised only if they satisfy various criteria including: run 
and controlled by persons 'fit and proper'; provision of 'sufficient' capital: separation of 
their own funds from those of clients; compliance with rules regarding the \\·ay in which 
business is conducted. Many institutions are required to be covered through the In\·estor 
Compensation Schemes. 
Powers were vested by the FSAct in the Secretary of State (the relevant department 
being originally the DTI, and subsequently the Treasury), some of which powers could be 
delegated to a 'designated agency', the Securities and Investment Board (SIB). In turn, 
the SIB has recognised a number of self-regulating organisations (SROs), exchanges and 
clearing houses52 which carry out much of the day-to-day regulation of firms involved in 
investment business. 
The Securities and Investment Board (SIB) and The Financial Services Au-
thority (FSA) Under the terms of the FSAct, regulatory powers was delegated to 
the Securities and Investment Board, which is a private body financed by charges levied 
on the investment industry. The main purpose of the SIB was not to directly regulate 
individual firms but rather to monitor self-regulatory organisations (SROs). The SIB's 
main role was that of certifying that the SROs' rule books are, at a minimum, consistent 
with the aims of the Act and that arrangements for monitoring compliance with those 
rule books were adequate. The SIB established ten principles and a set of core rules on 
conduct of business,53 which form the essential spine of the UK regulatory system for the 
conduct of investment business. The rulebooks of SROs were required to be consistent 
with these essential principles. It was intended that, the authorisation criteria and rules 
52SROs in the UK are currently Investment Management Regulatory Organisation (IMRO), Personal 
Investment Authority (PIO) and Securities aud Fmures Authority (S?A); Six RIEs are the London 
Stock Exchange (LSE), the London Metal Exchange (LME), the London International Financial Futures 
Exchange (LIFFE), International Petroleum Exchange (IPE), Tradepoint Financial Network and th\' 
Options Markets (OM London Ltd). The RCHs are mainly the London Clearing House Ltd (LCH) and 
the CrestCo. 
53The Securities and Investment Board (1991), Principles and Core Rules for the Conduct of 17It,C'·;t-
mfnt Business, January 1991. 
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directly adopted by the SIB sh ld b b . . . ou ecome enchmarks or more preClsely IDllllma mod-
els to which the rules of SROs would have to conform. In October 1997, the SIB \Va;:; 
renamed to the Financial Services Authority (FSA), the single financial regulator in the 
UK. The FSA not only is responsible for supervising banks, listed money market insti-
tutions and related clearing houses which were originally part of responsibility with the 
Bank of England, but also acquire the regulatory and registration functions current Iv ex-
ercised by the SROs, the DTI Insurance Directorate, the Building Societies Commission. 
the Friendly Societies Commission, and the Registry of Friendly Societies. The FSA will 
not assume the second part of responsibilities until the enactment of a proposed financial 
regulatory reform bill (expected to be late 1999). Before that, the other constituent bod-
ies will continue to have legal responsibility for regulating their firms under the original 
statutory or contractual arrangements. We therefore sometimes still refer to the original 
names in the description of the UK futures regulation in the text, snch as the SIB, SFA, 
etc. 
Securities and Futures Authority (SFA), Recognised Investment Exchanges 
(RIEs) and Recognised Clearing Houses (RCHs) Under the terms of the FSAct 
all institutions undertaking investment business were to be monitored by one of the SROs, 
or the SIB. The principal regulator of futures business was the Securities and Futures 
Authority.54 Although a number of exclusions under the FSAct exist, there is none which 
is of general relevance to an UK-based futures dealers, brokers, managers or advisors. 
Therefore, authorisation is almost certainly required, and the SIB had the sanction of 
refusing to recognise any SRO, including the SFA. The SFA was a private body funded 
by, and generally run by practitioners. Although it did not have any direct powers under 
the Act except to sanction members ~ho do not comply with its rules and ultimately to 
expel them, any futures business that is designated as an investment business tmder t IH' 
54The original SRO for futures business was the Association of Futures Brokers and Dealers (AFBDl 
which was founded in 1984, and a merger of AFBD and The Securities Association (TSA) formed the 
SFA. 
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terms of the FSAct has to be a member of SFA or directly authorised by the SIB. 
The SFA developed its rulebook, including principles and the conduct of business 
(COB) rules. A number of rules were specifically aimed at 'deri\ratives' or 'contingent 
liability' transactions, including rules on risk warnings, customer agreements, suitability. 
dealing rules, client money, information disclosure, unsolicited calls, advertising, etc. The 
extent of regulation differs between on and off-exchange transactions, private and non-
private customers, margined and non-margined contracts. and hedging and speculation. 
The SFA in the UK plays an analogous role to that of the NFA in the US: both are the 
self-regulatory organisations in the two respective countries, but the legal status of these 
two SROs is different. The NFA is explicitly recognised by the Statue (CFTCAct), \\·hile 
the SFA was designated by the SIB. Additionally, membership with the NFA is required 
for most categories of futures business, but the SFA did not have such a monopoly power 
for membership registration in futures related business.55 
Because futures transactions are deemed to be investment business, a futures ex-
change has to be recognised under the FSAct Schedule 4. The main requirements include 
ensuring that the exchange has sufficient financial resources for proper performance of 
its function; the exchange'S affairs are conducted in an orderly manner in order to offer 
proper protection to its investors; the exchange has adequate arrangements and resources 
for the effective monitoring and enforcement of compliance with its rules and any clearing 
arrangements made by it and rules of complaint hearing. An additional requirement, de-
fault rule, is added in order for an exchange to be recognised by the Companies Act 1989 
Schedule 21. An argument against the emphasis on investor protection is that London 
futures markets are'traditionally dominated by professional interests, unlike the active 
participation of individual speculators in the US markets. Upon a closer analysis, this 
argument is not persuasive. The functions of futures markets are the same, and the nlar-
kets themselves should not be different in nature, while recent developments in London 
55Some institutions can directly seek anthorisation from the SIB, while some may be authorised to 
engage in futures business by the rule of main line of business. 
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markets show the intention of encouragement of small investors into the markets. 
The London Clearing House Limited (LCH) is a major recognised clearing house in 
the UK which acts under the FSAct. Unlike the situation in the US. the LCH acts as an 
independent clearing house to clear contracts for several exchanges, including LIFFE. the 
LME, the IPE, and Tradepoint Financial Ketworks. To be a recognised clearing house, 
LCH must comply with Section 39 of the FSAct and the rules of the SIB. Its objecti\"es 
are to provide a secure, efficient clearing service to its members and the London exchanges 
on which they trade, and to protect the integrity of those exchange markets by acting as 
central counterparty and guarantor. The LCH ownership was transferred from banks to 
the clearing membership in 1996. To be eligible for membership of the LCH, firms must 
have not only an exchange clearing membership or memberships, but also the regulatory 
authorisation appropriate both to their overall activities and to their function in the 
cleared markets. 56 
The Treasury has ultimate responsibility for the operation of the FSAct, for which 
it is answerable to the Parliament, although it delegated most of its functions to the 
SIB57 (the FSA in the near future). The Treasury monitored whether the SIB meets 
the statutory requirements in relation to its qualifications as the delegated agency, the 
principles applicable to its rules and regulations, and ultimately has the power to assume 
all of the functions of the SIB. Futures regulation in the UK also involves other regulatory 
authorities, especially the Office of Fair Trading (OFT), the Serious Frauds Office (SFO), 
and Department of Trading and Industry (DTI). The OFT is responsible under statute for 
reviewing anti-competition practices in goods and services markets in the UK in general. 
In futures markets, this implies a continuous commitment by the OFT in reviewing anti-
competitive effects in rules or arrangements of prospective or existing SROs, investment 
exchange~ or cleari~g houses. The SFO is responsible for bringing prosecutions under 
the FSAct in the UK, but is usually limited to prosecuting cases which appear to the 
56London Clearing House, Market Protection, 1st edition, December 1996: . . 
57 However , the Treasury retained some functions. for example. the recogmtlOll of overseas lIl\'('stment 
exchanges. 
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Director to involve serious or complex cases, usually involve sums over £2 million. The 
DTI under the Companies Act 1985 has wide-ranging pmyers to investigate the affairs of 
the company concerned, however, in major cases of financial fraud, the first step is often 
the investigation by the DTI. Following the implementation of the European directiYes 
relating to investment services, responsibility for the supervision of certain European 
firms conducting investment business in the UK is shared with the relevant domestic, or 




Commodity futures markets have been evolving since the mid-nineteenth century in the 
United States, and manipulation has been one of major concern in the development of 
futures trading. However, the issues of whether manipulation is an equilibrium phenom-
enon and the nature and extent of the effects of manipulation are, at least as a matter of 
theory, still controversial. The rationale for futures (derivatives) regulation has therefore 
not been well understood. In response to these calls, this thesis has attempted to investi-
gate, theoretically the vulnerability of a commodity futures market to manipulation and 
factors affecting this vulnerability, empirically the economic effects of futures manipula-
tion, and explored the implications of these results for futures regulation. The central 
conclusion of this research is that, commodity futures manipulation can occur in equi-
librium under rather weak conditions: the first is that the supply of physical deliverable 
assets is less than perfectly elastic; the second is that there exists asymmetric informa-
tion in futures trading. The first condition prevails for most commodity markets and the 
latter condition essentially results from the attractive features of futures trading itself. 
This result is still robust in a dynamic setting even if other traders trade strategically, 
although manipulation may occur less frequently compared with the static model. t-.lore 
important, manipulation adversely affects the functioning of a futures market: it not only 
reduces the accuracy of price discovery of a futures lllarkeL but also discourages hed~-
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lng. Therefore, we argued that manipulation should be one of major concerns in futures 
regulation. These results may be potentially extended to other derivatives markets. 
In a simple Bayesian-Nash game developed in Chapter 2. we derived that the suffi-
cient conditions for the existence and non-existence of futures manipulation strategies 
and identified the importance of informational asymmetry and its associated ad\"erse se-
lection problem in determining the susceptibility of a futures Inarket to manipulation. 
Our analytical results demonstrated that manipulation affects the functioning of a futures 
market adversely. Manipulation distorts the relationship between futures price and the 
future cash price through its effects on traders' expectations, and futures price cannot 
be an unbiased estimate of the expected cash price anymore from the point vie\\' of other 
traders or market observers except the market makers. Typically, long manipulation 
increases the equilibrium futures price and discourages hedging activities. In Chapter 
3, we moved further to examine the robustness of the results derived from the simple 
Bayesian-Nash game by extending the game setting to a dynamic context. \ Ve demon-
strated that manipulation can still occur in equilibrium, but may occur less frequently. 
since other traders' learning process by observing some publicly available information 
may constrain the large trader's behavior to a certain extent. One interesting result 
from the introduction of the variable of exogenous market uncertainty into the dynamic 
system was that the large trader will behave less aggressively and the adverse effects of 
manipulation will be lessened, since the large trader has to take this risk into consid-
eration when he chooses his trading strategies. This finding may provide justifications 
for certain anti-manipulation rules currently imposed by either exchanges or regulators, 
such as trading for liquidation only, trading halts, allowing shorts to default. etc. 
This thesis also empirically examined the economic effects of the alleged SUlnitomo 
copper manipulation on the LME, and the result supported our theoretil'al analysis. 
Vve found that the manipulation not only affected the relationships between futures price 
and the futures cash price through its effects on traders' expectations, but also infiuen('l)d 
the basis and basis risk. These undermined the proper functioning of the L\ IE copper 
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market. Additionally, we employed a simple VAR approach to investigate whether the 
alleged Sumitomo manipulation influenced the LME cash prices. \Ve found that the 
actual LME prices were generally above the forecast prices during the period of alleged 
mani pulation. 
From our analytical results and empirical analysis, manipulation has important policy 
implications for futures regulation, i.e., manipulation should be one of the major con-
cerns in regulating futures trading. Our policy recommendations for regulation against 
futures manipulation include, statuary prohibition of manipulation and a three-element 
anti-manipulation framework: a large client position reporting system. a more rigorous 
ex post prosecution methodology and certain amount of emergency anti-manipulation 
firepower by regulators. To our judgement, this approach to regulating against futures 
manipulation may be more cost-effectively justified than the current US system. Manip-
ulation clearly motivated futures regulation in the US, but has not been the basis for any 
legislative and regulatory concern in the UK. We therefore explored specifically how more 
cost-effective futures regulation may be achieved in the UK. The measures we proposed 
include, modifying the FSAct or reinterpreting the relevant provisions of the FSAct (by 
a designated regulatory body or English courts) to make statuary prohibition of futures 
manipulation; establishing an effective anti-manipulation framework; and revising some 
seemingly costly and unenforceable investor protection rules. Moreover, recent trends in 
futures trading, including globalisation, continuously increased size and scope of futures 
trading, and the fast growth rate of OTe trading compared with on-exchange trading 
also challenge futures regulation in an important way. It is predictable that there will be 
greater regulatory convergence on financial regulation in the future, both domestically 
and internationally. The implications for regulation against manipulation are also far-
reaching. Since manipulation scheilles may become more complicated, coordination of 
strategies in different markets or using instruments may become more siInple and wide-
spread, effective regulation against manipulation may therefore require greater expertise 
and greater domestic as well as international regulatory cooperation. 
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This research is by no means exhausted. Many unsettled questions in this field await 
further research. For example, equilibrium analysis of futures manipulation \\'ith se\'eral 
large traders, or one or several large hedgers with market power in a market; inves-
tigations of manipulation schemes through co-ordinating strategies in options markets. 
futures markets and OTC markets; examinations of manipulation strategies in more 
general futures markets, such as interest rates futures and stock index futures, etc. IvIa-
nipulation has been reported and modeled on the US Treasury securities market (see. 
for example, Cornell and Shapiro 1989, Jegadeesh 1993, Chatterjea and Janow 1998), 
and its potential in financial futures markets with cash settlement was investigated by 
Kumar and Seppi (1992). Of course, the mechanisms involved in manipulation in these 
markets may be greatly different from that in commodity futures markets, bnt the effect s 
of these manipulations nevertheless require an analysis. These questions are important 
for restructuring the futures (derivatives) regulatory system. We cannot expect to resolve 
all these questions in this research. Nevertheless, we hope this thesis may stinlulate in-
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